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MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES.
AIR SURRENDER DOCUMENTS

 

 

Prepared by: HQ. M.A.A.F. Intelligent Section (US)

FOREWORD

In the next few years there will be many appraisals of the contribution of air power to this greatest of all historic struggles, and it is with this in mind that the present compilation of documents as future source material has been made.
The reports included are of a variety of types, but all of them contain statements concerning the effects of air power on the German War Machine by German officers and officials who were in positions where the impact of air power could best be estimated. No attempt has been made to "edit" the material included; intelligence reports and newspaper accounts alike have been presented exactly as they were submitted.
The latter section of this compilation has been devoted to a handy reference in which the more important statements have been indexed by subject.

PART I. INTERVIEWS

TAB A. APPRAISAL OF ALLIED AIR FORCE EMPLOYMENT

By
GENERAL VON VIETINGHOFF (Translation)

Commander in Chief, Southwest (High Command, Army Group C) Ia (Operations)

APPRAISAL OF ALLIED FORCE EMPLOYMENT

1) Period from the Landing at Anzio to 9 April 1945

a) Overall Disruption of Communications

Through attack against important points, road traffic was made much more difficult. The ceaseless use of fighter-bombers succeeded in paralyzing all day-time movement and through this alone the tactical counter-measures became of secondary importance. In general, air attacks against bridges interrupted traffic only temporarily. In about 50% of the cases the bridges were so damaged in the first attack, end the remainder in subsequent attacks, that they could no longer be used. Destroyed bridges in every case brought a hampering of communications, but were never able to cripple them, for in the Po plain, above all, there were sufficient auxiliary routes provided in the secondary roads. Good air raid warning and air raid shelter on all the main roads limited losses and accidents considerably.

b) Air Attacks on Rail Targets

Rail traffic was struck in the most protracted fashion by the destruction of bridges. Restoration of bridges required much time; the larger bridges could not be repaired. As improvisation, many bridge sites were detoured or the supplies were reloaded. With the increasing intensity of the air attacks, especially on the stretch of the Brenner, the damaged sections were so great and so numerous that this stretch, despite the best of repair organization and the employment of the most powerful rebuilding effort, became ever worse and was only ever locally and temporarily usable. A few bad weather days, in which the Allied Air Force could not have flown, would often have sufficed to bring the traffic again to its peak. Only in February and March was it again possible to travel by rail through the Brenner to Bologna.

c) Air Attacks on the Battlefield

By heavy attacks prior to 9 April the bomber units were able to smash even strongly fortified areas and to cut them off for the first moment. The actual losses, however, were not too high in the last analysis. In special mass carpet bombing in open terrain, for example at Anzio, many were buried alive. In cities such as Cassino the remains of houses and barricaded streets offered good opportunities for battle for on opponent schooled in close-range combat (for example, 1 FS Rifle Division) especially against the enemy armor. The fighter-bomber pilots had a genuinely damaging effect. They hindered practically all essential movement at the focal points. Even the radio and telephone communications were delayed threefold. Local reserves, which should have been moved by day, often arrived with great delay at the ordered position. Even the tanks could move only at night because of the employment of fighter-bombers ; however, the actual losses were few. The effectiveness of the fighter-bombers lay in that their presence alone over the battlefield paralyzed every movement. The artillery-spotting pilots were unpleasant as well. Their mere presence enforced silence upon our artillery. Each soldier felt himself observed and recognized by the artillery-spotting pilot, even when this was not the case. In this manner, in decisive phases of the battle, the center of gravity of our defense, the artillery, fell away. Our light, medium and heavy artillery in the front lines had few casualties from air attacks, especially, from those of light bombers.

2) Period from 9 April 1945 until the Capitulation

From the 9th to the 20th of April was the period of the most effective employment of the Allied Air Force. In the attack on Senio fortifications the number of casualties was increased by the dropping of numerous small-caliber fragmentation bombs. Especially in the region of Ferrara and Lake Commacchio the resistance of the troops was greatly reduced and communications and command were disrupted as never before. Through the destruction of almost all crossings of the numerous canals trans-shipment was made much more difficult and we had to leave much heavy equipment behind. The smashing of all communications connections was especially disastrous. Thereafter the orders failed to come through £t all or failed to come through at the right time. In any case, the command was not able to keep itself informed of the situation on the front, so that its own decisions and commands came, for the most part, too late. The air attack on the Headquarters of Army Group C on the 20th of April 1945 at Recoaro inflicted only slight damage, for the most necessary command positions had already been made bomb-proof. The crossings of the Reno and the Po were decisively influenced by the employment of the Allied Air Forces. The smashing of almost all ferries and bridges made an ordered retreat across the Po no longer possible. The troops amassed at the crossing points end often had to swim to the other bank without heavy weapons. After the 20th of April less use was made of the Air Force. In considering the most important effects of Allied air power, the morale effect upon the German troops must not be underestimated. However, it was here decisive in that, as a result of their complete lack of an air force of their own, without the promise of the help of a like force, the troops felt still more the enemy's superiority of materiel.
Commander in Chief, Southwest
v. Vietinghoff
General
Translation by:
L. Gerdine
1st Lieutenant, AC.

TAB B. BEURTEILUNG DES ALLIIERTEN LUFTWAFFENEINSATZES

By GENERAL VON VIETINGHOFF (Original)

Der Oberbefenhlshaber Suedwest (Oberkommando Heeresgruppe C)
Ia
H.Qu., den 10.5.1945

BEURTEILUNG DES ALLIIERTEN LUFTWAFFENSINSATZES:

1) Zeitraum von Landung bei Anzio - 9.4.45

a) Allgemeine Verkehrsbehinderung:

Bei schwerpunktmaessigem Einsatz wurde Strassenverkehr stark erschwert. Die ununterbrochene Jabotaetigkeit fuehrte dazu, dass tagsueber keine Bewegungen stattfinden konnten; die taktischen Massnahmen gerieten dadurch schon allein stark in die Hinterhand. Im allgemeinen unterbrachen Luftangriffe auf Bruecken den Verkehr nur voruebergehend. Etwa zu 50% wurden die Bruecken bei erstem Angriff, im uebrigen erst bei mehrmahligen Angriffen so zerstoert, dass sie nicht mehr benuetzt werden konnten. Zerstoerte Bruecker, brachten in jedem Fall Verkehrsbehinderung, vermochten aber in keinem Fall den Vorkehr lahmzulegen, da vor allem in Po-Ebene genuegend Auswoichmoeglichkeiten auf Nebenstrassen vorhanden ware Gute Fliegerwarnung und Deckungsloecher an allen wichtigen Strassen schraenkten Verluste und Ausfaelle wesentlich ein.

k) Luftangriffe auf Eisenbahnobjekte:

Am nachhaltigsten wurde der Eisenbahnverkehr durch Zerstoerung vo Bruecken getroffen. Instandsetzungen von Bruecken erforderten sehr viel Zeit, groossere Bruecken konnten ueberhaupt nicht mehr repariert werden. Als Aushilfe wurden vielfach Brueckensteilen umgangen odor an den unterbrochenen Stellen die Versorgungsgueter umgeschlagen. Mit zunehmender Verdichtung der Luftangriffe, insbesondere auf die Brennerstrocke, wurden die Schaedon so gross und zahlreich, dass diese Strecke trotz bester Instandsetzungsorganisation und Einsatz starker Baukraefte immer mehr absank und nur noch zeitlich und oertlich kurzbefristet betrieben werden konnte. Wenige Schlechtwettertage, an denen die alliierte Luftwaffe nicht fliegen konnte, genuegten jedoch haeufig, um den Verkehr wiedor die Hoche zu bringen. Selbet im Februar und Maorz gelang es noch wiederholt, mit der Eisenbahn durchgehend vom Brenner bie Bologna zu fahren.

c) Luftangriffe auf dem Gefechtsfeld:

Bei Grossangriffen vor dem 9.4. konnten die Bomberverbaende zwar starke Stellungsteile zerschlagen und fuer den ersten Augenblick ausschalten. Die tatsaechlichen Verluste waren jedoch letzten Endes immer nicht allzu hoch. Bei besonders massierten Bombenteppichen im freien Celaende, zum Beispiel Anzio gab es viele Verschucttete. In Staedtcn wie Cassino boten dagegen die entstan denen Haeuserschaeden und Strassenversperrungon gute Kampfmoeglic! keiten fuer einen im Nahkampf geschulten Gegner (z.B. l.FS.Jg.Div besonders gegen die gegnerischen Panzer. Die Schlachtflieger wirkten sich wesentlich nachteiliger aus. Sie behinderten praktisch bie Tage an den Brennpunkten alle Bewegungen wesentlich. Selbst der Meldeverkehr verzoegerto sich oft um das dreifache. Oertliche Reserven, die bei Tag bewegt werden sollten, kamen haeufig mit grosser Verspaetung an den befohlenen Zielen an. Die eigenen Panzer konnten sich bei starker Schlachtfliegertaetigkeii nur bei Macht bewegen, die tatsaechlichen Verluste waren jedoch gering. Die Wirkung der Schlachtflieger lag darin, dass sie allein durch ihre Anwesenheit ueber dem Gefechtsfeld jede Bewegung erstarren liessen.

Auch Artl.-Flieger waren sehr unangenehm. Schon durch ihre Anwesenheit zwangen sie eigene Artillerie zum Schweigen. Jeder fuehlte sich von Artl.-Flieger beobachtet und erkannt, auch wenn dies nicht der Fall war. Dadurch fiel in entscheidenden Kampf-phasen der Schwerpunkt der eigenen Abwehr, die Artillerie, aus. Die im Frontgebiet eingesetzte leichte, mittlere und schwere Flakartillerie hatte durch Angriffe besonders der leichten Kampfflugzeuge nur wenige Ausfaelle.

2) Zeitraum vom 9,4.45 bis zur Kapitulation:

Am wirkungsvollsten war der alliierte Luftwaffeneinsatz in der Zeit vom 9.4 - 20.4.45.

Bei Angriff auf Senio-Stellung erhocht sich die Zahl der Ausfaelle erheblich durch Abwurf zahlreicher kleinkaübriger"Splittorbombon. Besonders im Gebiet von Ferrara und am Comraacchio-Seo wurde die Ab-wohrkraft der Truppe stark herabgesetzt, Verkehr und Fuehrung wie ni zuvor behindert.

Durch Zerstoerung nahezu aller Ucbergaenge ueber die zahlreichen Kanzele waren die eigenen Absetzbewegungen sehr erschwert und musstc viel schweres Geraet zurueckbleiben.

Besonders nachteilig wirkte sich die Zerschlagung nahozu aller Nachrichtenverbindungen aus. Dadurch kamen die Befehle nicht mehr oder nicht mehr rechtzeitig nach unten durch. Ebenso konnte die Fuehrung nicht rechtzeitig ueber die Lage an der Front unterrichtet werden, sodass die eigenen Entschluesse und Befehle meistens zu spaet kamen. Der Luftangriff auf das Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe C am 2o.4.45 in Recoaro hatte nur geringe Nachteile gebricht, da die noetigsten Fuehrungsanlagen schon vorher bombensicher untergebracht waren. Der Uebergang ueber den Reno und Po war entscheidend durch den Einsatz der alliierten Luftwaffe beeinflusst. Durch Zerschlagung fast aller Faehrstellon und Bruecken war eine planmaessige Zurueckfuehrung uebe. den Po nicht mehr moeglich. Die Truppe staute sich an den Uebersetz stellen und musstc haeufig ohne schwere Wäffen schwimmend das andere Flussufer erreichen.

Nach dem 20.4.45 Hess der Luftwaffeneinsatz nach.

Ueber die tatsaechliche Wirkung der alliierten Luftwaffe hinaus war die moralische V/irking auf die deutsche Truppe nich zu unter-schaetzen. Jedoch war hierbei entscheidend, dass durch das voelligo Fehlen einer eigenen Luftwaffe die Truppe das Uebergewicht des feindlichen Materials noch mehr fuehlte, ohne dass Aussicht bestand, ihr mit gleichen Mitteln helfen zu koennen.

Der Oberbefehlshaber Suedwest v. Vietinghoff Generaloberst

TAB C. AIR POWER DOOMED REICH, RUNDSTEDT SAYS

by LOUIS P. LOCHNER

AIR POWER DOOMED REICH, RUNDSTEDT SAYS: FEEHLS SURE HITLER DIDN'T KILL HIMSELF
By Louis P. Lochner

With United States Seventh Army, May 4, 1945 (AP), Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, admitting complete German defeat, said today he regarded air power as the most decisive factor in the Reich's military failure,
Wearing his marshal's uniform with the Knight's Cross of tire Iron Cross and other decorations, the defeated former German commander in the West received correspondents in a chateau where he is held prisoner. Von Rundstedt said these were the other factors in Germany's defeat, in order:
1. Lack of fuel, both oil and gasoline
2. Destruction of the railway system
3. Germany's loss of raw material areas such as Romania,
4. Smashing of the home industrial sections such as Silesia and Saxony by air attacks.
Bowing stiffly to the correspondents, Von Rundstedt seated himself on a big sofa and replied to every question put.
He said in his opinion Hitler is dead, but not by suicide. He expressed belief the Fuehrer might have died in Berlin.
Nervously puffing at an unlighted cigarette he then said:

Praises Allied Leaders

1, American generals are surprisingly good, as is Marshal Montgomery of the British Army. They have learned much since the First World War.
2. The D-Day invasion came as a surprise, both regarding the exact time and locality, although the locality chosen had figured among German calculations.
3. The Western Allied armies made as successful a war of movement on Germany as the Reich made on France in 1940.
4, The so-called Von Rundstedt counteroffensive in the Ardennes last December was ordered by Hitler with the Field Marshal the scapegoat». It was Germany's last and only chance to avert disaster. It would have succeeded if supplies and reserves could have been brought up as quickly as General Patton could move up from the south.
5, Germany fights on solely because all utterances, both in the east and west, indicate that it is a fight for existence.
6. Germany would have won in 1940 except for British certainty that the United States would help.
7. However, no serious attempt was made in 1940 to invade England since experimental jabs showed the German water transport and fleet protection were inadequate.
After answering the first question regarding Hitler, Von Rundstedt commented: "Before I say anything else I must begin with a personal remark. I'm not a prisoner by choice. I was taken by force of arms from a military hospital. I should never have yielded myself voluntarily. That would have been the most despicable thing an officer could do. I would have resisted, weapon in hand,"

Suicide Not in character for Hitler

Regarding Hitler's death he said he had not heard the radio for days since the electric current had been cut off at his hospital, but: "I feel satisfied, however, that the Fuehrer is dead. Either he was wounded and died as a result of these wounds and possibly even fell fighting, or he died under the impact of the pressure of events upon his soul. Never, never will I believe he put an end to his own life. That was not in accordance with his nature.
Regarding the theory that Hitler might still be alive and in hiding, Von Rundstedt said« "Impossible, That would not be according to his character as I know it. Anyway, where would he go?"
When asked why Hitler did not make a last stand in the Berchtesgaden area, the Marshall said; "The most menacing threat to the Reich always has been Bolshevism. The Fuehrer therefore went to the point of greatest danger, namely Berlin. The effect of that fact on Berliners must not be underestimated. He might have conducted Berlin's defense and the war generally by radio and telephone from Berchtesgaden but he was a brove man who never thought of his own security."
Hitler, he claimed, was a "great strategist, his intuitions were good." One had a feeling throughout the interview that in this build-up for the Fuehrer, Von Rundstedt was deeply conscious that he was facing enemy reporters before whom the Hitler legend must be preserved.
Asked just when the war was lost, Von Rundstedt made a general rather than a specific answer.

Panzers, Luftwaffe Starved for Oil

"It is hard to fix the exact moment but generally it can be said we were poor in material. Accordingly, three factors defeated us in the West where I was in command. First, the unheard of superiority of your air force which made all movement in daytime impossible. Second, the lack of motor fuel - oil and gas so that the Panzers and the remaining Luftwaffe were unable to move. Third, the systematic destruction of a railway communications so that it was impossible to bring one single railway train across the Rhine. This made impossible the reshuffling of troops and robbed us of all mobility.
"Our production was greatly interfered with by loss of Silesia and bombardments of Saxony as well as by loss of the oil reserves of Romania."
Someone asked: "But why did you defend the western bank of the Rhine instead of the eastern?" "I was not in command at that time/ the Marshal replied, "but from a general military viewpoint, one defends every inch of one's homeland. You would not retreat to the Rocky Mountains in the event of invasion but would defend the East."
For similar reasons, northern Italy was defended so as to keep the enemy from Germany and especially to make the Allies' air forces' flying time and distance longer, he added. There also were political considerations involved, namely, to keep Mussolini in line, he said.

Was Scapegoat in Ardennes Offensive

Coming to the December offensive in the so-called bulge, the Marshal let a flicker of a smile creep over his otherwise impassive poker face when I said it was known in America as the Von Rundstedt offensive.
"Somebody must always take the rap and stand the consequences," he commented. Then resuming in a serious tone, he explained, "The purpose of the winter offensive was to relieve by counterattack the strong pressure of the American and British forces in the Aachen area and heeding for the Ruhr. Our objective was to throw the Allied troops back again over the Mause and seize Liege. Actually the forces under (Field Marshal Walther) von Model got within 5 kilometers (3 miles) of the Meuse.
"We succeeded in surprising you, but our reinforcements had to be brought up without the aid of railways, many even on foot. Patton could conduct his skilful counteroffensive with complete mobility."
The bulge offensive was Germany's last chance and Von Rundstedt declared he "said so in an order of the day. That I was right may be seen from the fact that when the Russian offensive began we had to shift all our mobile equipment to the east."
Although the order for the winter offensive came from the Fuehrer himself, he said, the generals on the spot in the west shared the opinion that only a surprise offensive might succeed, "when one fights defensively with weak forces against a strong enemy who can pick a weak point, there is only one chance loft - break through by surprise."
To a question why the war continues, Von Rundstedt said; "It is a fight to be or not to be according to all utterances from the east and west, we have no choice but life or death. I do not knew how long resistance will continue for I have been out of touch with the situation for weeks."
The Wehrmacht, Von Rundstedt seid, made no serious effort to invade England after the fall of France because "for an assault on England it was necessary to select the closest point from the mainland. New, to the north of that point was the North Sea, to the south the Atlantic. We did not have a fleet capable of standing by to protect us from those two sides. Moreover, our landing equipment (Von Rundstedt used contemptuous German term, 'aeppolkaehne', meaning mere barges for hauling apples) was totally inadequate as experiments with them showed."
Discussing D-Day, Germany's supreme commander for the west explained that he wes not in command after July 5, 1944 and hence declined to answer why the troops were so quickly pulled back from the Atlantic.
About events before then, Von Rundstedt said: "We naturally expected a landing attempt but could not tell where it would come, whether in Holland, central France or southern France. So I could not put all my reserves one place. Yet our reserves were so dispersed and placed that I could have met the D-Day landing even though it surprised us (accept for the fact we had no mobility, and could not bring up our reserves. Between Paris and Rouen there was not a single bridge across the Seine.
"Furthermore, your naval artillery was terrific. Also we could move only by night. We knew you wanted to get to the Rhine, hence we had reserves ready for an attempt somewhere between the Seine and the Sonars even though we did not know in advance when nor exactly where you would land."
Asked what he thought of American generals, Von Rundstedt unhesitatingly replied: "During the last war I had the feeling your generals were new and untried and therefore paid for their mistakes with big losses. This time I am simply amazed at what you have learned meanwhile. It is terrific. Your mobility, your ability to detect and exploit the enemy's weaknesses is as modern as were our operations in France in 1940."
Japan's entry into the war had no effect upon the German military fate, the Field Marshal said, since Russia and Japan did not come to blows.
"We knew you had enough to fight a war in the Pacific and the Atlantic, but if pressure on your eastern front could have been relieved by Japan's becoming involved in a war with Russia, that would have helped," he explained.
The 69-year-old Field Marshal had aged greatly since I last saw him in 1941. It was understood he has serious heart trouble and had one attack soon after his capture.

TAB D. COLONEL FRIEDRICH VOLLBRACHT PRELIMINARY REPORT

The following report of the preliminary interrogation of Colonel Friedrich Vollbracht, former Divisional Commander of Luftwaffe Staff Troops in Italy (roughly comparable to the R.A.F. or the U.S.A.A.F. Chief Theater Administrative Officer), is not intended to be more than a very rough preliminary report. Preparation was made to interrogate Colonel Vollbracht on the assumption that he vould have a fairly complete operational knowledge of the pert of the Luftwaffe in North Italy. In point of fact, his knowledge of Luftwaffe operations is light end dates back to 1941 when he did his last active flying on escort missions. His information was all administrative, in accordance with his assignment, not operational. Complete Enemy Order of Battle information, as far as it we.s available to his office, is in the possession of two of his subordinate officers, Hauptmann (Captain) Bergentum, Vertreter des Quartiermeisters (Quartermaster Representative), and Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) Beier, Flek Officer, trho are still at Florence awaiting transport to this headquarters. Questions concerning Order of Bettle in Italy were waived, pending receipt of the documents in charge of these officers, tentative questions having elicited no satisfactory replies. Captain Bergentum, Colonel Vollbracht explained, had to have information as to the disposition of all Luftwaffe troop units in the Theater in order to supply them.
Throughout the interview, Colonel Vollbracht was anxious to get in touch with General Von Senger, Army General commanding the Ground Forces in Italy and Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Von Schweinitz, who he believes to be at Headquarters, A.F.H.Q,. Colonel Vollbracht expressed some apparent surprise at being placed within a guarded camp, but did not protest or resist detention. His attitude was cooperative, soldierly, but still somewhat guardedly bewildered by the rapid trend of events: less than 72 hours previously he hed been in commend of his troops; he had only heard of the possibility of surrender 2h, hours before it was actually accomplished. Colonel Vollbracht regarded himself as a member of a commission to which General Von Senger end Lieutenant Colonel Von Schweinitz also belonged. The interrogating party regarded him as a rather special prisoner of war.
V.hen tho last offensive began in North Italy, the Headquarters of Colonel Vollbracht's unit was at Somma Compagna, between Villafronca and Verona. Later, when the Allied armies had succeeded in breaking across the Po, this headquarters was moved to the neighborhood of Villach.
Colonel Vollbracht's opinion, based on hearsay alone, since he had never seen the aircraft, was that the ARAD0 234 was a highly successful oirpJane. There were never more than three of them in Italy based, to the best of his knowledge, at Udine. He has no information concerning mechanical difficulties from which they may have suffered, nor any details of cameras and/or armament with which they were provided. As far as he knew there was no fuel shortage for these aircraft; since there were only three of them in the Theater and since they use a low quality fuel, he believed there wes sufficient.
Asked what he thought, as a professional soldier, of strategic bombing as a program, he replied: "You see me here. That is the obvious evidence of its effectiveness." Despite the USAAF-RAF Strategic Bombing Program the German military leaders and people feel much less bitter toward the Americans and the British than they do toward the Russians, who have never engaged in any air activity against them other than tactical support of ground movement. To the German military mind there was no question of the justification of strategic bombing as a legitimate weapon and an effective one.
The Luftwaffe, to his knowledge, has never contemplated strategic bombing but then the Allied factories were so dispersed, and those in the United States at such a distance, that it could never have been an effective program,
Asked whether the Allies could have succeeded without the strategic softening of Germany, Colonel Vollbracht replied that he thought the Gormen factories, if unmolested, would have been able to produce enough material fest enough to leave the issue doubtful.
Colonel Vollbracht did not believe the Germans had considered using V-1 or V-2 in the Italian Theater, but could give no reason why not. He felt that Allied air attacks on transport had been one of the decisive factors in victory in the Theater but did not believe that the Germans had ever suffered appreciable difficulty of communication... They had always had adequate radio and telephonic equipment. The important thing was the impossibility of transport and of supply. The closing of the Brenner route was of primary importance. Asked when he had first known that the Germans had lost the v/ar in the Italian Theater, he replied that everyone had known it when the Allied armies were able to cross the Po.
The operational head of the Luftwaffe in Italy was General der Flieger (Lieutenant General) Ritter Von Pohl, with headquarters at Bolzano.
In response to a question concerning the traffic carried on by the Lufthansa, Colonel Vollbracht replied that while he did not know precisely, he believed the Lufthansa maintained routes between Berlin, Munich, Milan and Barcelona. They may also have had a northern line. The Lufthansa had carried only passengers and it was difficult to get passage. To his knowledge, no Lufthansa planes had been shot down. The Lufthansa, he thought, used FW-200's.
Colonel Vollbracht had never seen an Allied propaganda leaflet (he said) and had not listened to foreign broadcasts. He had an order not to listen to foreign broadcasts and, as a soldier, he obeyed that order.
Colonel Vollbracht was born in Hamburg 8 February 1897 and was presently living in Munich. His house was demolished in an aerial attack 20 April 1945 and ne has nad no subsequent news of his wife and family. The brief sketch of his military career may be of general interest» entering the Ground Forces as a volunteer in 1914, he went into the Luftwaffe as a fighter pilot in 1917. After the war, in I930, he became Aviation Representative for sport-flying for the Shell Oil Company. During this period he took part in international competitions in both powered and glider aircraft, visiting England in 1934. Later in 1934 he re-entered the Luftwaffe. He attended the Jagdfliegerschule in Schleissheim, and remained there on the staff, becoming a Staffel-Kapitan. In I936 and I937 he was transferred to Werl, near Dortmund in Westphalia, and became a Gruppenkommandeur in Zerstörer Geschwader 26 (Fighter-bomber Geschwader 26). In ;4pril 1940 he became Geschwaderkommodore of Zerstörer Geschwader 2 and acted in that capacity until October 1940. During this period the Geschwader was stationed first in the Ardennes and later at Caen. In the winter of 1940 he was in Denmark as Commanding Officer of the Zerstörer Ausbildingsband (fighter-bomber school) et Copenhagen. In 1941 he founded, et the instigation of the Nachtjagd Korps, a Nachtragschulo at Schleissheim. In 1942 he became Jafü (Jadgfliergerfurher) der deutschen Bucht (area from the Hook of Holland to Denmark). In 1943 he was transferred as Jafü Süd-Frankreich (south France). In October 1944 he was given a personnel-administrative job in North Italy by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe and held this position until March or April 1945 when he took over the position of Divisional Commander of Luftwaffe Staff Troops in Italy.

RECCMMENDATIOINiS: It is recommended that Hauptmann Bergentum and Oberleutnant Beier be brought to this headquarters for detailed interrogation for enemy Order of Battle and other pertinent data. Documents in their possession should be brought with these officers. With the aid of these documents and the expressed willingness of cooperation of Colonel Vollbracht, it should be possible to complete the picture of the Luftwaffe in Italy through the end of the campaign.

L. GERDINE, 1st Lieutenant, LC,

TAB E. REPORT ON INTERVIEW WITH DR. HJALMAR SCHACHT, FRITZ THYSSEN, GEK3RAL OF INFANTRY THOMAS, AND OTHER VIE

SUBJECT: Report on Interview with Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Fritz Thyssen General of Infantry Thomas and other "Very Important Enemy" Capri, 13 May 1945.

1. Yesterday, May 13th, Colonel McCrary and I visited Capri to ask the concentration of important personages from Germany certain
questions about air power's share in Germany's defeat. We talked to three men at length — Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, former president of the Reichsbank and for many years the outstanding financier of Germany, Fritz Thyssen, one of Germany's industrial magnates and the original backer of Hitler, and General of Infantry Georg Thomas, who had a position in the Gorman Army similar to that held by General Somervell in the American — Chief of the Military, Economic and Armaments Office, and kembor of the Armaments Council.
2. These men and more than a hundred others had been imprisoned by the Nazis and had boen rescued by tho American Armies in Austria. Included in the group wore Kurt Schuschnigg, former Prime Minister of Austria and his wife, imprisoned since 1938; Nikolaus Von Horthy, son of the late dictator of Hungary; twenty-odd members of the family of Count Von Stauffenberg, the man who threw the bomb at Hitler; the Prince of Hess and the Prince of Prussia; General Von Falkonhausen, former commanding general of German-occupied Belgium, imprisoned because of leniency to the Belgians; Genoral Haider, former Chief of Staff of the German Army. There were also many women and children of all ages. This extraordinary group have been taken to Capri for screening and wore held under military guard at the Hotel Eden Paradiso in Ana Capri, a clean and lovely spot covered with bougainvillea and roses where the group
lived in complete coral'ort, with officer rations, but which they could not leave except under guard.
3. Dr Schacht. Germany's famous financier was a surprisingly large man with a broad, heavy-featured face, huge hands and shoes that would fit a New York policeman. He looked old and frail but spoke ver;' vigorously in excellent English. We told him we wished to know his opinion as to tho part Allied air power and particularly bombardment had played in Germany's downfall. Before answering this question directly he insisted upon summarizing his general attitude toward Germany's going to war. He stated that ho had been opposed to the war from long before tho beginning because "I was convinced it would mean complete disaster." He said he had willingly assisted Hitler in raising money for German rearmament because he wished to see Germany regain a position of strength on a par with other major nations. He insisted, however, that once it became apparent to him that Hitler intended war he withdrew his influence and the aid of the Reichsbank in financing Gorman rearmament. Early in 1938, said he, he forced a show-down with Hitler on this question, refusing to continue as head of the Reichsbank unless Hitler would halt the march toward war. Hitler refused, and Schacht left tho Reichsbank. To avoid the appearance of an open break he consented to remain as Minister of Economics of the government but this likewise ended in an open rupture with Hitler in January 1939- Again in order to save appearances (Schacht was a figure of such importance that an open break would have damaged Hitler's prestige in the eyes of the world) he consented to remain as a minister without a portfolio and went off on a trumpod-up excuse to mako a study of India. Ho returned to Switzerland in tho summer and first knew that war had started when he read it in the papers in Munich.
4. Schacht asserted that the reason he was so sure Germany should not go to war was that he -was convinced England and America would both come in and that their industrial potential was too great for Germany's to match. "Now we come to the bombardment. It was one of the chief reasons for Germany's defeat. You had a greater industrial capacity than we anyway and ours was crippled by bombardment." He was unable to give any definite figures about the reduction of German production by bombing, insisting that finance was his field and that throughout the war he had been on the outside of the government and only knew about it through talking with his many important friends. He insisted over and over that the defeat of Germany was due to economic reasons — a war of industrial capacity. We asked him how long it would take German industry to get back on its foet. "It will never do sol" he said. We demurred, pointing out that Coventry had regained full production eight months after the German blitz. "AchJ" he exclaimed, with emotion coming into his voice for tho first time, "that was just one city. We have 50, 80 or a hundred such. You have ruined them alii There is not a city in Germany left nor an important factory standing. They can never be rebuilt."
5. General Thomas. Schacht referred us to this perfect specimen of a Prussian gonoral as someone from the professional German Army who knew the war production side of German industry intimately and who had shared Schacht's views as to the war from the beginning. Thomas was a stiff-necked, bullet-headed, close-shaved, little man who looked like Hollywood's Eric Von Strohcim. He had been chief of war production in the German Army until November 1943 with rank corresponding to our Lt. General. He was then relieved because of his outspoken belief that Germanywould lose the war. He spoke no English but Schacht interpreted. We asked what his opinion was about the effectiveness of Allied bombardment. He replied "Bombing was the chief reason far tho defeat of the Wehrmacht." We asked whether ho meant bombardment of factories, of communications or of troops. He replied "firstly the bombardment of factories and secondly the bombardment of transportation. Not until the last few months when German morale began to break was bombardment of troops really effective." We asked which industries had suffered particular from bombardment. He replied that the most critical damage had been done to Gorman war industry by tho attacks on ball-bearing factories. Next he put the attacks on lines of communications and transport. VTo askod about oil and he replied that the attacks against the synthetic refineries had been the body blow insofar as oil was concerned He said this hurt more than the logs of Ploesti. Schacht interposed to remark that our attacks on oil transport between Ploesti and Germany had been extremely effective.
6. We asked if anyone in Germany had visualized the likelihood of bombardment of factories before the war. Both of thorn said that many had but that Gooring was in complete control of production and would not liston. Schacht said "Goering was, how do you say it?, a complete charlatan. He was a fool. He know nothing, nothing, abou production. A plan would bo shown to him for producing so many fighters per month and ho would take the plan as the accomplished fac and say 'See, mein Fuehrer, we arc now producing this many fighters por month'. After tho bombardment started we triod to dislocate (ho moant disperse) the critical industries deep into Germany but this took an incredible amount of steel and brick and labor and hurt our production capacity that much more." We asked about the attempts to counteract the American heavy bombers and Schacht again returned to his basic premise about Germany's weaker industrial capacity. He said "Goering insisted on concentrating on fighter production in order to attack your bombers. To do this we had to give up bomber production and so could not molest your bomber factories. The result was inevitable." We mentioned that for a time German fighter strength threatened to stop daylight bombardment, as at the Schweinfurt battle in August 1943. "Yes," said Schacht, "but then you just waited a month or tv*o until your strength had again built up far in excess of ours. We were powerless to stop it."
7. Schacht and Thomas were full of comments about other important Germans, as follows:
Udet. ("He committed suicide").
Goebbels (Schacht said "He was a terrible liar, but he had far the best brain of any of the big Nazis and was the most courageous.")
Hitler (We asked when Hitler first realized that Germany had lost the war. Schacht and Thomas replied that they thought he never realized it, that until the last he was convinced England and America would have a falling out with Russia which would save the remnants of Germany.)
Himmler (When I mentioned that Himmler had been reported captured that morning both mon sat bolt upright in excitement and asked about the details. Schacht said "Himmler was a dreadful, a horrible man. I only wish you would turn him over to the German people for trial instead of trying him yourselves.")
8. Schacht was not above an occasional joke. We asked him if he thought Hitler was dead. He replied "I would not believe it if he told me so himself." After we had finished talking to him some other visitors asked him to sign some German marks for them for souvenirs. His name, of course, appeared on many of them already, just as Morgenthau's does on American bills. He signed his big, bold signature on several and then an American MP handed him a U.S. short-snorter bill. Schacht drew back in mock surprise, saying "but that is fjood money!" When we thanked Schacht and Thomas for their help both of them asked in a plaintive, tremulous way if we knew what was going to happen to them, where they were going and when they could get in touch with their wives. Schacht said he had not seen his wife for four months and the last he knew she was living on a small country est to near Berlin.
9. Fritz Thyssen. Schacht had said that Thyssen was a weakling whose prestige, like his wealth, had largely been inherited. After Schacht we talked to Thyssen for a few minutes. He was very old and frail looking but loquacious and spoke excellent English. He talked of having backed Hitler originally but of turning against him when the pogroms started and of subsequently becoming more and more in opposition until he fled to Switzerland before the war started. Subsequently he was captured in Paris in 1940 and has been in a concentration camp (Buchenwald) ever since. He said that this had kept him from knowing very much about what bombardment had done to Germany. He said he had been told that everything was gone and his only hope was that his steel plant at Hamborn had survived. He said it would be impossible to rebuild industrial Germany without great amounts of foreign financing.
10. Before we left, Schacht, Tomas and several others were taken away to go back to Naples. All the group, assembled to bid them farewell l and there was much formal shaking of hands, etc. Most of them appeared in good but cynical spirits — we heard many of then saying "Aufs' Buchenwald" — the German slang equivalent of "See you in Buchenwald."
JAMES PARTON, Lt. Col., A.C., Historian, Hq. MAAF.
14 May 1945.

TAB F. INTERROGATION REPORT OF MAJOR WALTHER WILHELM HUTMACHER AND MAJOR RUPERT FROST OF THE GAF

Headquarters MAAF, 8 May 1945

The following information was secured fron interrogations of Major either Wilhelm Hutmacher, former Staff Officer to Colonel Vollbracht at Luftwaffe Headquarters, North Italy, and Major Rupert Frost, former Commanding Officer of Nacht Schlacht Geschwader 9 (NSG 9).
Both officers considered themselves members of the General von Senger commission and were therefore apparently instructed to be as helpful as possible. If their frequent claims of being uninformed regarding information requested is a criterion of German Staff Officer awareness the interrogation officers are in possession of a new enlightenment as to why Germany lost the war.
The interrogations were performed in accordance with a series of questions prepared by Air Commodore Woolley, Chief Intelligence Cfficer, MAAF.

PERSONS DETAILS

Major Walther Wilhelm Hutmacher was born 23 August 1911 at Munster in Westphalia.
His wife and two children live at Fritzlar near Kassel. His most recent position was that of 1-A (Operations Cfficer) at the Luftwaffe Headquarters in Italy, first at Molveno, then at Bolzano. A professional soldier, he entered the Luftwaffe 2 July 1934. Before coming to Italy in October 1944 he was with the Luftwaffe Headquarters in East Prussia. Earlier he had served with the 4th Flieger Korps in Russia, the Luftkriegsakademie in Berlin, the 2nd Flieger Korps in Sicily, and as CO. of the Erganzungs-Gruppe of KG 25.
Major Rupert Frost was born 19 October 1911 at Schmiegel near Posen. A professional soldier, he joined the infantry 1 March I933 and transferred to the Luftwaffe in 1934. His last assignment was as Commanding Cfficer of Nacht Schlacht Geschwader 9. Previously he served with Nacht Schlacht Gruppe 4 at Stalingrad and with KG 27. He has been identified with German Night Fighter tactics and organizations since their conception beginning in the early months of the Russian war by flying day fighte: equipped aircraft whose mission was to drop bombs by hand without benefit of bombsight over Russian lines.

Order of Battle (Italian).

The first Italian Fighter Group, organized only two months ago, was last stationed at Galerata. The Group had 28 ME-109's, of which 18 - 25 were always operational. It is believed that the remaining aircraft were destroyed on the ground at Galerata.
The Second Italian Fighter Group was stationed at Ghedi and Villafranca until about seven months ago, when they moved to the airfields at Aviano and Oscppo, This Group was also equipped with ME-109's, of which the remaining 18 were transferred to Bergamo 23 April and were there destroyed on the ground.
The Third Italien Fighter Group was located at Holzkirchen, Germany. It has been there for the lest two or three months, but it was never operational. Its function was one purely of training and it had only some old training types of aircraft.
The total strength of the three Italian Fighter Groups during the last days was perhaps 40 - 50 pilots with a total of 50 planes.
There was also an Italian Torpedo Squadron equipped with Savoia-Marchetti 70's with its operational base at Ghedi and its rear base at Bergamo. It had some 20 planes and 16 pilots. In the last six months this squadron was known to have made only one attack against some Allied ships at Ancona about 28 January 1945» The personnel of these units were all Italian.

Crder of Battle (German).

Fernaufklärungs Gruppe 122 (Long-range Reconnaissance Group 122) had two squadrons (Staffel) in Bergamo. This group regularly flew recce missions for the Mediterranean area end over Malta. Aircraft from this unit did most of the recce over Naples, Bari and Algiers and did some escort flying es well, when the Allied armies crossed the Po, three or four planes went to Bolzano where they were destroyed and six or eight got safely off to Innsbruck.
Nahaufklarungs Gruppe 11 (Short-range Reconnaissance Group 11) consisting of only one squadron made mostly of ME-109's was always based at Udine. This squadron flew little, doing recce over Ancona for the most part. It had 15 aircraft end 10 - 12 pilots. T.»hen the Allies crossed the Po the squadron was ordered to Bolzano, but bad weather prevented take-off and the aircraft were destroyed on the ground. It is possible that one or two did escape, however.
Nachtschlacht Geschwader 9, of which Major Frost was the Commanding Officer, was formerly stationed at Ghedi and Villafranca but was recently moved to Thiene near Vicenza. It had 25 JU-87's and 15 FW-190's forming, on the basis of 12 operational aircraft per squadron, totaling two squadrons of JU-87's and one of Fw-190's. Six FW-190's and 13 JU-87's, roughly 50 escaped to Innsbruck when the Allies crossed the Po. They were subsequently ordered to return to Bolzano but were unable to do so because of bad weather.
Comparison of IAF and GAF Flying Personnel. Sources were of the opinion that Italians needed no more training than Germans and made good fighter pilots, even better in many cases, than did Germans. They had a "feel" for flying pursuit ships and were masters of the "art" of flying rather than the "technique". However, they were undisciplined and could not be depended upon to fly formation. German fighter pilots, on the other hand, flew formation well. The Italians made poor bomber pilots because they had difficulty with the complicated nature of the mechanisms involved. The failure of the Italian Air Force should be ascribed to their lack of modern type aircraft rather than to their inability in handling the types they had. Supplies, gasoline, etc., for these Italian units came from the
Germans entirely.

Arado 234.

There were three ARBADO 234 's in the" Theater, based at Udine. They were known as the"KOMMANDO SOMMER" and were to have been formed into Staffeln (squadrons). They were used for reconnaissance only with great effectiveness (see below). Of the three, one was captured at the front when it force-landed behind Allied lines, one burned on landing at Udine five weeks ago, and the third was believed destroyed at Udine.
Until the Luftwaffe introduced the Arado 234 into this theater the Army was never satisfied with the recce reports. Despite the fact that there were only three Arado 234's in the Theater, after they began to do regular recce over a strip from Livorno to Ancona, there were no more complaints. Until the use of the Arado 234, Luftwaffe recce pianos simply could not get into the target area they were kept from doing recce by tactical considerations, not by fuel lack.
The Arado 234 proved itself excellent for recce work. It customarily operated et 9-12,000 meters. It had no armament whatever, but did have a Fu Go 25. There was no Fu Go 16 built in but they were soon to have been provided. Although the Arado 234 was still experimental, it was highly successful in all phases and seems to have had no mechanical difficulties. It had interchangeable fittings for all three standard types of camera equipment. Since there were only three in the theater, there was no serious fuel shortage for them: they used & low grade fuel (1-2), completely unrefined (?), shipped in tank trucks from Miessburg near Celle, sources thought.

Night Fighters.

ME-I09 or FW-I90 aircraft were not used as night fighters except in emergencies.
FW-190's were used as night bombers, Major Frost's unit, NSG 9, having been thus employed.
FW-190's had only recently been employed as night fighters in emergencies without ground control (?). Three such missions, accomplished during the last two weeks, netted the Germ&ns two four-engined bombers and one Mosquito.

V-Weapons in Italy.

The Germans became aware through various sources and as a result of our constant recce over the Villafranca area that the employment of V-weapons in the Italian theater was anticipated by the Allies. Inasmuch as there was no V-l construction underway and furthermore as there had never been cny talk or plans of actually using this weapon in the theater, the Germans were at loss as to v«hy the Allies expected the weepon to the extent of obviously having decided from where V-l would be launched.
Further information told the Germ&ns that we had reports of actual V-l's deployed tlong railroad sidings and reedy for launching.
Sources claimed that they hed even been informed as to the approximate dates the Allies were expecting the first V attacks.
As much of their information seemed to center about the Villafrancs area their own recce w&.s sent up in an effort to learn the basis for Allied suspicions.
Results of this disclosed that c section of the concrete surfacing of a landing strip, because of the shading of colors, appeared very similar to photographs of actual V-l launching sites.
The presence of V-l bombs was explained by large concentrations of 1,800 kg bombs and 8 x 10 meter gasoline tanks which Italian civilian rumors had already identified as V-weapons.
Sources claim that when the grounds for Allied fears of possible V-USG were fully understood unofficial enhancing of the evidence "might" have been performed.
The simple explanation of why the use of V's was never contemplated in Italy is the insufficient quantity of these weapons that German industry was able to produce.
Sources claimed to have hecrd that the demands of the England-directed launching sites were never fully satisfied.

Fuel.

The gasoline shortage was first felt in Italy about January 1944. Major Hutmecher was then commanding a Geschwader and he was instructed to keep the information from his crews. Before January 1944 "the supply of gasoline was apparently unlimited. By July 1944 bomber groups had to be left standing because of a shortage of fuel, and it was about this time that the reorganization of the Luftwaffe was effected.
Luftwaffe Losses in Italy. Sources could give no exact figures for losses in Italy but estimated roughly that 100 - 120 aircraft had been destroyed on the ground from October 1944 "to the end of the campaign, and an additional 60 - 65 were destroyed during the same period in the air. A negligibly small number had been destroyed in landing and take-off accidents.

Security of Allied POW's.

Sources could not cite any specific tactical use of information obtained from Allied prisoners of war except that in one instance they understood the Germans had succeeded in getting detailec information of .American night-fighter tactics down to ranges of radar from a prisoner of war.
In this case the information elicited was highly important and would have played an important part in operations but, "unfortunately" little opportunity was had to put it to use.
In spite of the fact that both sources understood that much valuable information had been obtained from interrogating /.Hied air men both were quick to admit the superiority of British interrogation techniques, after which their own were but "poorly patterned."

Railroad Communications.

Sources did not regard the interdiction program against German rail lines as decisive. In almost all cases rail cuts were repaired in 48 hours. Had gasoline been plentiful the transportation system would not have been disturbed, even if the rail attacks had been much heavier. The crux of the German war in Italy was gasoline. Both sources were enthusiastic in their claims that the destruction of the German fuel structure through our strategic bombing of oil won the war in Italy as well as in the rest of Europe.
To support their contentions that rail bombings were not disruptive to communications, they insisted that as recently as a week ago it was easily possible to travel from Berlin to Villafranca in 5-6 days and two weeks ago from Munich to Lake Garda in 6-7 hours.

Signal Intelligence.

Both sources were high in their acclaim of the success of the German intercept services. Both hcd heard that much important intelligence had been obtained in this manner.
Concerning Russian signals, sources claimed they were more easily made use of than were British or American because the Russians often broadcast in the clear, used less care, and had much simpler codes.

Effectiveness of "Window".

Both sources gave evidence that early "window" efforts on the part of the allies caused considerable and serious difficulty^ but as higher degrees of experience were achieved in reading impulses it was possible in almost all cases to successfully determine altitudes and distances. In the lest year small if any difficulty was caused by use of "window".

German-Japanese Relations. Neither source had personally any first-hand knowledge of German-Japanese relations, but both wore conversant with propaganda on Axis partner solidarity. It was almost a year ago that the last blockade runner, a Japanese ship, had got through to Bordeaux.
There were no Japanese units with the Luftwaffe, although the Japanese had technical experts serving in the aircraft and other factories.
In general, the Germans did little rejoicing over Japanese victories because they felt it a pity that the yellow race should debase the white. They were happy, however, that the Japanese were strong enough to hold off large numbers of Allied troops and large quantities of material.

Death of "Der Fuehrer".

Beth sources concurred in the opinion that: "The Fuehrer died as a hero. He always said he would live or die with his troops. That he did. Death wes his only way out. After his cause was lost it was only through death that he could prove his own belief in that cause."
/s/ ROBERT E. W»ORK, Capt., A.C, for FREDERICK J . HAAS , Major, A. C., P. W. Intelligence.

TAB G. FACTORS IN GERMANY'S DEFEAT (A Series)

The following German officers expressed their opinions when presented with six questions on the effects of Allied bombing results. Other high ranking officers and civilians will be interrogated as they arrive and further reports will be issued.

General der Infanterie Georg Thomas Chief of the Wehrwirtschaft u. Ruestungsamt (roughly equivalent to the U.S. War Production Board. He was relieved of this position by Hitler sometime in 1943.
Colonel General Franz Haider Chief of Staff of the German General Staff until relieved in September 1942.
General Max von Pohl Commanding General of the German Air Forces in Italy. He bases all his opinions exclusively on experiences in the Italian theater of war.

Question No. 1

What is the general opinion of the effectiveness of United States strategic bombing of the aircraft and fuel industries of Germany?

General Thomas

Strategic bombing attacks on the German aircraft and fuel industries during the years 1943 and 1944 were decisive. In the aircraft industry, the most seriously affected item was engines and in the aircraft accessories industry it was ball bearings, gears, injection pumps, etc. The engine deficiency was already felt in 1943«
The shortage of fuel started to affect operations and training of the Luftwaffe and tank troops in 1943. A German defeat might have been brought about much sooner ill the event strategic bombing of the fuel industry had started earlier because the long distances to be overcome on the Eastern front presented a much greater supply problem than was the case in 1944.

Colonel General Haider

The Allied Air Force obtained a decisive superiority in 1943. From news which General Haider received privately, he understands that the attacks on German aircraft and fuel industries were the decisive factor.

General von Pohl

Until the end of 1944 difficulties in the supply of aircraft and fuel were mostly due to disruption of communications. It was only after the loss of the Rumanian oil fields, the destruction of a part of the German aircraft factories and principally the destruction of German synthetic fuel plants that the remaining Luftwaffe forces in Italy could not be provided with sufficient fuel. This condition was severely felt beginning early 1945. In May 1945 there was only sufficient fuel on hand for a few operations. The only jet planes in Italy were three Arado 234's.

Question No. 2

At what point in the war did strategic bombing cause the German General Staff to revise its tactical and strategical plans of operation?

General Thomas
Strategic bombing forced a revision in armament plans in the summer of 1941 when the efficiency of strategic bombing became apparent. Since the summer of 1942, armament plans, especially the planning of aircraft production, were greatly influenced by growing Air Force attacks. Since 1944 Allied air operations became the deciding influence in German war planning.

Colonel General Halder

Late in the summer of 1941 Hitler resolved to lay the greatest stress on aircraft production because of expected Allied Air Force attacks. The intention could not be fulfilled because of later pressure from the Russian Armies. For the years following General Haider's retirement he quotes statements from letters received from comrades at the front who indicate that the superiority of the Allied Air Force has decisively influenced the progress of the war in Africa, Italy and France,

General von Pohl

According to my knowledge, the evacuation of Sicily was the first case where the operational plans of German Headquarters had to be changed by the activities of the Allied Air Force before a decision on the ground was reached. This change was caused by the Air Force attacks on the railroads in southern Italy and the sea area off Messina, which effectively delayed the arrival of German reserves and supplies.

Question No. 3

Would the invasion of the European Continent have been possible without strategic bombing of transportation and communication facilities?

General Thomas

"No!"

Colonel General Haider

"No!"'

General von Pohl

According to his experience in Italy the answer is "no" because the Allied Air Force to a still greater extent than in Sicily prevented operative counter-measures. The Allied operation at Salerno almost became a failure because Allied supporting air power was busy with other activities.

Question No. 4

Did United States bombing of strategic objectives paralyze German industry or German transportation, or if neither of these, against what phase of German industry or Army did air bombing have the greatest effect?

General Thomas

A complete crippling of industry and transport occurred only in the last months of the war. However, since 1943 strategic bombing of important industrial and transportation centers caused essential troubles in production and transport. Chiefly affected, were aircraft factories, fuel plants and artificial rubber factories while raw material industries (coal and iron) suffered less. Strategic bombing of the fuel industry especially affected oil refining and synthetic fuel plants. Oil wells in Rumania and Germany were not badly damaged. Greatest damage to transportation centers was caused in Berlin, Middle Germany, the Ruhr area and Frankfurt.

Colonel General Halder

According to private news which reached General Haider, neither German war production nor the German transport system have been completely crippled. Both, however, have been hurt to a heavily growing extent after 1943 and the greatest bombing efficiency - aside from terror attacks on German cities (sic) - was achieved against aircraft, fuel and rubber production.

General von Pohl

Within the Reich, the Ruhr area because of destruction of communications seems to have been handicapped almost completely, while in Italy a complete handicap to production never occurred. He believes that there were too large time intervals between attacks in Italy which always permitted repairs of the Brenner line and the east-west railroads. In principle, he thinks attacks on communication systems and fuel factories to be the most effective.

Question No. 5

Was Allied air power chiefly responsible for Germany's defeat in this war? (Try to give specific instances and reasons for this opinion.)

General Thomas

Besides the irresponsible Hitler military leadership since 1941 the attacks of the Allied Air Force are the chief reason for Germany's defeat. They include the destruction of aircraft production, crippling of the transportation system and in the last months of the war the deterioration of morale of troops and civilians.

Colonel General Haider

He also sees the chief reason for Germany's defeat to be the catastrophic military and political mistakes of Hitler. Next to this he lays the blame on the Allied Air Force. The latter have increasingly crippled German war industry, the transportation system and toward the end destroyed the will of resistance of the German people and ground troops.

General von Pohl

His answer is "Yes" and he quotes two instances:

a. The defeat at El Alamein was a turning point in the war. It was due to the stoppage of supplies from Sicily to Africa (the amount of fuel available at times in Africa was zero) and to the new system of carpet pattern bombing which the already shaken troops could stand no more.
b. The German offensive in the spring of 1945 in northern Italy encountered such overwhelming Air Force attacks in the immediate front lino area and on river crossings that the troops were literally scattered and their morale deserted them.

Question No. 6

Assuming there had been no German Air Force and no Allied Air Force, would the German Armies have been able to win the War?

General Thomas

In the event there had been no aircraft employed by either side, Germany still could not have won the war decisively. Resistance might have been prolonged to the point of diplomatic negotiations, but the possibility for a considerably prolonged war did not exist because Germany's potentialities in food and raw materials were bound to become less and less.

Colonel General Halder

The superiority of the German Army, especially of the tank troops, justifies the assumption that the success of the war in Poland, France, the Balkans and West Russia would have been similar on other fronts, but perhaps at a slower rate in case of an absence of an air force on both sides. A reasonable military leadership would have been able to fight successfully over a long period of time beyond Germany's frontiers while using the rich economic potentailities of occupied territories. Colonel General Halder also took the position that no one could positively say whether such a prolonged war would have brought a German victory. He said that Germany would never have been able to hit the bases of American and British Armies decisively, but history proves that such long absorbing wars are especially influenced by the development of morale and politics which moans that they are dependent upon imponderables.
Also in case of an absence of an Allied Air Force the military tasks of the Allies against Japan and probably also against Italy would have been rendered more difficult and furthermore the decisive weapon for fighting the submarine would have been missing.
(In another interview Colonel General Haider answered this question with an emphatic "yes," but qualified it by stating that his opinion was based on a military leadership in the war rather than an "inspired" one.)

General von Pohl

The absence of an Air Force on both sides would have caused an essential prolongation of the war but, unless it had occurred within the first few years, not necessarily a German victory because of the enormous material superiority of the Allies.
P. W. Intelligence Section, Headquarters, M. A. A. F.

TAB H. WHY GERMANY LOST

"You ask me when Germany lost the "war. My answer: The day we started it. When did Hitler know he was beaten? I doubt if he ever admitted it, even to the very end. Do I believe that Hitler is really dead? To answer that, I have a little joke: I would not believe Hitler is dead if he were to tell me so himself."
The speaker smiled at his little joke. He was a tall man, even when he sat down. He had a scrubby moustache. White hair. Rather thick glasses that magnified his blue eyes. He had some kind of skin trouble on his chin; shaving had not helped it. The cuffs of his blue coat sleeves were frayed a little — but it was an excellent cloth. His shoes were black and hand made, very good. His shirt was the only thing that looked new; his other clothes looked like those of many men in 1936 — Wall Streeters who had not bought new clothes since 1929. Wall Streotcrs, and probably many other Americans would recognize this man who spoke, in good English, with such authority about Germany and Hitler. His name: Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht, born in Denmark, onetime head of the Reichsbank, and generally recognized as the man whoso financial wizardry had hauled Germany up by her bootstraps during a critical period in Nazism.
Dr. Schacht, and 70 other recent political prisoners of Hitler, lived briefly at the Hotel Eden-Paridiso, Capri, Italy.
We wore interested in three of these men: Dr. Schacht, because of his intimate knowledge of the economy of Germany.
General of the Infantry, Georg Thomas, Chief for the Military of the Economics and Armaments Office of the Reich, because of his intimate knowledge of the war industry — he combined the jobs of Somervcll and Knudsen.
And finally, Fritz Thyssen, because the press of America had built him up as the first and most evil genius of the great industrialists who helped Hitler to power.
All 71 of these special "guests" were intensely interesting, like actors in another incredible "Grand Hotel." Two healthy blond children played chess, loudly on the floor; they wore only swimming trunks:
"Schach! Herr Blum darf sich nicht bewegenl Er weiss nicht wohin zu bewegen!"
"Checkl Mr. Blum cannot move! He does not know where to go!"
One had named the king-piece of the other, "Mr. Blum", after Leon Blum. Other remarks about Herr Blum indicated that the children had not liked this eminent Frenchman.
Another elegant figure — but again in frayed clothns — was General von Falkenhausen, onetime Occupation Commander of Belgium, onetime member of the staff of Chiang Kai-shek. And General von Haider, onetime German Chief of Staff.
And there is one whole family here, the von Stanffen-bergs — it was one of them -who engineered the plot to kill Hitler (Thyssen, with great pride in German-made goods, lamented that the dynamite used to kill Hitler had been Made in England). Hitler ordered every branch and root of this family to be collected in one prison, for complete extermination.
The Hungarian group keeps to itself, eats to itself — there is strict protocol at the table. Nicholas Horthy, younger son of the former Regent, found his male secretary before he came to Italy — the flunky has accompanied the master.
And there was the Prince of Prussia, a very lucky man. This grandson of the former Kaiser was jugged for listening to a BBC broadcast from London. Onetime playboy, he had a villa on Capri before the war — his servant and his clothes were still there when he returned as a "prisoner guest." Now he looks most chic in white silk monogrammed shirt and blue linen slacks, white bolt, white shoes. At Buchenwald, his duties consisted of washing tho dishes for the SS guards. He adapted himself well to his chore-grew fat on left-overs.
Our guide makes a correction: This is not the Prince of Prussia, but the Prince of Hess. He is very sad today; his wife was one of the daughters of the King of Italy. She has just died.
The Prince of Prussia is that man over on the other side of the sun porch. Way over on the other side. The Prince of Prussj and the Prince of Hess do not speak to each other. Why, our guide does not know.
That afternoon, Kurt von Schuschnigg, former Austrian Chancellor and his wife, and their small daughter, also came to Capri — but to a villa of their own. The sheep and the goats were being separated slowly by American officials who could not quickly decide which wore sheep and which were goats.
Dorothy Thompson had run into Schuschnigg, Blum, and Niemoeller the evening before at the Parco Hotel in Naples; she was outraged as only she can be that officials had taken so long to make up their minds what should be done with these "hot potatoes.
"Blum...a great figure with a clear mind. Schuschnigg... why his last speech was one of the finest things of the war. And Niemoeller...why here is a man who knows the full extent of the collapse of the German character and he knows what must be done about it...he should be permitted to speak "
Dorothy had stumbled onto a meeting with these three men ahead of all the clamoring war correspondents in Italy; she was battling censorship to get her story past the stern "STOP" that had been placed on all these VIEs (Very Important Enemies).
There was much such incidents that stung nickel-flipping officials during the first days of unscrambling sheep and goats — the drivers for the motor pool threatened to strike rather than to chauffeur some of the VIEs in staff cars. Bill Mauldin drew a TNT cartoon in Stars & Stripes:
A fuddle-faced American General was on the phone, a stiff-necked, snake-eyed German topshot sat rigidly at attention. The American General was protesting into the phone:
"No no no no, my dear Colonel...the Field Marshal is my guest for dinner tonight!
Dr. Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht knows the American mind "well; he certainly sensed this strange subservience, this unique inferiority complex in the presence of Great Names — even though they are enemy names. As he talked to us, he skillfully constructed an alibi for his whole association with Hitler.
Time and again, ho remembered dates on which he had broken with Hitler on some point — not just the year and the month;. but the day of the week, almost the time and the weather and the place it happened, all the facts out of which a man weaves an alibi.
At the outset of the interview, we made it clear that we had only one purpose: What facts do you know about the effect of Allied bombing on Germany's ability to fight total war?
From the outset, he made it clear that he had always opposed war, had done everything in his power to prevent it. Only a War Crimes jury can judge the truth of his claims to innocence; it was not our concern. But we let him talk on his favorite theme, in order to pull out the facts we were hunting.
"Always I opposed war. Rearmament, yes, I was for that — in the beginning. I knew from history and from personal experience that to bargain successfully with other nations, you must be strong.
"Once, I was opposed even to rearmament, but that was when England and America and Russia talked of disarmament — and then never disarmed.
"And so, because it was evident that nobody would disarm; I consented that the Roichsbank should help Germany to rearm. I agreed this with Hitler — but with the understanding that there would bo a limit, and the limit would be when we began to get our way.
"With the beginning of the Jewish persecutions, I began to feel that there would be no limits. Some of us had worked out reasonable solutions for all our problems, including the Jewish question, in London — I and my good friends Montagu Norman of the Bank of England and Lord Wintert on and others. But when I returned to Germany, I knew there would be no interest in reasonable solutions.
"And then I had to decide what I could do to check things to ride the curb on things, you might say. I was no politician. I was no military man, I had not even served in the armies in the last war. And so I had to work in the only way I could — through my control of the purse strings.
"Hitler was always careful to make people believe that I supported him. In the beginning it was important to him that people should believe I was for him.
"But when I began to tighten up on the financing of his wild rearmament plans, then he began to resort to other means of financing, dangerous means which I knew must eventually affect the currency of Germany. And that was when I broke with him."
During this critical period, Schacht was at least given credit for working out the schemes by which Hitler bought up, all through the Balkans, the critical reserves of certain strategic raw materials vital to war production. But Schacht now insists that he always opposed war.
"It was then that Goering came more and more into influence and eventually, I was compelled to say to Hitler, that if I am to bear the responsibility for the economy of Germany, then I must have the command. But if Goering is to have the command, then he must shoulder also the responsibility."
The sharp hatred for Goering was clear not only in what he said, but in the way he said it. It is highly significant that the man who created and completely commanded the Luftwaffe was at this critical stage of preparation for total war in command also of the industry of Germany — primary target for Allied Air Power in the war to come.
"Charlatan — that is a good French word. Does it mean the same in English? A charlatan is what Goering is. A complete charlatan. A fool. And a coward. And always a liar. And in all things ignorant.
"But always also he had great influence.
"But he did not produce. Nothing but plans. He would go to Hitler with plans for producing so many of this and that. But it would be only on paper. He would command an industry to produce so much, but he did not concern himself with profits or losses."
Schacht's contempt of Goering was based on many things; but not least on Goering's contempt for orthodox laws of economics .
"I have always said that the fate of Germany is economics. Hitler and Goering said no, the fate of Germany is politics It was the end of Germany.
"I said to Hitler that since I have no military experience at all, of course I would not presume to try to lead even a squad of soldiers across a single street.
"And in the same way, I said to Hitler, I doubt that you can find in the Luftwaffe a captain of airplanes who was capable of commanding the whole of German industry.
"And Hitler permitted me to say that. He did not rebuke mo. But he went on listening to Goering's boasts about how many planes would be produced next month — on paper."
And then Schact reverted to his favorite theme — his innocence of all blame for war.
"I always talked against war, and exerted all my influence in the only way I could to prevent war. I knew what British and American industry could do. I had seen it happen in the last war, I knew that by blitz, wo could win campaigns, but you cannot win o. long war by blitz. I am not a military man, but I know that.
"And I knew through my friends that England must come into any war in Europe and that would mean a long war.
"But not after 1930 did the Reichsbank finance anything of armament. That was when I left my position, though I had agreed to serve for another 4 years term if Hitler would stop his rearming. This ho would not do so I resigned.
"But still I desired; to keep some contact in the hope that I might in the end exert a deciding influence against war. And so Hitler made to me a deal, I was a minister without portfolio and a trip to India was trumped up for me to give the appearance that there was no open break between Hitler and myself.
"This was Hitler's own wish, because at that time it was still valuable to him for Germany and the world to believe that I supported him as a close advisor.
"Actually, I was not at all close to him. There were no cabinet meetings after 1938. I did not know when the war would start. I road of the news in the papers at Munich where I was at the time."
We explained to Dr. Schacht that in America, once war started, all the great industrialists — most of them opposed President Roosevelt politically - came instantly to the support of the Government, did all they could to convert their industry to war production. Schacht nodded his understanding of this fact. And then asked him:
In Germany, did the same thing happen? Did all the great industrialists come forward quickly and willingly go all out for war?
"No," and this was emphatic; "Every industrialist knew that we could not win a war and so there was no enthusiastic support for war among them."
How about Fritz Thyssen? We were given to understand that he was typical of the big industrialists in Germany who supported Hitler to the hilt.
"Thyssen is a weak man who supported Hitler in the beginning because ho thought Hitler was a social reformer and Thyssen was interested in that. Do not confuse this Thyssen with his old father. I knew him. He was a groat man. This Thyssen is weak. The son is not the father.
"Many industrialists I knew had the courage to tell Hitlo the truth, that we could not win a war against England and America. It did not add up for us. But Gooring always talked of victory and that is what Hitler wanted to hear and so his influence increased.
"Many industrialists, even when our Luftwaffe seemed invincible, had the courage and foresight also to warn that our own factories would one day be bombed. But Goering always boasted that no enemy bomber would ever penetrate into Germany. That deceived the people. And Hitler. It did not deceive the industrialists.
"And there was at least one military man who opposed Goering — Udet, He knew the capacity of British and American factories to produce airplanes. He told Hitler, and Goering, that Germany would unquestionably lose superiority .in the air by the beginning of 1943 and that after that German industry would be at the mercy of enemy bombers. You know what happened to Udet. He shot himself. No, he was not shot. He did it himself. I am sure of that.
"After the British in 1942 began their systematic bombing attacks, there was sudden effort to dislocate all our factories — to disperse them, I moan, move them into safer areas and put some of them even underground.
"But you will understand that the moving of a factory with all the people who work in it is not a thing that can be done quickly without groat loss of production. Much manpower is required for the moving, and also many materials — bricks and cement and steel. And while it is being moved, it might just as well be destroyed. It does not produce.
"You must understand that I was out of direct touch with things in the end; but of course I learned much through friends, I know our industrial capacity, and I could see with my own eyes what it had done to our great cities with your bombing.
"Last evening, we sat here, three of us, and we made a list of all the German cities of more than 50,000 people. All of those cities are gone. Wiped out. Destroyed to the ground so far as industry is concerned. You ask me now whan will Germany recover from this bombing?
"My answer is: Never,"
We pointed out that "never" was a very long time. We reminded him that in England, for instance, Coventry had been wiped out, and yet Coventry today produces more than before it was "coventrized."
"Yes that is true. But remember, Coventry was a single city. In Germany, every city is destroyed. Do you understand, every city ruined.
"These are things that I tell you as a financial man. But there is here a man who has great military knowledge, General Thomas. He was the chief for the military of the Economics and Armaments Office."
The young American MP captain in charge of the hotel and its VIE guests sent for Gen. Thomas. In a few minutes, he came down. He shook hands stiffly, a rubber smile on his leathery face; as he put out his hand, he lowered his eyes, bowed as if he wore a too-tight corset. He was a small man, but obviously keen. He looked exactly like Hollywood's Eric von Stroheim made up to play the part of Rommel the Desert Fox. Vie sat down, explained once more exactly what we were after: The effect of Allied bombing on Germany's war effort. Dr. Schacht interpreted.
"All German industrialists were acutely aware of the probability that Gorman factories would be bombed" — General Thomas spoke rapidly, without hesitation, in musical German. Dr. Schacht considered carefully before he translated into his scholarly English:
"The Government did not have plans for the dispersal of factories, but there were plans; and the work was going on.
"But your bombing caught certain strategic centers and destroyed them — the ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt, for instance — and that affected all industry, no matter how it was dispersed. Such bombing was the decisive factor in your victory.
"First the bombing of such strategic centers, and then the destruction of our transportation facilities. The bombing of the bridges and the rail yards through which we brought oil from Rumania hurt us more quickly than the bombing of the refineries at Ploesti, And finally the bombing of our synthetic oil plants hurt us very much.
"Not until the end was the bombing of troops effective. Victory is production, and you destroyed German production. Victory is movement - you paralyzed us.
"When we could not produce or move, then your planes came over our troops and they saw no German planes but only the enemy, and so their morale was destroyed."
We tried to pin General Thomas down: Do you feel that in time bombing alone would have beaten Germany?
"Absolutely not."
How then would you evaluate the effect of bombing on Germany's capacity to wage war? There was little hesitation in his answer:
"Without bombing, the war would have gone on for a long time, for years. Bombing was the decisive factor in the defeat of Germany this year."
Then, under questioning, General Thomas repeated what Dr. Schacht had said: Germany was defeated the day she began a total war. He was most emphatic in building his "I-told-you-so" case:
"I was always opposed to war. I saw war in terms of my speciality, which was production. And I knew that German production was to British and American production as one is to four, or even worse against us.
"No, I did not foresee that Russia would be brought into the war. But even without Russia defeat for Germany was certain in a long -war."
Wo askod General Thomas: Do you beliuve that Hitler is dead?
"I do not know. I have been out of touch."
We askod them both: At what point in the war do you believe that Hitler knew Germany was defeated? Thomas agreed with what Schacht had already said:
"1 doubt that Hitler or Himmler ever realized that Germany could not win. They kept telling themselves that something would happen, some miracle. I know that Hitler felt England and America v;ould in the end fight against Russia."
How about Goebbels? Dead?
"I do not know about that either." Schacht answered: "A thing people do not realize is that Goebbels was the only intelligent man among them all. And also he was a man of great courage, yes that is true. Hitler, Himmler, Goering, all of thorn were cowards. But not Goebbels."
What sort of a man was Himmler?
"Terriblel The worst of them all". Both were emphatic on this point: "He is truly a frightful man. I do not know what has happened to him..."
We told them that the radio reported the capture of Himmler a few hours ago; they showed instant excitement and keen interest:
"No! Is it true! Then it is wonderful news] But I hope that you do not kill him. He must not become a martyr that way. You should let the German people try him.. .they would take care of him.,.he must be made to suffer a long time..."
There was almost a personal delight in their faces as they contemplated special punishment for Himmler; somewhere, there must have been sharp clashes between these two men and Himmler.
An American captain came and said they must pack and go now. We rose to shake hands — Thomas was composed and stiff again, Schacht smiling and eager to seem friendly.
"Do you know where they are taking us now?"
We did not. There was nervousness in their question — obviously, they had been often told to pack and move to unknown destinations.
"Can you then perhaps tell me how I can get a message to my wife that I am well, and how can I get a message back from her? She is living now I believe on a little country place outside Berlin..."
There was real anxiety in his voice now; but again, we could giving him no help. We explained that Berlin was in another Theater of war and there was no way in which we could get such information. His face fell, looked more grey, his suit seemed suddenly much too big for him.
Thomas and Schacht went out into the lobby of the hotel; there was much activity. An American girl, member of the Budapest State Department mission, came up to Dr. Schacht and asked him to autograph a German bank note that bore his name as president of the Reichsbank; he smiled and complied. And then she asked him to sign an American dollar bill "short snorter"; he looked at it carefully, then laughed and said: "You do not want my name on this, do you? This is good money,'"
After they had packed, we tried to get their pictures; too much bustle. All the other "guests" were lined up, shaking hands, saying good-bye. Again and again, the parting words were:
"Auf nach Buchenwald...off to Buchenwald" — a joke now, but not so long ago it would not have been funny.
Outside, as they all piled into jeeps, we got pictures ol both Schacht and Thomas; they asked how they should pose. Interestingly enough, though Genoral Thomas had said he did not speak English, when we askod him to take his hat off, he did.
When thoy had loft, we sent for Fritz Thyssen. We had watched him during the interrogation of Schacht and Thomas — he sat at a writing desk, thinking long and hard before he wrote each liru. He was most affable now, like the others, eager to talk. We put him in the bright sun on the porch — I planned to take pictures of him while we talked.
"Not in the sun, please.. .my eyes...".
So we moved our chairs, but still kept him in enough light to shoot the pictures. We cocked the camera, focussed it, kept it on him throughout the interview. Only once did he seem to object to the pictures — when we tried to catch him laughing. We opened the interrogation by explaining the purpose: To get his opinion of the effect of bombing on German industry.
"You must understand that I have been a prisoner of Hitler for a long time, many things I do not know very well. For instance, I do not know what happened to my steel plants which were once the largest in Germany...not so large perhaps as your U. S. Steel Company, but still very large for Europe. My father built them up..."
We explained to him that probably his steel plants were not greatly damaged, because steel had not been high on the bombing priority lists.
"I was against the war from the beginning; I voted against it in 1939 and went to Switzerland shortly after that. It was in Paris in 1940 that I was taken prisoner. I have been in Buchenwald since then.
"And so of course I cannot say exactly what your bombing has done to Germany's industry. But this I do know:
"It was inevitable that Germany would have lost this war because it was inevitable that the United States would come into it if England did. And then your production would guarantee for you the victory.
"Your bombing only served to increase the margin of advantage in your favor.
Ifl/Jhat will happen after this war? When will Germany recover? Germany would not have recovered after the last war if it had not been for American financing. With our own steel works, it was Dillon, Reed Company who did it for us. Mr. Eberstadt, perhaps you know him, he was the man who worked with us. He knows German industry thoroughly,...."
We explained that Mir. Eberstadt had held an important job in America's Government setup for war production.
"I am sure that Germany, after your bombing, will stand no chance at all for recovery without credit in America this time. And will that be available to us this time? I do not know the answer. .... "
"I am going to the Argentine where my daughter is now. My wife is with me. What will I do in the Argentine? Whatever I can do to help my Rhineland recover...".

TAB I. REICHSMINISTER ALBERT SPEER

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
A.P.O. 413
15 May 1945 EXTRACT
REICHS5MNISTER ALBERT SPEER

Initial Interrogation of Albert Speer

Albert Speer was today interrogated by Lt. Sklarz and Sgt. Fessberg et Schloss Gluecksburg (Schleswig-Holstein). Interrogation and investigation of Speer's personal records started at 1330 hours, end was concluded at 1645 hours. Speer showed himself extremely cooperative. He is without a doubt a man of very unusual ability and has a complete picture of the German war effort. His memory, especially in regard to questions of armament production, both technical and economic, is astounding. He shows great pride in the results achieved by German production while under his control. He has been associated with the Party for the past twelve years and made a definite statement to that effect. He did not at any time criticize leading personalities of the regime, nor was any attempt made by the interrogators to elicit such remarks from him«. Further detailed interrogation of Speer has been tentatively scheduled for tomorrow at which time his personal reports to Hitler will be examined.

Location of Further Records and Key Personnel

According to Speer, valuable information should be found at Hamburg. As of April 15, 1945 Dr. Hottlage was set up at the Comrnerzbank there, of which he is a director. According to Speer, the proceedings of Zentrale Planung, recorded in shorthand are available at the Commerzbank through Hettläge. Speer claims, though, tha+ these records will be disappointing to us since Zentrale Planung did not play a great part in the production program. Hettlage himself, however, should be very useful on account of hi's unusual memory for figures, Speer asserted. There should also be a good source of information in the files of Ruestungskintor, also last located at Hamburg, Also accessible at the same location should be Besch of the Planungsamt, as well as Speer 's Zentrelernt which has or had a register containing all evacuation addresses of the ministry. Speer suggested that both Generalfcldmarscholl Mich (a close personal friend of Speer) and Schulze'Fielitz of Amt Energie were or are in the vicinity of Flensburg but gave no definite address. V.e will check this situation tomorrow if possible, Stobbe Bethlefsen (former chief of Amt Bau-C.T.) is thought by Speer to be in Dortmund at the Dortmunder Union steel corporation. His information concerning Amt Beu-0»T. will be more complete than Borsch's (present chief of Amt Bau). The Technisches Amt was last reported to Speer as located in a train in a tunnel near Goehlen (?) near Salzburg, Austria.

Speer's Critique of Strategic Bombing

Asked about his opinion on Allied target selection, Speer stated that in general the right targets had been selected. The final decision was due in greet part to the elimination of German synthetic oil production. Oil and high grade steel were the two focal points of all war production. Steel, however, was et no time decisively affected by strategic bombing. The bombing of the ball bearing industry did not bring about a decisive setback although the reserves of the industry shortly after the bombing were sufficient for only five days of production. The crisis was, however, overcome by redesigning motors and engines speedily and thereby effecting a saving up to 30% of bearings per unit. Our continuous bombing of aircraft assembly and other dispersed plants was not considered of decisive effect by Speer. He compared German war production to L stream. Instead of boirbing the source (steel), we chose to concentrate on the mouth. This could not decisively alter the course of the stream.

Collaboration between Speer and the Armed Services

Asked about armament production decisions and thereby touching on the whele complex of questions about coordination of Speer's machine and the tactical plans of the armed services, Speer gave the following picture:
Extremely smooth cooperation between Speer and the chiefs of the armed services was maintained throughout the wer. The services never interfered with Speer's planning end accepted his decisions without criticizing them. Speer claimed that until summer 1944 he was always able to give the three services rather accurate indications about armament deliveries for six months in advance. The services were therefore able to plan all operations in the field without having to make emergency demands on Speer. He claimed that he was never consulted about any tactical matters and that even for Bundstedt's winter offensive no special demands were put to him.
Although a very wide range of questions of vital interest to the Survey was touched in the initial interrogation of Speer, the undersigned considered it his duty to limit these questions to a mere probing for information in order to gain a clear picture of the main issues that will now have to be developed step by step. It is therefore not possible at this early date to report about any detailed matters like organization of the ministry, as well as the situation in each phase of the German war effort. All these issues can and vill now be discussed separately with Speer,

Minutes of Meeting with Reichsminister Albert Speer

Flensburg, Germany 17 May 1945

Question: One of the fundamental problems is: whose attacks were more effective on industry, British or American?

Speer: "when the English bombs actually hit they caused more destruction. I forbade the press to mention that American bombs caused less effect. Perhaps the explosive is not so good, I don't know. My opinion is that the detonator was not sensitive enough and thus the crater was too deep and the blast went up instead of out to the side as was the case with English bombs. In addition you dropped lighter bombs while the English mixed mines which had a greater effect then the bombs."

Dumbach: It isn't true that a 500-lb. bomb has one-half the effect of a 1,000-lb. bomb. A 2,000-lb. bomb would be preferable as it would tear up the foundations. In the small weights the difference in effect is not double per double weight.

Question: You aren't referring to the bombing technique but rather hits by English and American bombs.

Speer: "Then there has been a misunderstanding. The American method was more dangerous because it was an economic war technique while the English were aiming for centers of cities. If the Americans had used the British mixture, the synthetic production of oil would have been destroyed last October, perhaps even earlier. The English attacked Foelitz twice at night and hit it well. The English also hit Leuna at night. The directors were shocked at the effect and reported that this plant would be cut of operation for a long time while we had assumed that there would be some production after six weeks."

TAB J. ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING

Major GALLENKAMP - Intelligence Officer.

"The greatest single cause of the German oollapso was Allied strategic bombing of the German transportation system. Gutting our rail lines indirectly restricted the production of our industries. For example, my father-in-law's factory in Osnabrück - the Schoeller Photo-Paper Factory - began to feel the coal shortage acutely during the late.fall of 1944« In January, I945» so little coal could be transported from the Ruhr due to the air attacks against the transportation network that 5°^ of the factory activities were shut down,
"By the beginning of 1945» air attacks had reduced railroad traffic in North Italy to an insignificant trickle of supplies. The effectiveness of these attacks depended largely on whether the target was a railroad bridge or simply a section of the line. Mien anti-porsonnel 'butterfly bombs' were dropped on a bombed-out bridge, the difficulty of repair was increased tremendously. As a certain number of these bombs were fused to explode within a half-hour after striking the ground, our repair crews were compelled to wait a half-hour bofore attempting reconstruction. The remaining 'butterfly bombs', fusee5 to explore on contact, then had to be sot off, A gunner, protected by a shield, fired at the individual bombs from a distance of-50 to 60 meters. By this method six hours wore required to explode 113 bombs. ' Though our personnel losses were quite small, the time lost was tremendous.
"The air war against railroad communications was a greater factor in the German defeat than the raids against industrial targets. Very often the factories were missed entirely or else slightly damaged. Though the destruction of the surrounding residential sections might break the morale of a people like the Italians, it could not knock the Germans out of the war» Without a doubt a successful Allied invasion of the continent would have been impossible without the destruction of cur communications system by Allied air attacks. If we had had an effective railroad system behind us at Saint Lo, so that supplies and reinforcements could have been rushed in at the right moment, the case might have been entirely different."

Major BUDELMAUN - Airfield Commander.

"Strategic bombing of German industry and transportation is, in my opinion, the one paramount reason for Germany's defeat. As the aircraft industry was largely dispersed in various sections, attacks on a few invportrnt departments could hold up production all clo.ii the line. Attacks on the transportation system, furthermore, hold up production by delaying the r'elivcry of vital material."

General HARTMANN - General Der Artillerie.

"Damage by Allied air action against railraod and M/T transportation was very great. Primarily the greatest damage was to material - railroad cars, trucks, cargoes, etc., but personnel losses were very slight.,. During the crucial fighting at Cassino, the railroad line from Florence south could not be kept in regular operation, and the material had to be brought a distance of 600 kms.

Hauptmann FRAECHENTRAEGER - Squadron Commander.

We were beaten a year ago when Allied air attacks against gasoline and aircraft industries had crippled our air am and our transport . bion system had begun to cr&cl:. I attribute Germany's defeat primarily to the strength of your air force for without strategic bombing of industry and transportation, you could not have successfully invaded the continent. Lack of gasoline hold us up more than lack of aircraft. In my opinion, one bomb dropped against a gasoline plant was north two bembs dropped against an aircraft factory."

ALLIED AIR POWER

General HARTMANN - General Der Artillerie.

"Allied air power was the most outstanding cause of Germany's defeat. Aftor Germany had conquered France and the low countries and thus laid the foundation for a 'Festung Europa' , almost the entire Allied war strategy had to be aimed at caning to grips with the Wehrmacht on ths jJuropcan continent. That the Allies were not only able to establish a foothold in Europe, but also to drive the war to a successful conclusion, is the victory of the Allied Air Forces.
"In the first place, the Allied Atlantic Life Line was seriously threatened by our submarine warfare. Had German strategy succeeded at this point, America would never have been able to transport sufficient material to Great Britain to launch a successful invasion ag-inst tl;c Continent. Allied bombing attacks against sub-ycrcl.3 and factories nanuf r cturing U-boat components, plus the Allied1 air and naval operations against operating submarines were largely responsible for our defect in the Battle of the Atlantic.
"In the second place, the Allied landings in Europe could never have been successful without Allioc air superiority. Possibly without air superiority a landing might have been made, although the beachhead could have boen isolated and later wiped out if we had been able to rush reserves immediately to the front and for that, our transportation system would have to have been functioning effectively* Allied air attacks against our communications network prior to and following the actual invasion were responsible for the success of the invasion.
"In the third place, after the failure of our submarines and the establishment of Allied landings on the continent, the war had to be fought on the continent, within easy bombing range of the most vital organs of the German war targets (not easy targets, perhaps, but still targets), for your air arm.
"Not to be left out of the picture, of course, are the Russian advances, our loss of rsnvower and equipment on the Eastern Front, and the gradual capture of vital industries by the advancing Rud Army. Th-a question still remains, however, how far the Russians could have advanced without the Allied strategic bombings. Throughout the last months of the Eastern campaign, our troops worn seriously handicapped by the need for an un-impaired transportation network behind them.

Major BUDELMANN - Airfield Commander.

"In January 1941, Flieger Korps 10, under General GEISSLER, arrived at Catania at Fliegerhorst Kommandantur A 230, and carried out boribing raids on Malta. After this unit left, around May 1941 for Greece, the task of bombing Malta was left temporarily to the Italians - who did a miserable job. On one occasion the Italians were supposed to fly a fighter cover for a German bombing mission against Mrlta - a half hour later they were saying they couldn't locate the island.
"According to tales current at our mess, the Italian Colonel at the airport used to fly over to Malta for lunch with the garrison commander. The actual air and sea invasion of Malta was supposed to have been undertaken by the Italians betrween March and June 1942. Nothing cane of this plan, however. The Italian fleet didn't stir from Messina, alleging a shortage of petroleum,"

F.A.D

TAB K. INTERVIEW WITH DR. SCHACHT

Germany's financial wizard of the "30s, Doctor Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank during the critical years of 1933 - 1938, was interviewed 29 May I945 in a Prisoner of War compound by two officers from Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces , Intelligence Section.

German Economy

Dr. Schacht became president of the Reichsbank in March 1933 vjith an appointment for a four-year term, and joined with Hitler because he thought Germany should re-arm up to the point to which other European nations were arming in order to permit Germany a satisfactory place in negotiations and because he thought he saw enough "elan" in the Party to carry out this program. All leading German industrialists and financiers were similarly minded and there was no sincere opposition by these groups to Hitler's plans at that time.
At the expiration of the four-year term in March 1937» Dr. Schacht refused re-appointment unless the colossal re-armament expenditures were stopped or reduced, as he felt that Germany was now sufficiently armed and further armament would disastrously weaken the normal German economic structure. Hitler accepted, or appeared to accept, this condition, appointing Dr. Schacht to the presidency of the Reichsbank for a provisional term of one year.
The budget for the year March 1937 - I938 was already approved and included the sum of three billion marks for rearmament, of which approximately two-fifths was allotted to the Luftwaffe. (General Georg Thomas of Military Economic Office, comparable to our Wer Production Board - estimates that this percentage of budget allotment to the Luftwaffe was roughly maintained until the end of the war.)
The lest loan for general budgetary purposes was floated by Dr. Schecht in the fell of I938, and from this point on £.11 the financing by the Government Y;E-S on a short term basis. (By short term he means about 9 years with interest at around three and L half percent.) The Government in Germany had no difficulties in financing itself, principally because cf severe rationing and price control of consumer goods which always made large amounts of money available for internal investment purposes.
In the meantime, in March 1938» Dr. Schacht had accepted the presidency of the Reichsbank for another four years, but he was not fated to finish this term of office. The circumstances surrounding his final dismissal were as follows:
In the first days of January 1939, Dr. Schacht saw Hitler concerning the re-armament policy, which Schacht had consistently opposed after March I937, and Kitler remarked, "Now I have discovered how to finance these things." Hitler promised to have a meeting with Schacht and Schwering Kosigk, Finance Minister in the Cabinet, within a week. Schacht reminded Hitler of the billion marks assessed the Jews after tb. Paris incident of November I938 which was to have been paid in four instalments of 250 million marks each. The Jews were only able to raise 170,000,000 marks on the first payment and the other 80 million had to be paid with various types of credits and commodities. Hitler asked Schacht to issue 80 million marks in money through the Reichsbank on these credits, which Schacht refused.
On January 8, 1939, Schacht delivered to Hitler a memorandum on finance signed by all the directors of the Reichsbank, in which he pointed out that such an issue v;ould mean ruining of the currency. Hitler's answer was to dismiss Schacht 20 January 1939. Two other members of the Directorate of thu Reichsbank were dismissed at the same time, and three others resigned which left only two of the original directorate.
There were no Cabinet meetings of the Hitler government after March I938 and Dr. Schacht was not consulted on financial matters after his dismissal in January 1939.
When Schacht left the Reichsbank in January 1939, total Reichsbank notes in circulation amounted to about 8 billion marks whereas note circulation today is at least 80 billion marks. Also at the time of Schacht's departure the national debt amounted to approximately 80/90 billion marks (exclusive of the Reichsbank note issue) against a national debt at the end of the war of about 450 billion marks. This deterioration in national finance took place under Schwering Kosigk who was Finance Minister up to the time of the capitulation.
Dr. Schacht estimates total German armament expenditures for the years I933 through 1939 &t 40 to 45 billion marks. The amount for the year 1933 was very little and for 1934/5/6/7 about 30 billion marks.

Barter

It was during 1934 that Dr. Schacht started the famous barter deals, principally with South American and Balkan countries, although South Africa and Spain came in for a small share. Originally Germany delivered on the barter deals, but at the start of war such a great proportion of German industry was working purely for armament that consumer goods manufacturing was reduced to the point where the German Government was unable to make deliveries as promised and instead set up credits for the unfortunate countries at the other end of the barter arrangements. Sweden was the only exception to this situation and according to Schacht never gave Germany any credit but insisted either upon cash payment for goods delivered or on an immediate physical exchange of bartered goods.
At present Dr. Schacht believes that the total amount standing to the credit of the countries involved with Germany on barter deals amounts to at least 12 billion marks.

Importance of Air Power

Dr. Schacht believes that the deciding factor in the European war was Allied air povrer. "Vie have been overwhelmed by your air force," he exclaimed. He believes that from the American or Allied point of view, strategic bombing is the most economical method of attaining a military end yet conceived; economical from the point of view of the cost in money and resources and from the point of view of lives saved. The priority of targets as worked out by the Allies was "masterly", Dr. Schacht said. The early raids on the Schweinfurt ball bearing plants were one of the greatest blows to the Gorman war machine, particularly in view of the fact that Sweden, who was giving Germany no credit, was the chief remaining source of import for ball bearings.

After Retirement

Dr. Schacht remained a Minister without Portfolio in the Hitler government until Jenuery 1911-3, and conscious of a certain responsibility, despite the fact that he was nover consulted, made a series of ill-fated ettempts to remedy the situation.
In the summer of 1941 he wrote a letter to Hitler, asking him to make peace after the first attacks on Russia. The letter was answered politely by one of Hitler's intimates, but later Schacht learned that Hitler had remarked to his generals, "Schacht versteht mich immer noch nicht" (Schacht still does not understand me) and in which the latter heartily agreed. iiC;ain in the early fall of 1942, upon receipt of an order from Hitler that no Minister might listen to foreign broadcasts without the express permission of the Fuehrer, Schacht wrote to Hitler in protest and requested his absolute dismissal from the Hitler government, Hitler refused.
'Vhcn in November 1942 placing 15-16 year old boys in Flak units was contemplated, Schacht wrote to Gocring protesting such a measure in the bitterest terms end for this offense he was dismissed from his nomine 1 position of Minister without Portfolio in January 1943» The dismissal w&s done in the most definite manner and he was required to return the gold Party badge v^hich had been conferred upon ell Ministers. Dr. Schacht then retired completely from ell public life.
After the bomb plot of 20 July 1944 Schacht was imprisoned in solitary confinement in various camps, narrowly escaped death ct Dachau and finally released by the American Armies in May 1945.

German-Japanese Relations

Dr. Schacht has no direct evidence, but believes that the Japanese atteck on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 was not coordinated vith the German Government. Here, he says, we give too much credit either to the Germans or the Japanese. Oshima, the Japanese representative in Berlin, v;as generally drunk from about ten o'clock in the morning on, end little planning and coordination could be expected from him.

Miscellany
Dr. Schacht was never impressed with Hitler. He regards him as one of the most personally unscrupulous men of his acquaintance, and has a still lower opinion of Goering, who is a complete charlatan. Goering's appreciation of the German industrial situation in relation to the German war effort was nil. In the early days of the war, when told that United States steel producing capacity was four times that of Germany, he said, "You must have added an extra zero to the American figure," and refused to discuss the matter further.
Dr. Schacht is still convinced that Hitler is not dead end suggests that it is quite possible that Hitler is attempting to make his way by submarine to Japan. He believes if Hitler had actually been killed in defense of the Reich, the German newspapers and radio would have made a great hullaballoo about his "Heldentot" (hero's death). (This seems to be rather far-fetched as the German propaganda system at that stage was in a poor situation for communication with the people.)
In Dr. Schacht's opinion, Hitler was impatient to go to war, and did not properly evaluate the vulnerability of German industry to potential Allied Air power.

FREDERICK J. HAAS, Major, Air Corps, H .Q,. , M. A. A. F, , P .W. Intelligence Section.

TAB L. FACTORS IN GERMANY'S DEFEAT (B Series)

The following are the opinions of twelve high-ranking German Air Force officers on the general effects of Allied day and night strategic bombing: as set out in the five questions recently submitted by U.S.A.A.F, These opinions are of general interest and are therefore given a wider circulation. It is intended to interrogate other high-ranking officers on the sane lines as and when they arrive in England, and it is hoped to issue further reports in due course.

Generalleutnant Galland..... Commanding General, Fighters

Genoralmajor Kolb ..... 1940 Abteilung 5 - Technical Training - Reichsluftfahrtministerium (Air Ministry), 1943 - Area Airport Command (East), August i944 Furth.

Generalmajor von Rohden ..... Chief of Abteilung 8 (Historical) of the German Air Force General Staff.

General Ingenieur Spies ..... Chief Engineer of Luftflotte 2 until Autumn 1943. After a period of bad health was appointed, in August 1944, Chief Ehgineer of Luftflotte 10.

Generalleutnant Untrioser ..... At Allgemeine VerwaltungRoichsluftfahrtministerium (Air Ministry).

Generalfeldmarshall Sperrle ........... Commanding General of Luftflotte 3 until the fall of Paris.

General Bodenschatz ..... Chief Administrative Office of the Luftwaffe High Command until the Hitler bomb plot.

Generalmajor Ibel ..... Commanding General of Jagd Division 2.

Generalmajor Peterson ..... Air Attache to Denmark I939 - May 1940 and to Sweden until Autumn 1942. From January 1943 onwards Area Airport Command Boblingen and subsequently Croatia.

Generalmajor Seidel ..... 1938 - 1944 General of the Quartermaster. July 1944 onwards, Commanding General of Luftflotte 10,

Generalmajor von Massow .... Commanding General, Training

Generalleutnant Veith Commanding General, Flak Training.

FACTORS IN GERMANY'S DEFEAT

Qustion No. 1

What is the general opinion of the effectiveness of United States strategic bombing of the aircraft and fuel industries of Germany?

Generalleutnant Galland

The heavy attacks by United States strategic boribors on the main centers of German aircraft production early in 1944 practically destroyed the German fighter production. For a short period but at that time their dispersal program was already under way and after a short period it was possible again to maintain production. The figure for fighters, night fighters and fighter bombers in 1944 reached a total of 3050 aircraft per month while the average for 1943 was about 2500. In Galland's opinion it was the Allied bombing of the oil industries which had the greatest effect on Germany's war potential; reduction in the quantity of available petrol forced the curtailment of supplies for training. From the autumn of 1944 onwards plenty of training and operational aircraft wore available and there were enough pilots up to the end of 1944» but lack of petrol did not permit the expansion or proper training of the fighter force as a whole, Galland wondered why we waited so long to attack German oil production.
N.B. The figure of 3050 aircraft given by Galland represents the peak monthly figure v/hich was attained in August or September 1944 and it includes a total of 600 aircraft coming from repair factories. It also included all single and twin-engine day and night fighter types, jet-propelled aircraft and new types such as the DO 335. From September 1944 until December output declined continuously when the total amounted to 2000, of which 500 represented repaired aircraft.

Generalmajor von Massow

Strategic bombing of the aircraft industry was a blow which was soon overcome by dispersal, but the attack on Gorman oil production which, according to von Massow, was opened in July 1944» was in his opinion the largest factor of all in reducing Germany's war potential.

Generalmajor Kolb

This general considers that at the opening of the bombing of aircraft industry the Germans were caught short by having left their factories vulnerable to air attack, and dispersal to the underground sites should have started far earlier than it did. This Prisoner of War could not understand why the Allied bombing of oil refineries and fuel depots started so late as it did.

Generalmajor von Rohden

Strategic bombing was the decisive factor in the long run. This Prisoner of War, however, made the proviso that had the Luftwaffe been reorganized on a 90% defensive basis at an earlier date than actually was the fact, Allied strategic bombing might not have been so successful.

General Ingenieur Spies

This Prisoner's of War comment on strategic bombing of aircraft and fuel industries in Germany was in the form of a counter-question - "Why did you not begin bombing the oil industries earlier?" The industry was always a weak point in German economy, and targets like Leuna were easily damaged. Once the bonbing had begun it was extremely effective and Allied intelligence was such that they know exactly when a target was ready to recommence refining and immediately opened further attack. He considers that U.S. bombing attacks on the aircraft industry, while very successful and effective, had not such a far-reaching effect as attacks on oil.
It is perhaps worth repeating that he particularly praised the accuracy of both day and night bombing fron about 1943 onwards. It was quite obvious to him that a lot of thought had been put into the question of which target should be attacked - for instance the ball-bearing industry - and in his opinion the only nistrke we made was, that oil was not made the primary target from the beginning.

Generalleutnant Untrioser

This general also echoed the opinion that attecks on the fuel industry were the more effective than those on the aircraft industry, since in the latter case dispersal of assembly plants followed almost immediately. As a proof of this, Prisoner of War pointed out that aircraft production was maintained at a high level up to the last months of the war.

Question. No. 2

At what point in the war did strategic bombing cause the German General Staff to revise its tactical and strategical plans of operation?

Genoralmajor Kolb

This Prisoner of War is of the opinion that from the middle of 1943 onwards, Germany was forced into a major revision of its strategic plans of operations. The powor of Allioc1 day and night strategic bombing forced Germany on to the defensive from that time onwards,

Generalmajor von Rohden

Strategic bombing caused the General Staff bo revise its plans in the early summer of 1943« Aircraft reporting anc1 rad.:r units were the first to be withdrawn fron "Russia to strengthen Western defenses.

Generalleutnant Galland

Galland believes that Allied strategic bonbing did not actually dictate any change in tactics on any front at any tine. In developing this argument he pointed out that on the Eastern Front it was Russia's quantitative superiority and the extension of German supply lines which caused the breakdown. In the West, in 1940 and I9lj.l1 it was the R.A.F. fighter force which prevented the German Army fron advancing on England. In the African campaign the Allied tactical air superiority enabled the Allied forces to move forward, and again in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, Allied successes were largely due to tactical air superiority. Strategic bombing, in his opinion, never forced any great changes in planning and strategy until after the opening of the invasion, when the disorganization of German communications in the West by strategic bombing forced the withdrawal to the German frontier. In the closing two months of the war, the crippling of German transport system brought about the swift collapse of such resistance as remained.

General Ingenieur Spies

Although this Prisoner of War did not know whether the German General Strff revised their plans or not, he was in close contact with General Jeschonnek late in 1941 and the latter told him then that Germany would have to face severe strategic bombing; at that time, however, it was hoped that the war would not last long enough for this to take place.

Question No. 3.

Would the invasion of the European Continent have been possible without strategic bombing of transportation and communication facilities?

Generalmajor von Rohden

This Frisoner of War expressed the blunt opinion that invasion of Europe would have been impossible without strategic bombing.

General Ingenieur Spies.

This Prisoner of War stated categorically that without air superiority the invasion would have been defeated. Superiority was needed both strategically to attack German communications, and tactically to aid the advancing armies. He ascribed the speed of Allied advance both in Africa and France to the very effective tactical bombing of all types of target including transport facilities and he considered the strategic disruption of communications was the vital factor.

Generalmajor Peterson

The invasion could not have taken place without the strategic bombing of transport and communications.

General Bodenschatz

The invasion could not have been made without tho overwhelming superiority of the Allied Air Force. The Germans could not bring up their reserves as the railways were cut; they could not move their troops by road in daylight, and as the nights were short, only very little tine was left to move their troops at all.

Generalfeldrarehall Sperrle

Allied bombing was the dominant factor in the preparation for and execution of the invasion. In his opinion, the initial landing would have been possible without the assistance of the Air Force but the subsequent breakthrough would have been out of the question without the nassive scale of bombing, particularly of the communications far into the German rear.

Generalmajor Ibel

Without air superiority, the invasion of Europe would have been impossible. This General could not speak from personal experience but was of the opinion that a major factor in the success of the invasion was that reserves could not be brought up owing to the bombing of communications.

Generalleutnant Veith

Invasion of the Continent would have been possible without the assistance of an Air Force, but in such a case the Germans would have been able to prevent a breakthrough and would have thrown the invading forces back into the sea. In his opinion, the Allied breakthrough would have been utterly impossible without strategic as well as tactical bombing. Prisoner of War gave special prominence to the latter type of attack.

Generalmajor Seidel

This prisoner of war had no first-hand experience but was of the opinion that without the disruption of German communications the invasion would have been a failure.

Question No. 4

Did United States bombing of strategic objectives paralyze German iidustry or German transportation, or if neither of these, against what phase of German industry or Army did air bombing have the greatest effect?

Genoralmajor Kolb

Kolb considers that air bombing had the greatest effect on industry in the attack on communications.

Generalleutnant Galland

Galland considers that the bombing of communication facilities such as railroads, canals, bridges, etc. was the most important single factor in the defeat of Germany, In fact, he termed this bombing "decisive." He was careful to point out, however, that this bombing could only be called decisive in the light of the general Allied tactics which nere actually usedj he thought that with the Allied material and numerical superiority there might have been other means of winning it without bombing. He rated bombing targets in the following scale of effectiveness.
1. Transport facilities, because of their direct importance to military operations and war production.
2. Oil targets, because of their relation to the function of air forces, armored forces and military transport and in dustry in general,
3. General industry including aircraft production.
4. Attacks on cities to cripple manpower.

Genoralmajor von Bohden

Bombing of communications was the main factor which upset German industry. The next greatest effect of bombing was against fuel.

General Ingenieur Spies

Experience in Russia had taught him that bombing of transport facilities, although causing delay and confusion, was a trouble which could be overcome with surprising rapidity and that through lines could be built in stations and yards which appeared to be utterly destroyed. Nevertheless, when bombing of comnunicat ions began in Germany itself, the transport system was slowed down to such an extent that industry had groat difficulty in functioning. Ultimately, delay in getting somi-finished products to the assembly factories progressively slowed down production until it almost cane to a stand-still early this year. The fact that semi-finished products had to be carried over long distances was due, in the first place, to the bombing of factories, which forced dispersal, and secondly to attacks on transport, which still caused delay in production.

Generalmajor Seidel

The decisive factor was the disruption of German transport communications.

Generalleutnant Veith

This Prisoner of War considers that the sequence of Allied, attacks was logical end effective, firstly, in our attacking the German aircraft industry which had not yet recovered sufficiently by the time the invasion arrived, and secondly that the destruction of the oil industry and the simultaneous dislocation of German communication system were decisive.

Question No. 5

Was Allied air power chiefly responsible for Germany's defeat in this war? Try to give specific instances and reasons for this opinion).

Generalleutnant Galland

Galland believed that Allied air power was the essential factor in the winning of the war in the same way as Germany's air power won the early campaigns in Poland, France andRussir. Allied military operations in Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy and during Rtmdstedtfe offensive were also decisive and dependent upon air superiority. In the last weeks of the war Allied air superiority stunned the German defenses rnd shortened hostilities by months.

Generalfeldmaisphall Sperrle

Sperrle thinks that Allied air power was the chief fector in Germany's defeat and he again emphasized the final confusion caused by the bombing of communications.

TAB M. REPORT OF MISSION TO BOLZANO

31 May 1945

Major Albert E, Stoll, Jr. - MAAF Intelligence
Capt. Herman J. Sander - MAAF Intelligence
Mr. John Foster, Tech Observer - Fifteenth Air Force
Mr. L. E. Rahurn, Tech Observer - Fifteenth Air Force
Lt. Carl Blumenschien - Special Projects (RCM) Fifteenth Air Force

Purpose:

To interrogate German personnel and visit flak installations at Bolzano in order to ascertain the effect of radar countermeasures employed by the Fifteenth Air Force.

Personnel Interrogated:

Major Hoefer - General von Pohl's Chief of Staff
Hauptman Bergenthum - Quartermaster, von Pohl's Staff
Hauptman Schultze - Signals Officer, von Pohl's Staff
Oberleutnant Bcie - Flak Officer on von Pohl's Staff
Oberst Haumsister - (Flak Fuehrer) CO of Flakregiment 5
Major Bißlemen - CO of Flakbattalion
Leutnant Marks - CO of Flakbatterie
Oberleutnant Flaig - Radar Officer of Flakbatterie
Oberleutnant Dahlke - S. und. I.
Major Frost - CO N.S.G. 9
Major Hutmcher - Operations Officer, N.S.G. 9
Oberst Bicrfolclor - CO 200 Luftnachrichten Regiment
Hauptman Schwinstor - I/352 Luftnachrichten Regiment
Oberleutnant Liebold - Air Inspector
Raupt Hhginecr Mohr - 200 Luftnachrichten Regiment
Haupt Engineer Mueller - S. und I.
Eauptman Kimia - 200 Luftnachrichten Regiment
Hauptman M;;us - Flak Operations Officer

Findings:

After ten days of interrogating various Luftraffe personnel, the radologists have prepared a technical report of their findings, In general it is believed that German radar development was on the wrong track and quite a bit behind that of the Allies. The scientists were too bound by conservative ideas and did not experiment enough.
The gasoline shortage was evidenced in several ways. There was no fuel allotted to run the electric generators so that men could get practice operating their equipment. Transportation was on a priority basis with flak materiel bearing a low priority.
The Germans evidently banked on their fighters as the best weapon against our bombers, When their industry could not produce the necessary fighters the German High Command being bound in red tape still continued to neglect new development; in flakvcupons and methods.
The German staff officers did not know the equipment used as well as the Allies did. Personnel were getting scarce and poorly trained duo to shortage of gasoline to run generators. Equipment was hard to get and modifications were slow in coming. Italy was a forgotten front!
Due to use of chaff, gunlaying radar was considered of little use. Battery commanders relied on visual gunlaying and used radar only because they were ordered by the High Command to keep in practice.

A. E. STOLL, JR., Major, Air Corps.

ADDENDA

During the ten days my party was in contact with members of the Luftwaffe. I queried them on various subjects not definitely called for by my mission. The substance of the conversations is herewith presented.

ME 262

Major Hutmacher of the General Staff Corps.

"Reichsmarshall Goering and Luftwaffe General Galland argued about the proper use of the ME 262. Goering wished it used as a fighter-bomber ( s it was used in the West with great losses to ground fire); Galland Fished it used strictly as a weapon against our four-engined heavies. Since Hitler wanted some Luftwaffe activity over the Western front every day Goering won the argument.
"Galland vas called to Fuehrer Headquarters after Me262 losses in the West had become very high. A plan was evolved to try his suggestions against the Fifteenth Air Force in January 1945. The industry was to produce some 4,000 aircraft for the mission. The planes were to stage in Austria or northern Italy and attack the bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force before rendezvous with their escort. An alternate plan was for one-third to engage escort, two-thirds to engage bombers.
"Needless to say the aircraft industry did not supply the planes - and anyway the war ended too soon,"

Major Hoefer, von Pohl's Chief of Staff.

"In the East the ME-262 was used as a fighter with great success: in the West it was used as a ground attack weapon with groat losses to small arms fire. No attempt was made to armor plate the jet engines."

The Surrender of ltaly

Oberleutnant Boie of the General Staff Corps, Flak Officer on von Pohl's Staff,

"I had an order from Germany to arrest or shoot von Pohl if he tried to negotiate a peace. Major Hoefer was to command here until General Pichard could arrive from Munich. Since I was of the same mind as von Pohl I pulled out the phone wires."

Signals Officer on General Staff.

Question: "Did you know where the Fifteenth Air Force missions were going?"

Answer: "Yes. Your weather reconnaissance tipped us off faithfully. We heard the weather ship call for takeoff instructions, followed it enroute to target area, intercepted its reports to Fifteenth Air Force Headquarters, By 0800 we knew the general target area.

"We followed the bombers circling over Foggia area, heard them call their Wing Headquarters - thus got battle order. Earling Warning System followed to Within gunlaying radar range, at which time the small wurzburgs started tracking."

Crew Chief of small Wurzburg (gunlaying radar).

Question: "What anti-jamming methods were used - not modification of equipment - but what did the radar operators do?"

Answer; "When spot jamming was apparent the operators would shift a half megacycle or so and track through the interference."

Crew Chief of Kommandogeraet (Visual gunlaying instrument).

Question: "Was information from gunlaying radar considered accurate?"

Answer: "No. Because of the effective use of Chaff we could use such information only 20 per cent of the time, and then only for altitude. We relied almost entirely on visual gunlaying."

Interesting note on movements in the Po Valley from Oberst Bierfolder's enlisted dispatch rider:

"I would ride my motorcycle for one kilometer, dismount, hide quickly, look in all directions (including up), listen for one minute; then ride off like hell for another kilometer, dismount, etc."

TAB N. M.A.A.F. FIELD INTELLIGENCE UNIT SPECIAL MISSION TO NORTHERN ITALY

30 May 1945

Preamble:

The undersigned was sent along as Interrogator-interpreter with a Mediterranean Allied Air Force, Field Intelligence Unit Mission to Northern Italy to obtain information on German Radar instruments and operation v/ith reference to:

a. Antiaircraft gun laying
b. Air warning system
c. Night fighter-bomber control

The administrative and directive activities of the Mission were carried out by Major Albert B. Stoll, Jr., who will report on the German personnel interrogated, the sites visited, and on certain information secured on Air tactics.
The report on radar will be made by the technical specialists: Mr. John Foster, Mr. Louis Raburn, and Lieutenent Carl Blumenschein.
As the German interpreter, my report concerns itself with ir.ore general statements made during the course of the interrogations or during more informal conversations v/ith German Air Force officers on matters political, military, and personal.
It should be said that before our Field Party of five moved up to Bolzano area, where all Luftwaffe personnel were still available for interrogation, I had acted as interpreter for interrogations by M.A.T.A.F. officers of four of the same Luftwaffe officers of whom we made use at Bolzano, These were members of General von Pohl's staff, and helped us establish contact with the persons and places of the area which could be of help to us. These officers of the Luftwaffe staff were most cooperative and spared no effort to help us in ev ry way possible -- whatever their motive may have been.
It should also be remembered that the following opinions were given:
a. by German Air Force officers whose experience with Americans were largely restricted to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations;
b. by men who were still only "internees" at the time of these conversations, and had been well treated;
c. casually and informally during the course of technical interrogations, in transit from one place to another, or during informal discussions at their quarters. No interrogation tricks ¥/ere required, and so far as the undersigned knows, all opinions were honestly and freely given. The statements made were what the men really thought.

Attitude toward Americans:

Hauptmann Berrenthum, who was Luftwaffe Supply officer for Italy on General von Fohl's Staff, volunteered the comment that American MP's were evidently selected men for they certainly riade a very favorable impression upon hin.
The saMe officer, when asked whether he thought that Americans vere a "soft and easy-going people", responded: "That is what we were told, but it has not been my experience thus far. You Americans are less formal in your military discipline than we are, but you have certainly been proper in your handling of us* We are, however, afraid that we shall be in Italy a long time."
Oberleutnant Beie, who was Flak Liaison officer on General von Pohl's staff, could read and speak English fairly well. Having been given such American periodicals as Stars and Stripes, Time Magazine, and Reader's Digest, he was amazed at the frankness with which articles critical of government, social conditions, and Allied differences of opinion were printed during war time. He felt that although some articles against Germans were a bit overdrawn, our reports on them was much more reliable than anything he had reed in German papers about themselves.
The parting statement to me of the German Colonel in charge of all Flak along the Brenner line, wasj "If you Americans need a good Flak officer against the Japanese, let me know. I should be very happy to help out'."
Major Frost, who commanded the Night Fighter-bomber Group in Italy confided in me: "You know, I consider myself unfortunate to have been born a German. I am an incurable flying enthusiast. I don't know how I shall be able to stand not to be permitted to fly any longer. I should give anything to be permitted to fly with you Americans against the Japanese, although I know that it is impossible."

Attitude Toward The Russians:

Almost without exception, the German officers we interrogated expressed their curiosity about our "real attitude" toward Russia. I was asked at least five times, whether we Americans would have a show-down with Russia in the not too distant future; The basis of their concern was obviously that "Communism" or "Bolshevism" (as they preferred to term it) would almost certainly come about in Germany through Russian influence upon a post-war situation which was conducive to it, unless the United States and England did something about it.
During an informal evening discussion with Hauptmann Bergenthum, Oberleutnant Beie, and Major Hoefer, (who had been on General von Pohl's staff for several months, but had previously been in command of the German Bomber Group 55 in Russia, and had 450 sorties to his credit), the following opinions were expressed:
Major Hoefer claimed that so far as he was able to judge, Russia was being politically smarter than either the United States or Britain, in that she was permitting German officials to carry on the provisional government, although une'er Russian control. She was also taking steps to feed the population and speed up a return to normal life in nor occupied territory in order to win Germans to Communism. The German people were being shown that propaganda of their former loaders about the brutality and ruthlessness of the Russians and Bolshevism, was not true. This, however, all a cruel hoax which would lead to a future Germany within the Russian rather than the Western orbit.
Major Hoefer ... Russia (or the Slavic race) was destined to control the future. Through their bitter experience, the Germans had learned that the Russians had not only unlimited resources and population, but "a primitive vitality" which was almost certain to dominate over the already degenerating Western races and nations. With a fatalism (not unlike that of the philospher Spengler), they saw little hope in a League of Nations or a Security Council, but vore convinced that tho question of a showdown between Western culture and Astern (Slavic) culture was only a matter of time.
Major Hoefer claimed that Russian weapons and planes were on the whole inferior to those of the Germans or the Anglo-Americans, that Russian accuracy and precision as flyers and gunners were also inferior, but that sheer weight of numbers, coupled with an unbeatable physical vitality and endurance, had been too much for Germany.

Why Germany Was Defeated:

Most of the officers interrogated were asked at some point during the period when they were convinced that the war was lost. There was some difference of opinion here, but none of them had any real hope after the success of the Allied invasion of France.
Major Hoefer, anri Hauptmann Boie said that they hoped for nothing more than the overthrow of the Nazi political leadership by the German General Staff, after the defeat at Stalingrad. They regretted, that the attempt on Hitler's life had failed in July 1944, but also felt that Himmler's hold on things might still made a real Nazi collapse difficult.
The main reasons for Germany' s defeat in the order of importance, were expressed by the men as follows:
1. The decision to invade Russia, and the "surprising" quality and quantity of Russian resistance, persistence, and vitality.
2. Allied air supremacy achieved through United States materiel, and the Allied strategic bombing program of German oil industries, and key aircraft parts industries.
3. The lack of unity within German military leadership caused by the friction between capable military leaders and the misguided plans of Hitler and his Nazi big-wigs. This ma.de a unified planning and strategy impossible and led to many silly decisions. Nazi handling of occupied countries and people ruined the plan of military leaders in their operations. Theater commanders had no freedom of action within the larger plan. For example:
a. Hauptmann Bergenthum once heard General von Pohl remark that a Corporal could do his job just as well, for all he could do was to take specific and conflicting orders from the Fuehrer's Headquarters and pass them down to subordinate units.
b. One of the German Radar experts said that due to conservatism in higher places, Radar development in Germany was shunted off its original direction toward decimeter wave-length development, and hence lagged behind Allied development in this respect.

The Italian Front:

The following opinions arose out of conversations with Hauptmann Borgenthum, Oberleutnant Boie, Major Hoofer, and Hauptmann Maus:
Italy was a secondary (the forgotten) front for the Germans, especially during the last six months of the war. The flovr of supplies was seriously restricted. Flak ammunition was limited to a certain number of rounds per gun per day. The newest and best Radar equipment never got to Italy. Trained gun crew men were taken away from Flak and shoved into the front line as infantry, and were replaced by older men, who were physically and mentally less capable.
It had been hoped to develop a larger jet aircraft program in Italy in order to meet the tremendous Allied air superiority. General Galland was supposed to be organizing and training several jet aircraft groups near Munich. These were to be piloted entirely by officers« But it all came to nothing because of a lack of fuel due to Allied strategic bombing and the Russian advance. There were never more than four jet aircraft in Italy, and these vrcre used for reconnaissance purposes.
German Air Force and Army leaders in Italy were ready to surrender a hopeless situation much earlier, but orders from the Fuehrer's Headquarters threatened severe reprisals against the families of all who surrendered or made moves in that direction.
The officers engaging in the conversation were surprised that:
a. The Allies had not begun the offensive sooner, as the situation as they (the Germans) saw it was long since hopeless.
b. The Allies had not concentrated earlier on keeping the northern part of the Brenner line knocked out, as this would hcive strangled German supplies in Italy even more.
c. The landing in 1943 was made at Anzio instead of Rome or the Piove River Valley (northeast of Venice) either of which v/ould have been "pushovers" at that time, according to those officers,

H. J. SANDER , Captain, Air Corps, Interrogating Officer, Headquarters, M.A.A.F.

TAB 0. REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF SEVERAL FLAK DEFENSES IN NORTH ITALY BY RADIO COUNTERMEASURES PERSONNEL (Extract)

HEADQUARTERS, MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED AIR FORCES
APO 650
EXTRACT 6 June 1945,

SUBJECT: A Report on the Investigation of Several Flak Defenses in North Italy by Radio Counterneasures Personnel.

TO: Doctor F. 13. Torman, Radio Research Laboratory, Harvard University.

The purpose of this investigation ms to obtain, if possible, information on the German reaction to Radio Counter-measures in northern Italy, to permit general conclusions to be drav/n of the effectiveness of the Radar Cbuntermeasures program in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, This report is concerned only with the basic aspects of radar flak intelligence, and for that reason contains few specific technical details. However, every attempt uas made to consider all the details known to be influential, whenever general conclusions vere made, The report has been written after many suggestions, considerable discussion of the points involved, the final approval of 1st Lt. Blumenschein and Mr. L. E. Raburn.....
.....Whenever a question was asked on the time required to design and produce equipment, the German officers always placed the Allied bombing as a major factor. The Allied air offensive was obviously one of our major victory operations. To stop this offensive, the Germans did use two systems, flak and fighters. However, during the last year, the high, priority that was placed on the design and production of jet aircraft; and several forms of fighter control and early-warn ing radrrs, sho¥/s that the Germans had decided to depjnd upon fighters rather than flak to do the job. All the officers that wore interrogated, believed that this was a fundamental error. (It must be noted that they were all flak officers). This ml'-ht be more obvious now, since the jet formations never became a reality. However, these officers felt that instead of attempting to construct massive r?.dar equipment, and to obtain a high production rate on fighters of a revolutionary design under the pressure of extensive Allied bombing, it would have been better to place the highest priority -on flak equipment. The required improvements were desired in the following order:
a. Development of rocket flak to cut down transit time, and the application of proximity fusing.
b. Better anti-jamming devices, and if possible, the development of a microwave, automatic-tracking radar similar to the SCR 584, "that would eliminate the human function as far as possible. This decision to employ large formations of fighters against our bombers was admittedly probably influenced to a great extent by the political control that had governed many of their previous operations. The Luftwaffe, for instance, h?d control over flak operations, and might have fevored aircraft operations, and the development of radar for aircraft use. However, the Allied use of Radar Counter-measures, its effects, and the German anti-jamming devices was one subject of which all channels of command v/ere well aware. The repeated failure of their gun-laying radar under Allied Radar Counter-measures, and lack of education produced rumors on the equipment and had caused it to be considered, even at the batteries, as a secondary means of flak control.
These officers had decided over a year ago, that Germany had lost the radar wrar. They believed that the curtailment of future large scale radar development and modifications was made for the following reasons.
Their existing radar, even with its anti-jamming devices, had not been dependable« The Germans were a rare of our microwave gun laying radar, and realized that it was a practical system. However, we were so far advanced in this field and had such an extensive, flexible Radar Countermeasures program, that they no doubt believed we were prepared to offer interference also at microwave frequencies. The development of their anti-jamming devices had been considered as a major radar program, and had been given priority above the development of radically new gun laying equipment.

Interference from the Fifteenth Air Force

While the purpose and effect of a Radar Counter-measures program is not too well known by personnel in our air force, German Luftwaffe personnel in Italy were well aware of its existence. The main interference came from the four-engined bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force, with little or no interference from the tactical bonbers«, Several countermeasures were developed in Geirany, and the batteries lost no time in making good use of thorn. The installation of these antijamming devices had been completed six months before our main installation program began« This means that all their batteries were prepared to practice with these devices on the meager Radar Countemeasures effort that existed at that time. It is possible that the initial use of such small numbers of equipment by the Fifteenth Air Force did more harm than good.
During the last six or eight months, the intensity of the interference had increased until both radar operators and technical personnel believed "the game was about up," Chaff concentrations were reported to have placed the noise level too high for Wurzlaus operation, and the use of Carpet had forced the frequency of the Wurzburgs to the practical limits. The general opinion was that Chaff generally had more effect than Carpet. They definitely agreed that the use of both forms of interference was still advantageous on a clear day.

JOHN FOSTER , JR. , Technical Observer.

TAB P. FACTORS IN GERMANY'S DEFEAT (C Series)

Further questioning of German Generals captured in Italy concerning the effects of Allied air power has resulted in the following answers. Some of the gentlemen considered the questions en imposition on their time. From many of the answers to Question No. 5» it is apparent that a number of these General Officers put the blame for losing the war on Nazi leadership rather than on their own.

Colonel General von Vietinghoff ..... Supreme Commander Southwest.
General Wolff ..... SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General of the Waffen SS.
General Lemelson ...... Commanding General 14th Army.
General Jahn ..... Commanding General of Lombardy Command.
Major General von Schellwitz ..... Commanding General 305th Division.
Lt. General Hildebrandt ..... Commanding Liaison Staff to Monte Rosa Division.
Lt. General Boehlke ..... Commanding General 334th Division.
General Roesener ..... SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Polizei Wehrkreis 18 (western half of Austria).
Lt. General Fretter-Pico ..... Commanding General 305th Division.
Major General Schiel ..... Commanding General 94-th Division.
Lt. General Pensel ..... Liaison Officer to General Graziani

Question No. 1

What is the general opinion of the effectiveness of United States strategic bombing of the aircraft and fuel industries of Germany?

Colonel General von Vietinghoff

Insofar as it is possible to judge from Italy, it is generally recognized that Allied air attacks were extremely successful. This is especially true with reference to attacks on the fuel industry which by the end of the -war proved to be the decisive factor.

General Wolff

Allied air attacks on the fuel industry had the greater effect and the results were cumulative until finally, in the last months of the war, the industry was almost totally destroyed.

Lt. General Boehlke

During the first years of the war the Allied air attacks only had a small retarding effect on German aircraft and fuel production, but toward the end of the war the continuing attacks had a decisive effect in determining the course of the war.

General Roesener

Air attacks forced decentralization of the aircraft industry and consequently affected production possibilities. In the fuel industry there occurred almost a total stowage in the late stages of the war and the latter program was considered the more effective of the two.

Question No. 2

Would the invasion of the European Continent have been possible without strategic bomb in <? of transoortation and communication facilities?

Colonel General von Vietinghoff

The landing itself was always possible, but without the supporting bombing of our transport facilities we could have at least isolated the beachhead and possibly wiped it out.

General Wolff

No.

General Lemelson

A landing in France was Dossible at any time and along any part of the coast, if sufficient superiority of air and sea power were brought into action. However, had not the transport facilities in our rear areas been bombed, it v/ould have been possible for the German army to bring up adequate reserves and institute counterattacks which would have contained, if not obliterated the beachhead.

General Jahn

In the absence of air attacks on transport facilities in rear areas, the invasion would have required the commitment of considerably larger forces, more time, and involved heavier losses. In the course of time, however, the invasion would have succeeded anyway,

Major General von Schellwitz

In our attemots to bring up reserves we undoubtedly sustained heavy losses from your attacks on our rear areas. Nevertheless, because of the generallv deteriorating militarv situation in Germanv at the time, the invasion would have been possible, even without the bombing of transport facilities in our rear areas, but it would have involved considerably stronger forces, more time and larger losses on your part.

Lt.. General Hildebrandt

Yes, b!ut only with more material, greater losses and more time.

Lt. General Boehlke

Without the cripaling attacks on our transport facilities by Allied air forces, the invasion could never have succeeded. Through the destruction of supply lines and railway installations deep behind the front lines it became impossible for the German High Command to build up any suitable strong points as the situation required.

General Roesener

The landing in Normandy became oossible through heavy bombing attacks against our communications and supply system. However, if paratroops had not been used immediately after the bombing attacks the invasion would hn.ve been a much more difficult matter, or might even hive boon repelled.

Lt. General Fretter-Pico

No.

Lt. General Pemsel

Yes, because we had too few reserves and thev were all incorrectly placed anyway.

Question No. 3

Did United States bombing of strategic objectives naralvze German industry or German transportation, or if neither of these, against what ph.ise of German industry or Army did air bombing have the greatest effect?

Colonel General von Vietinghoff

Actual "paralysis" of industry was only teranorary. but "severe disruption51 was continuous.

General Wolff

Yes.

General Jahn

Yes, the attacks on the German transport system, coordinated with the serious losses in the fuel industry had a paralyzing effect not onlv on the industries attacked, but on all other German war industries is well.

Major General von Schellwitz

Yes, without ouestion.

Lt. Seneral Boehlke

Bombing at first had only a nuisance value m Itr effect on industry and transportation facilities. Damage was overcome fairly quickly, either by repair work, or evacuation to a new location. It was not until the last year of the war that the results reached such proportions that it could be said that the bombing had actually accomplished a paralyzing effect.

Lt. General Fretter-Pico

Bombing attacks had a greater paralyzing effect on the transportation system than against industry.

Question No. 4

Was Allied air power chiefly responsible for Germany's defeat in this war?

Colonel General von Vietinghoff Yes, because:

a. Industry and transport facilities were greatly reduced, which resulted in a lessening of supplies to all fronts.
b. On the Italian and the Western Front, all freedom of movement for reserves, tanks, etcj, was denied during the daylight hours. Thus, counter attacks were impossible. In isolated instances, when we were successful in assembly troops for a major surprise attack, it could only be done at night and then the Allies were always in a position to bring their Air Force into action at any desired spot in a few hours and thus frustrate every German attack. For this reason alone I was forced, in the autumn of 1943, to give up my original idea, which was to destroy the forces of the 5th and 8th Armies by using all available German forces, first against the 5th and then against the 8th Army. Instead I had to go over to a purely defensive policy. After that, every possibility of clearing the Italian mainland disappeard and it became equally impossible to force the Allies into an engagement requiring the commitment of substantial strength, which without Allied air superiority would previously have certainly existed as a practical possibility.

General Wolff

Yes, for the following reasons:
a. The ever increasing disruption of productive plant and transport facilities resulted in a supply situation which became more and more
unsatisfactory. The front died of slow starvation.
b. Allied air superiority was used so successfully against our artillery and anti-tank weapons (PAK and 8.8 Flak) that time and again a path was blasted into and through our defense lines for your ground troops.
c. Deployment of troops and counter attacks became impossible ... during daylight hours.
d. The almost constant interruption of the railway services had the effect of preventing the arrival of practically all Army mail since
February 1945. This placed an additional burder on the soldiers' nerves and morale, since no one knew-whether his family was still alive, or if their were, whore and under what circumstances they were living.

General Lemelson

Considered as a part of the general material superiority of the Allies, the strength of the Allied Air Force was of first importance - esDecially during the last year in Italy - because it:
a. Prevented all movement of tactical reserves on the battle field during the dav and therefore made the transfer of a strong point, especially if it included motor transport, Dossible only to a very limited decree, and then only at night,
b. Limited the movement of operational Panzer reserves to the hours of darkness and thereby greatly reduced their effectiveness.
c. Greatly increased supply difficulties by reason of the destruction of railway lines, although reduced supplies were also to some extent due to air attacks against our war industries. It was always possible to get what supplies there were through by motor convoys.

General Jahn

General Jahn's statements were entirely contrary to those of the other Generals. He said:

They were of great, but not decisive importance. In spite of the complete absence of the German Air Force, and enormous difficulties, it was possible UP to the ver^ last to keep the Front supplied with the most essential materials of all sorts, and to accomplish troop movements. Even the morale and the will to fight of the German neonlo was not broken, despite the destruction of practically every large German city and the enormous losses among the civilian population.

Major General von Schellwitz

Yes, a major factor because on the Home Front, it involved the destruction of industry crippling of transport facilities and likewise, to a certain extent, of the food supply;
War Front, it involved, crippling of the services of supply, destruction of the fighting units and critical strong points, interfered with and finally prevented the bringing up of reserves, crippled our submarine warfare. aond encouraged the resistance movements behind the German lines.

Lt. General Boehlke

The Allied Air Forces have played large part in the defeat of Gemany for the following reasons:
a. Destruction of the German Air Force, thereby achieving absolute air superiority over Geman-occupied territory. The consequences of this were that it became extremely difficult to move reserve troops and it became practically impossible to develop strong points for defense in sufficient time.
b. Destruction of German armament and transport facilities, which resulted in serious shortages at the Front of all tvpes of war materials,
c. Complicated the work of food administration.
d. Forced the evacuation of important industries to points far distant from their normal supply of raw materials.
e. Eliminated German submarine warfare as a serious factor.

Question No. 5

Assuming them had been no German Air Force and no Allied Air Force, could the German Armies have won the war?

Colonel Genoral von Vietinffhoff

Yes, with the proper tactical leadership.

General Wolff

Yes, assuming the right tactical leadership.

General Lemelson

Yes, assuming the right tactical leadership in the highest places.

General Jahn

No, since Germany's position with regard to comparative overall strength became less favorable every year. However, the war would undoubtedlv have lasted longer.

Major General von Schellwitz

The German Army could have prolonged the land war considerably, but in the long run could not have held out against the war and manpower potential (not including Japan) of the whole world.

Lt. General Boohlke

Yes.

General Roesener

The General replied with the unimaginative answer: "With the strength we had in 1939, yes, but with our 1944 strength, no." He simply decided to ignore the factors which reduced the strength.

Lt. general Fretter-Pico

Yes

Lt. General Pemsel

Yes, under different political and military leadership.

Major General Schiel

Yes.

FREDERICK J. KAAS
Major, A.C.
P.W. Intelligence.

TAB Q. INTERROGATION REPORT OF HERMANN GOERING (Extract)

Preamble

The following report is the result of a lengthy interrogation of Hermann Goering by officers of the Air Prisoner of "for Interrogation Detachnent. Questionnaires prepared by USSTAF and Air Ministry were covered by this interrogation.
The interrogation dealt also with information of a general and historical nature rhich often led to liberal discussions on basic issues» It will readily be seen that by this means considerable light was shed on the events which took place behind the scenes of the play enacted by the leadhg characters of the Nazi hierarchy» It was apparent that the totalitarian regime had not run as smoothly as its leaders would have made it seem, and, surprisingly enough» one of the chief causes was Hitler's constant trespassing on Goering's private operational premises.
How much constant interference affected the overall policy of the Luftwaffe and accelerated its doom is shown in the reflections of the prisoner of war who, by his very nature, pretended to be unaware of the disastrous part that he himself had played in this regard. The report shows how Hitler concerned himself continuously with the smallest technical decisions. During the last two years when Goering's star - to use his own words - was descending, this interference assumed proportions which caused Goering to exclaim: "You had a great ally in your aerial warfare - the Fuehrer,"

PART I. ALLIED AIR P0WER AND THE WAR

The Role Of The Air Force In General

Although the air forces may render a decisive contribution towards the winning of a war, they alone, in the opinion of Goering, will never bring a great nation to its knees. "The air forces cannot occupy." They can only disrupt, interfere and destroy and thus prepare for the eventual last fight leading to final occupation and victory."
This softening-up process should follow certain set rules which he called his "Evangelium." The first objectives at the beginning of a war must always be to destroy the enemy's air force, completely disregarding all other targets. The air force is the heart of military power and resistance, and only when this is destroyed, should .other targets be attacked; the priority to be given to these other targets would obviously depend on the economics of the country under attack. Goering's views on the assigning of target priorities in Germany are outlined in Part IV.

The Role of the Allied Air Forces In This War

Goering attributed our victory over Germany to two main factors: the successful invasion and, above all, the irresistible numerical superiority of the Allied air forces. Aside from, all other aspects, he emphasized the devastating Allied air superiority on the morale of the ground forces. "The Allies owe the success of the invasion to their air forces. They prepared the invasion; they made it possible; and they carried it through." Without the Allied air force, Goering claimed, it would have been possible to bring up German ground reinforcements and make full use of armored units.
He particularly stressed the part which the United States Air Force has played. "Without the American Air Force, the war would still be going on elsewhere but certainly not on German soil."
The first heavy blow rendered by our air force came in the African campaign and then in Italy, when we attacked Italian airfields. Ke claimed that the German Air Force wes helpless against these attacks because of the refusal of the Italians to allow the Germans to adjust the airfields to their own needs. When these objections were finally overcome, Goering tried to render Allied, attacks ineffective by building what he called air-force fortresses - a system of run Trays built on either side of a major road and connected with each other by taxi strips, protected by heavy flak concentrations. The purpose of such fortresses was to maintain a sufficient number of runways oven under the heaviest carpet-bombing attacks. Three such fortresses were completed in Italy and others were started in France, Holland and Belgium. He claimed that his theory had proved sound since the fortresses stood up under heavy attacks. In practice, however, they were not of much help since sufficient aircraft were never available to make full use of the scheme.
Another heavy blow, and he considered this to do one of the most decisive factors in the ultimate outcome of the war, was the range of our fighters. The man who once boasted that no enemy bomber v/ould ever fly over German soil, admitted that he was stunned: "I would have thought it impossible that so many enemy four-engined bombers could fly around for hours over German ( territory." Goering is convinced that this was only made possible through our fighter escort which, indeed, came as a complete surprise to him. He said that he almost refused to believe it v when our fighters penetrated as far as Liege, and then Plannover. But when two we-.ks later, fighters, escorting bombers, even appeared over Berlin, he knew thct the result of these long range' fighters would be tragic. "Der weitreichende Begleitjüger war eine Tragik."
Goering beliov^d that night raids were effective and had good results inasmuch as they caused groat damage to industrial installations. Beyond, this, he called them terror raids as they, not so much by intention but rather in effect, were not confined to definite t?.r;-cts, Piid actually in most cr.ses hit residential sections.
Ground straf:, i attacks at nl.ht '"ore unimportant in their contribution to the defeat of German . He said that they coulr" be wry effective if they wore carried out on a largo scale.
The effect of our strategic bombing is dealt in detail in Part IV.

PART II. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

Things To Come

Goering mentioned several neu projects which had been in the development stage*.

"Natter" - a rocket aircraft that was supposed to go through a bomber stream at a very higl speed. The pilot pushed a buttom causing the "Natter" to split into three parts which then parachuted down to earth. "Natter" had already been flown in test flights.

"Wasserfall" ."Enzian" , "Rheintochter" - are the code names for radio controlled flak rockets. These were handed over to a special staff under Dornberger. More information on them can be obtained from General von AXTHEIM.

V-Weapons

"You were extremely lucky that the war did not last another year or that we were unable to start to use our weapons one year earlier." With these words Goering began his comments on V-Weapons.
The development of V-1 starter during the war. It v/as originally in the hands of the Luftwaffe, but later was handed over to the flak organization.
The V-1 was very primitive and did not require much material which might otherwise be used in aircraft production. The production of V-2 was more complicated rnd absorbed more material, although not enough to handicap aircraft production. In this con ection, Gooring mentioned that the production of aircraft ras held back by the "riciculous" Navy program, particularly by the building of heavy battleships.
The research work on V-2 began already beTo.ro -the war. It V7as based on the original idea of developing an express mail service to the United States. The German Army then sponsored the further research anr"i developed it.
Because of the impossibility of exact aiming, only larger cities could be attacked with V-Weapons. Too much success, however, was not expected as only an insufficient number of missiles was available.
"V-2 was impressive (V-2 war imponierend)," Goering said with enthusiasm and pride when he related how he had seen a V-2 being fired. When ho imitated - as the actor that he is -the process of the V-2 firing, from the sofa which he filled, the effect was almost as unattractive as the actual firing.

FART III. JET AIRCRAFT

ME 262 -Production

Of all the jet aircraft, the ME 262 had been planned to be the first one to go into mass production in August 1944. The original plan called for 500 aircraft for December 1944. 500/600 per month for January and February, and 800 for March I945. The highest output reported by the industry was 280 aircraft in March 1945, but actual deliveries to operational units totalled only 190 aircraft for that month. Altogether, 1400 ME 262's had been built by the end of the rar. Over half of these 1400 aircraft were lost through our bomb attacks on their airdrome, crashes, conversion training; and other causes. Of the 700 aircraft which became operational, the greater part was lost in combst, through crashes or defects in the propulsion units. A number were destroyod by the Germans at the end of the war.

Operational Use

Goering was asked: "What was the reason for tho delay in the use of the ME 262 as a fighter?" Promptly and excitedly cane the answer: "Adolf Hitler's madness (Der Wahnsinn Adolf Hitler's)." HG elaborated this statement witb the following explanation: 'Then the first ME 262 left the assembly line in May 1944, Goering confidently and full of hope for a revival of the German Air Force's fifhter strength, presented it to Adolf Hiler as the fighter which was to sweep Allied air power from the skies.
To Goering's and everybody else's surprise and consternation, Hitler said: "I am not at all interested in this plane as a fighter." He insisted that it be converted into a bomber. He ordered that the armament be removed and that 1 x 500 kg or 2 x 250 kg bombs be carried instead. "Then Goering called his attention to the fact that a removal of the guns would cause an unbalance, Hitler suggested that extra fuel should be carried in the front thereby also increasing the range of the aircraft. Hitler in his ignorance, stated Goering, did not realise that since this extra fuel would be consumed in flight, the original unbalance would return.
Hitler oven went so far as to have Goering issue a written order strictly forbidding that the aircraft be referred to as a fifhtor. Ho wanted it to be called a "Blitzbomber."
Generalleutnant Gnlland, young and fanous German fightor ace, General der Jagdflieger (Commanding General Fighter Command), embittered by this decision and blocked by other fighter pilots of long standing and fame, tried to fight Hitler and had a heated argument with him. On Hitler's insistence, Goering had then to dismiss Galland.
Because of all these arguments, the ME 262 was, fortunately for us but to Goering's regret, kept from its effective use for several months. Only one concession was made by Hitler. Our intrusions over German territory were becoming so troublesome that - as Goering put it - "Mustangs were practically doing training flights over Bavaria." Galland was therefore recalled to stop "this nonsense" and given a small unit of about sixteen ME 262's (JV 44)t for "hich he picked the most experienced pilots he could find.
At long last, at the end of 1944 Hitler gave permission to use this aircraft as a fighter on a larger scale. According to Goering, Hitler was finally convinced of the effectiveness of the ME 262 es a fighter when in January/February 1945 ten Jets attacking a bomber stream, shot dorm ten bombers.

Once Hitler had decided that the ME 262 become a fighter aircraft, he wanted it to become operational immediately. Goering would have preferred to wait until he was able to equip a complete Geschwader -ith it. This, however, TOS not approved by Hitler and death was threatened to anyone who tried to keep a jet aircraft from the front line.

Effectiveness of Bombing On Jet Operational Program

The general effect of our strategic bombing on the production schedule for jet aircraft resulted in the decision to give absolute priority to tie production of the ME 262 and to speed up its manufacture to the utmost.

PART IV. ALLIED STRATEGIC BOMBING

Targets - Selection

Goering claimed that the Germans realized at an early stage of our air attacks, that the Allied air force intended to bomb by systematic selection of related targets. Immediately after our first attack on the oil industry, they were sure that synthetic oil works would then become our first priroity target, Generally speaking, our attacks selected the right targets and did not overlook any installations, the bombing of which would have ended the wer sooner. Explosives factories should have received more attention. The priority which we put on the targets was not always right either. He also felt, that I.G. Farben plants had been comparatively spared for some particular reason.

Airfields, Airframe, Engine And Ball Bearing Factories

Attacks on airfields were generally effective. It was, however, very easy to make necessary repairs within a short time. They called this "the race between the shovel and the bomb" ("Wettlauf zwiischen Spaten und Bombe").
As between airframe and ongine factories, priority should definitely have been given to the latter. Attacks on airframe factories were effective, but concentrated attacks on engine factories would have crippled the German Air Force much sooner. (This, incidentally, is contrary to the opinion of Prof. MesserSchmitt, who ras questioned on this and other points and claimed that there is no difference in the importance of these two types of targets.)
Attacks on ball bearing manufacture were, according to Goering, none too effective. He offered three reasons for this: Dispersal, underground factories, and above all, substitution of roller bearings for ball bearings.

Synthetic Oil Works And Communication Lines

"Then came attacks on two elements, which hurt us considerably." Tr'ith those -'ores Goering expressed the damage done to the German Air Force by our attacks on synthetic oil works and communication lines.
The attacks on synthetic oil works were the most effective of all strategic bombing and the most decisive in Germany's defeat. "Without fuel, nobody can conduct a war."

The German Air Force schedule for aviation fuel originally-provided for a production of 300,000 tons per month, and this amount would have been ample for all their needs. They attained a maximum production of 160,000 tons in the summer of lykk, but their average availability of aviation fuel was only about 110,000 - 120,L00 tons per month. Constant bombing reduced the output to 15,000 - 20,000 tons and as an example of the effect of this reduction he related that in the Russian csmpcign 3,000 sorties per day had been reduced to 600 - 300 (on exceptional drys to 1200) per day towards March/ April 1945.
Even if 90% of the bombs dropped on a factory like Leuna Works missed, the 10%' which registered were sufficient to interrupt production.
A concentration on oil targets in preference to our policy of bombing aircraft and ball bearing factories from January 1944 on would not have permitted the aircraft industry to recover sufficiently to produce enough fighters to protect oil targets in subsequent attacks. In order to minimize the effect of our attacks on oil targets, ^0 heavy bombers would have had to be shot dorm per day. The aircraft industry could not have recovered sufficiently to produce such an exc ss number of fighters as to accomplish this.
"The disruption of our communication lines has done more harm to us than the destruction of our factories." Our attacks on the German transportation system became particularly severe and most noticeable at a time when it was finally decided to build underground factories. The destruction of the transportation system prvented a contraction of industry which had previously beon dispersed all over the country in underground factories.

Conclusion

The following conclusion can be drawn from Goering' s statements. In order to hamper tho Gorman Air Force most, the foilowing order of targets should have boon observed:
a. Synthetic oil works
b Cormnunications
c. Aero-engine factories
d. Airframe factories
e. Ball bearing factories
f. Airfields

Repeat Raids

Goering emphasized that they were very relieved whenever we failed to bomb the same target in close succession and allowed them the breathing spell that they were praying for in order to carry out operationally vital repairs. It also gave them sufficient time to salvage and remove vital machine tools. An outstanding example in Brauchitsch's opinion was the USAAF raid on Schweinfurt which, if it had been promptly repeated, would have had an even more crippling effect than the 60% damage resulting from one attack. Both Goering and Brauchitsch considered the Allied raids on Dresden this February, when one blow followed the other in quick succession, the most deadly, most demoralizing and therefore the most effective series of raids of the war.

"Nothing is more terrible than an attack which is made on the same target three times in a row. That really undermines the resistance of the people."

Garpet-Bombing on Troops

Carpet-bombing on troop concentrations was as in the case of Saint Lo very effective. On one occasion tanks assembling for a planned attack on a grand scale were severely hit. It took them six hours to reassemble, thus rendering the intended attack impossible,

CONCLUSION

The "Reichsmarschall", as will be apparent from the length of this report, was willing enough to talk and to answer questions. On certain subjects and details, however, he was not well informed. This may partly be due to that his Adjutant referred to as his "easy going nature," but partly also to his unwillingness to face unpleasant facts which often led his assistants to conceal the truth from him.
The above leads to another observation; not only did his waning star, and Hitler's constant interference, dampen his desire for hard work, but the once daring fighter aco and post-war politician had, surrounded by outwrd comfort, wealth -nd luxury, become soft and afraid for his life,
Gooring, still playing with the idea of stepping into Hitler's shoes and for this reason attempting to appease Hinimler, finally shied away from the final consequences which such a step might entail. And it was more like the playing with the idea "hen he exclaimed: "If I ever had to use an armored car, then this would have been the moment. Everybody knew thet my first move would have been to do away with Bormann."
His self-deceit remained right up to the very end and his ruthlessness towards those under him can best be illustrated by citing one of his own statements, namely: "I have never signed a man's death warrant or sent anybody to a concentration camp; never, never, never. . . . unless, of course, it was a question of military necessity and expediency."

TAB R. INTERROGATION REPORT OF GENERAL BAYERLEIN (Extract)

A CRACK GERMAN PANZER DIVISION AND WHAT ALLIED AIR POWER DID TO IT BETWESEN D-DA.Y AND V-DAY

BACKGROUND OF P/W.

The following story is that told to interrogators by-Genera lleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, at the time of his capture Commending General of the SS Corps, but during most of the time covered by this report commander of the Panzer Lehr Division.
General Bayerlein is a soldier's soldier. He entered service in I917 end served out the WorId War I as an infantry non-com. He become an officer in 1922 a;ad served with the tanks in the Polish campaign (1939) and the French campaign (I940). He was Rommel's trusted chief of staff in the Afrika Korps (1943) and then briefly commanded the 3rd Panzer Division in Russia.
In January 1944 he was reccalled from the Eastern front to organize end train the Panzer Lehr Division in the vicinity Nancy-Verdun.
This division was organized especially to throw back the expected invasion and beginning with D-Day and continuing to the surrender in the Ruhr pocket, it was constantly subjected to the pressure of Allied and especially American air power.

Verbatim replies by Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, to questions from Headquarters, 12th Army Group (4 May 1945).

Question 1. AIR ATTACK ON ROAD MOVES

How did existence of fighters affect tactical decisions to move or not to move?

Answer 1. Troop movements could not be carried out in day time when the weather was favorable for flying. Movements were therefore always dependent on the weather. It wrs no longer possible to fix a definite time for a movement. Nevertheless, if marches had to bo carried out, they were very expensive in casualties and materiel. Necessary night marches required more time than day marches. No long distances could be covered during the short summer nights. All troop movements were, therefore, delayed and rendered very difficult by Allied fighters so that Headquarters were unable to make any definite time calculations and troops often arrived at the decisive place too late.

QUESTION 2. EFFECT OF FIGHTER-BOMBERS AGAINST DIVISION IN LINE.

What was effect on supply of ammunition, fuel, food, under various conditions as to weather, season, terrain, etc.?

Answer 2. When the weither was favorable for dive-bombing (Jabo), supplying took place only at night. Therefore, massing of vehicles on the roads particularly in summer (short nights). Handicapped also at night by night-bombers, night fighters, flares ("Christmas trees"), destruction of roads and blocking of throught by bombs. The switch of the movement of supplies to night time means delay and makes for security in supply.

1. Arrival of supplies on time cannot be relied upon.
2. When it was r&ining or snowing, supply was possible also in daytime. But even on rainy days, dive-bombers (Jabos) of teil appeared.
3. In winter, supply is easier as the nights are longer.
4. In wooded and hilly sreas supply was easier, as cover and camouflage vvas better; therefore, supply also in daytime . Suvmner foliage trees offer better camouflage.
In conclusion it must be said, that dive-bombers (Jabos) have prevented reliable supply of ammunition and fuel.

Q 2. b. What was effect on communications between echelons of command and between artillery observation posts and batteries?

A 2. b. Lines of communication (telephone) to the sides and to the rear, and to a lesser extend to the front, were often destroyed by bombs as they rere mainly leid along roeds end lanes, less across open country. Communications were interrupted for hours at times. On 27 July (SW of St. Lo) and on 13 August (NW Argentan), I had no telephone connections all day long (following the continuous dive-bombing attack!1)» Wireless communications were also impeded as the wireless operators had so often to take cover. Communication between artillery observers and batteries is less affected by dive-bombing (as it is by wireless). Generally speaking, all communications by meens of vehicles was strongly hampered.

Q 2. c. What was effect on teetical displacement in MLR?

A. 2. c. Dive-bombers (Jabos) limit a mobile conduct of the war in the MLR. With heavy dive-bember operations at the main point of the enemy attack, movement of tanks, AT guns end personnel on trucks or armored ccrs was either impossible or only with heavy casualties. In Normandy, for instance, tenks had to be dug in on a wide front and used as armored AT guns or machine guns instead of being employed as mobile tank destroyers. Reserves (tanks and personnel) required for the carrying out of oounter-offensives, had to be kept close enough to the front line in order that extensive movements were unnecessary; particular care had to be taken to keep them from going through lanes, over open country and bridges. It was necessary to build a number of dummy emplacements in order to split up dive-bomber attacks on tanks and gun emplacements. (AT gun 'Riegel' et Duren consisting of 107 8.8 AT guns end 214 dummy emplacements.)

Q 2. d. Were effects of attacks on MLR more or less significant than those on MSR?

A. 2. d. Dive-bomber attacks (Jabos) were more effective and successful on MSR as these could not be well protected, covered or camouflaged. They are very vulnerable to dive-bombing attacks. In the MLR on the other hand, combat troops are under cover, entrenched, end camouflaged; losses are, therefore, smaller. The presence of dive-bombers in the air in all cases has a demoralizing effect on ground troops and gives them a feeling of inferiority.

Q 3. AIR ATTACK ON REAR COMMUNICATIONS BY MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBERS

a. To what extent was division conscious of Allied success or failure in bombing communications in rear?

A 3. c. During major operations important communication lines were destroyed by bomber attacks end were not usable for hours at a time. (Destruction of the D.V. Heusen near Giessen, and of the communications center Altenkirchen.) Telephone calls had often to be relayed over many side and emergency lines end were difficult to understand.

Q 3. b. Was division conscious whether railheads for supply were 10, 50 or 100 miles behind divisional rear boundary?

A 3. b. Location of railheads was mostly known to division. In Normandy, railheads were much farther than 150 km to the rear, due to the destruction of railway sidings end lines in the heart of the combat area.

Effectsi

1. Long distances from railhead to troops - need for time and transport space, heavy road traffic. The roads themselves partly destroyed or damaged by bombs, partly also lecding to difficult thoroughfares which were destroyed, requiring detours

2. Road traffic was often exposed to air attacks by day and night.

3. This resulted in great delays in the bringing up of supplies.

4. Increased use of fuel for motorized vehicles instead of railvrays.

Examples; In Normandy, fuel end ammunition often had to be fetched from the area East of Paris or south of Le Mans and Rennes and then arrived so late that critical situations arose in the front lines. During the Ardennes offensive, fuel had to be fetched from Troisdorf (southeast of Kceln), spare parts and tanks from Bergisch-Gladbach (east of Düsseldorf) as the railvreys had been destroyed. The trucks were on the road for about six days. The troops got into critical situations. That is why many tanks had to be left behind during the retreat from the Ardennes f<r lack of fuel, (A total of 53 from the Panzer Lehr Division.)

Q, 3. c. Was division conscious whether troops unloading points (for replacements) were 10, 50 or 100 miles to the rear?

A. 3. c. Reinforcements of personnel were equally affected by the situation at the railheads. Motorized transportation of personnel put a strain on the vehicles, required fuel, and delayed the arrival of reinforcements.

Q. 3. d. was division conscious of whether road communications centers had been heavily attacked (Eifel), or whether road bridges had been destroyed by bombing (Seine)?

A 3. d. The division knew that important road communications centers had been attacked end that bridges had been destroyed.

The Loire and Seine bridges had been destroyed prior to invasion. Important communication centers (Conde, Argentan) in the rear of the invasion front were destroyed in the night of 6/7 June so that here already traffic was hampered considerably. During the following nights other important communication centers were destroyed (Villers Bocage, Aulney, Flers, Harcourt). This had a particular disturbing effect upon the entire supply traffic. On the Remagen front, the destruction Altenkirchen (railways end roads) was particularly crippling for supply traffic since detours were very difficult. Destruction was particularly unpleasant during the Ardennes offensive, on the narrow and difficult Eifel roads on account of the long supply routes. Detours were almost impossible because of the nature of the terrain or, even if possible, detours took three times as long as the normal route (use of fuel).

Q 3. e. What were effects of medium bomber and heavy bomber attacks on rear area communications, rail and road, as noticed in Normandy, Ardennes, Cologne, Remagen?

A. 3. e. Effects of att&cks on communications (railways and roads:

1. Removal to the rear of railheads.
2. Long distances on roads, endangered by dive-bombers .
3. Heavy road traffic.
4. Road traffic hampered by destruction of communicotion centers, bridges end narrow passes. Necessity of detours requiring extra time.
5. Considerable ds.lay in bringing up of reinforcements .
6. Added use of fuel.
7. Destruction of supplies by bomber attacks on rail installations end dive-bomber attacks on roads.
8. No reliable time calculations can be made as far as supply is concerned. Front line troops do not know when to expect their reinforcements. A feeling of uncertainly befalls command and troops.
9. The bringing up of tenks from railheads , over long distances, to the troops, requires particularly much fuel and uses up materiel (chains, driving gears, brakes, motors). This goes especially for heavy tanks with the light motor of short endurance. 10. The attacks of the heavy bombers (Fortresses) on back area rail and road targets increase delay and uncertainly in the bringing up of reinforcements for front line troops»
The attacks in Normandy and the Ardennes had the worst effect. In Normandy, destructions were heavier and extended deep into the recr areas. In the Ardennes, destructions coupled with the difficult mountain terrain of the Ardennes and the Eifel, had a strong effect on the campaign, particularly when after 23 December the iveether took & turn for the better.
In the fighting east of the Rhine disruption of supply traffic was not so marked because attempts to prevent traffic (rail and road) across the Rhine by destruction of bridges hed not been carried out early enough.
In the Remagen area, supply traffic was rendered very difficult because of the timely destruction of the communication centers of Glossau-Marburg; for some time the situation improved as the weather deteriorated (9-13/3), but later again became critical.

Q 3. f. How was tactical employment of division effected by ebb and flow of supplies in rssponse to bombing of rare communications; i.e. gasoline and copmmunition rationing. Did division pay for necessity to ration in higher casualties, loss of ground?

A 3. f. Cporations and conduct of the wnr by division was greatly influenced by the attacks on supply lines:

1. Almost always a ahortege of fuel: therefore often difficult or impossible:
(a) tactical movement of tanks for counter attacks;
(b) change of positions of the artillery;
(c) bringing up of tanks from the rear;
'd) bringing up of reinforcements;
(e) moving reserves to endangered front sectors in time for counter attacks;
(f) hauling of damaged tanks to repair shops;
(g) bringing up of ammunition;
(h) mobile defers:; not possible, only fixed defense.

... Because of this lack cf tanks and the necessity of keeping tanks back due to shortage of communication, personal cesualties necessarily increased and the enemy was more successful in his attacks. We lost ground more rapidly, losses on the enemy side were smaller.
In general, it may be said that the effort of the tactical air force was strongest in Normandy. It became weaker during the advance through France and again increased in the other main battle areas, but it never again reached the strength of the attacks in Normandy.

Q 4. AIR ATTACKS ON REAR INSTALLATIONS

Q 4. a. Does the General have any awareness of the effects of allied air atacks on army dumps end depots for ammunition, gasoline food, clothing; engineering, equipment, ordnance, etc.

A 4. a. Air attacks on back area installations - it is known that attacks on fuel and communication dumps ere effective. Fuel dumps often burned out completely, as attempts to put the fires out in time refrained from because of an extended stay of the aircraft over the burning target, attacks on ammunition dumps were not so effective. In many cases only individual sactions were set on fire and then burnt out only partly, as the dump sections were placed for apart. In order to destroy an amminition dump completely, a very heavy bomber attack is necessary.

Q 4. b. What were such effects? Did such attacks produce any sharp tactical results? A general attrition of supplies?

A 4. b. Precautions. Decentralization of the dumps; building of small dumps. Within the dump decentralization by building numerous but small piles. Underground installations, camouflage. Employment of 2 cm and 3.7 AA guns (however, only to a limited extent). Tactical results were a constant shortage of fuel and ammunition at the front.

A 4. c. What were effects of attacks on Corps, Army and higher headquarters? Were they useless from Allied point of view? Did they produce effects on Commander morale? Could more have been useful to Allies?

Q 4. c. Attacks on headquarters were excellent in several cases. Headquarters was almost completely destroyed in the attack by Marauders, Thunderbolts, and Rocket Typhoons on Headquarters of 5th Panzer Army in Normandy, north of Conde, on 10 June. The Commanding General was the only one left of all the high-ranking officers.
In the attack on CP of 84 A.K. in Normandy, southwest of Perriers, at the end of June, casualties among high-ranking officers were small, loss of vehicles and communication equipment great.
Heavy loss of vehicles in the attack by Marauders on CP of I, SS Panzer Korps in Normandy, east of Monts, about 26 June. In all attacks communications were temporarily disrupted. The morale effect of all these heavy attacks was greet, even upon the commanding officers, but this only temporarily.

Q 5. TECHNICAL QUESTIONS.

a. Is there any difference in ground force reaction to P-47's, P-38's, P-51's, Spitfires and Typhoons?

A. 5. Difference in effect:
1. Lightning; Unpleasant for ground troops because of its quiet, almost noiseless approach, its maneuverability and speed, its heavy armament and bombs, exact aiming end hitting. Particularly effective against tanks. Direct or near hits destroy the tank,
2. Thunderbolt.} Armament and bombs; noisier, easier to identify from the ground, also very maneuverable and fast. Otherwise, same effect os Lightning, probably lighter bombs. (I, myself, was hit by Thunderbolts five times.) Direct or clcse bomb hits destroy the tank, weapons penetrate all tank armor except that of the "Koenigstiger".
3. Spitfires and Mustangs have not impressed me particulerly in their effect.

Q.5. b. How does ground force react to Marauders and Invaders?

A.5. b. Marauders are particularly effective because of their enormous bomb effect...

Q 5. c.What about Napalm? Rocket-firing Typhoons?

A 5. c. Napalm was of good effect on artillery positions in forests. Fire and smoke put the artillery out of action for a long time. Rockets of the Typhoons ere feared and have a deadly effect on artillery guns end tanks. Good results in Normandy.

Q 5. d. Do ground forces find bombs or strafing more unpleasant?

A 5. d. Strafing is more unpleasant for ground troops than bombing because of better and more exact results, even in trenches. There is no may of evading it. Penetration of armor of armored cars end tanks (except Tiger II). Serious injuries, which almost always resulted in complete disability.

Q 5. e. Did division find daily photographic reconnaissance unpleasant?

A 5. e. Daylight reconnaissance MLS not noticed by the troops because cf altitude. Night reconnaissance with flares was unpleasant. Troops felt that they had been seen. Consequently, positions -were often changed after night reconnaissance.

Q 6. BROAD QUESTIONS.

a. How would the General rank the causes for defeat in explaining the defeat of the German ground forces?

A. 6. E. Causes for defeat)

1. Tactical air power ) I am unable to decide.
2. Strategic air power) which is the better.
3. artillery (directed by aircraft, with air superiority).
4. Numerical superiority (materiel, aircraft end ermunition).
5. Allied strategy. Bold operational leadership. Quick and very able follow-up of initial successes. Building up of material dumps. Active leadership in armored troops, excellent cooperation between air force and ground troops.
6. Tanks. The Sherman tank because of its inferiority in range, caliber end armor could be used only as infantry support. Destruction of
enemy tanks was job of dive-bombers and air-directed artillery.
7. Excellent organization of supply lines.
8. Engineers who built and repaired bridges across many rivers with astonishing speed.
9. German strategy. But even if this hed been better, it would have hed no decisive influence in view of 1 - 8.

Q. 6. b. Plow would the General judge American intelligence in selecting tactical targets? Cite mistakes, v/here installations bombed were dummy, or evacuated. Cite coups.

A. 6. b. Intelligence Service must have worked well, for generally tactical targets were recognized swiftly and correctly.
The Germans unfortunately made little use of dummy installations (except in AT defense line at Dueren). Nothing is, however, known
of an attack on dummy positions. .

Q 6. c. How did physical fear, when aircraft threatened Generels with violent death in battle in contrast with their World War I expectation to die in bed, effect command decisions?

A 6.c. Attacks on staffs and death of Commanding Officers often made a deep impression on troops. Traveling of Commanding Officers In areas threatened by dive-bombers was therefore often postponed or abandoned cltogether.

Q 6. d. Does the General consider that more or less emphasis on air power by the allies at the expense of, or in favor of, ground power would have been profitable?

A 6. d. Increased tactical air operations after 1 August 1944 would have added to German losses and could have hastened the Allied operations. Heaviest air operations of this war were in Normandy.

Q 6. e. Does the General consider that Allied bombing would have been more effeccively employed if it had been concentrated more against the ground troops and less in strategic attacks against the German economy, or vice versa?

A 6. e. The attacks on industry and communication systems were absolutely necessary and decisive for the end of the war. Attacks on troop concentrations were rare. i,n increase in this type of attack would have been advantageous. They are particularly effective because attacks on columns and troops in the MLR ordinarily result in a small number of casualties, whereas attacks on troop concentrations bring greater losses in personnel.

Q 6. f. Would the battle effectiveness of Panzer Lehr have been much improved if allocations of oil, tank, MT, had been doubled or trebled? How much? To what extent; that is, was the basic lack of material responsible for defeat and to what extent the tactical conditions of battle without air protection, etc.?

A 6. f. The fighting power of the Panzer Lehr would have been greatly increased if they had received a greater allotment of fuel, tanks, well trained personnel, vehicles for transportation of fuel and ammunition» and above all if they had been equipped with a much greater number of 2 cm and 3.7 cm id, guns to keep the dive-bombers ewey. The defeat of the division was caused in the first place by the strong enemy air force, by the complete absence of our own air force, by shortages in LL weapons (2 cm and 3.7 cm) \7hich would have made up to a certain degree for the absence of our air force. Shortage of materiel is only a secondary cause for the defeat. Such a shortage, however, is also £ consequence of the enemy's air superiority.

PART II. HANDY REFERENCE BREAKDOWN

 

In the following section, specific pertinent statements by important German officers and officials have been classified by subject matter for handy reference. With each quotation is given the name of the speaker, concerning whom a brief sketch will be found under "Personalities»" The capital letter at the end of each quotation indicates the TAB in Part I of this book in which the statement appears;
Subject sub-divisions are as follows:

I a Effect of Air Operations (Strategic)
I b 2ffect of Air Operations (Tactical)
I c Effect of Air Operations (Interdiction)
II Jet Aircraft in Italy
III V-Weapons in Italy
IV Adolf Hitler
V Personalities
VI Luftwaffe Order of Battle
VII Political Comment
VIII Miscellany

I a. EFFECT OF AIR OPERATIONS (STRATEGIC)

SOURCE: General Georg Thomas

"Bombing was the chief reason for the defeat of the Vfchrmacht." We asked whether he meant bombardment of factories, of communications or of troops. He replied "firstly the bombardment of factories and secondly the bombardment of transportation. Not until the last few months when German morale began to break was bombardment of troops really effective." We asked which industries had suffered particularly from bombardment. He replied that the most critical damage had been done to German Aar industry by the attacks on ball bearing factories. Next he put the attacks on lines of communications and transports. We asked about oil and he replied that the attacks against the synthetic refineries had been the body blow insofar as oil was concerned. He said this hurt more than the loss of Ploesti, Schacht interposed to remark that our attacks on oil transport between Ploesti and Germany had been extremely effective.
'E'

SOURCE: Colonel Friedrich Vollbracht

Asked what he thought, as a professional soldier, of strategic bombing as a program, he replied, "You see me here. That is the obvious evidence of its effectiveness," Despite the USAAF-RAF Strategic Bombing Program the German military loaders and people feel much less bitter toward the Americans and the British than they do toward the Russians, who have never engaged in any air activity against them other than tactical support of ground movement. To the German military mind there was no question of the justification of strategic bombing as a legitimate w'eapon and an effective one.
The Luftwaffe, to his knowlodre, had never contemplated strategic bombing but then the Allied factories were so dispersed, and those in the United States at such a distance, that it could never have been an effective program.
Asked whether the Allies could have succeeded without the strategic softening of Germany, Colonel Vollbracht replied that he thought tho German factories, if unmolested, would have been able to produce enough material fast enough to leave tho issue doubtful.
'D"

SOURCE: Field Marshal von Rundstedt

Von Rundstedt said these were the other factors in Germany's defeat, in order:
1. Lack of fuel, both oil and gasoline.
2. Destruction of the railway system.
3. Germany's loss of raw material areas such as Romania.
4. Smashing of the home industrial sections such as Silesia and Saxony by air attacks.

SOURCE; General von Rohden

Strategic bombing was the decisive factor in the long run. General von Rohden, however, made the proviso that had the Luftwaffe been reorganized on a 90% defensive basis at an earlier date than actually was the fact. Allied strategic bombing might not-have been so successful.
This Prisoner of War expressed the blunt opinion that invasion of Europe would have been impossible without strategic bombing.
Bombing of communications was the main frctor which upset German industry. The next greatest effect of bombing was against fuel,
'L'

SOURCE: Doctor Hjalmar Schacht

"Now we come to the bombardment. It was one of the chief reasons for Germany's defeat. You had a greater industrial capacity than we anyway and ours was crippled by bombardment," He was unable to give any definite figures about the reduction of German production by boiibing, insisting that finance was his field and that throughout the war he had been on the outside of the government and only knew about it through talking with his many important friends. He insisted over and over that the defeat of Germany was due to economic reasons — a war of industrial capacity. We asked him how long it would take German industry to get back on its feet, "It will never do so" he said. We demurred, pointing out that Coventry had regained full production eight months after the German blitz. "Ach! he exclaimed, with emotion coming into his voice for the first time, "that was just one city. We have 50. 80, or a hundred such. You have ruined them all. There is not a city in Germany left nor an important factory standing. They can never be rebuilt."
"E"

SOURCE: General Galland

In Galland's opinion it was the Allied bombing of the oil industries which had the greatest effect en Germany's war potential; reduction in the quantity of available petrol forced the curtailment of supplies for training. From the autumn of 1944 onwards plenty of training and operational aircraft was available end there were enough pilots up to the end of 1944» but lack of petrol did not permit the expansion or proper training of the fighter force as a whole. Galland wondered why we waited so long to attack Geman oil production.

SOURCE: General Spies

"Why did you not begin bombing the oil industry earlier?" The industry was always a weak point in German economy, and targets like Leuna were easily damaged. Once the banking had begun it was extremely effective and Allied intelligence was such that they knew exactly when a target was ready to recommence refining and immediately opened further attacks. United. States bombing attacks on the aircraft industry, -'hue very successful and effective, had not such a far-reaching effect as attacks on oil."
'L'

SOORCE: General von Massow
Strategic-bombing of the aircraft industry was a blow which Has soon overcome by dispersal, but the attack on German oil production which, according to von Massow, was opened in July 1944, was in his opinion the largest factor of all in reducing Germany's war potential.
"L"

SOURCE: Doctor Hjalmar Schacht

"Many industrialists, even when our Luftwaffe seemed invincible, had the courage and foresight also to warn that our own factories would one day be bombed. But Goering always boasted that no enemy bomber would ever penetrate into Germany. That deceived the people. And Hitler. It did not deceive the industrialists."
"H"

S0URCE: General Galland

Strategic bombing never forced any great changes in planning and strategy until after the opening of the invasion, when the disorganization of German communications in the Triest by strategic bombing forced the withdrawal to the German frontier. In the closing two months of the war, the crippling of German transport system brought about the swift collapse of such resistance as remained.
'L'

SOURCE;, Inudstrialist Fritz Thyssen

"It was inevitable that Germany would have lost this war because it was inevitable that the United States would come into it if England did. And then your production would guarantee for you the victory,"Your bombing only served to increase the margin of advantage in your favor,"
"H"

SOURCE: General Georg Thomas

"But your bombing caught certain strategic centers and destroyed them — the ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt, for instance — and that affected, all industry, no matter how it was dispersed. Such bombing uas the decisive factor in your victory"
"First the bombing of such strategic centers and then the destruction of our transportation facilities. The bombing of the bridges and the rail yards through which we brought oil from Romania hurt us more quickly than the bombing of the refineries at Ploesti. And finally the bombing of our synthetic oil plants hurt us very much."
"H"

SOURCE: General Georg Thomas

We tried to pin General Thomas down: Do you feel that in time bombing alone would have beaten Germany?

"Absolutely not."

How then would you evaluate the effect of bombing on Germany's capacity to wage war? There was little h-esitation in his answer:
"Without bombing , the war would have gone on for a long time, for years. Bombing was the decisive factor in the defeat of Germany this year."
'H"

SOORCE; General Veith

Invasion of the Continent would have been possible without the assistance of an Air Force, but in such a case the Germans would have been able to prevent a breakthrough and would have thrown the invading forces back into the sea. In his opinion% the Allied breakthrough would have been utterly impossible without strategic as well as tactical "bombing." Frisoner of War gave special prominence to the latter type of attack.
'L"

SOURCE; General Veith

General Veith considers that the sequence of Allied attacks was logical and effective; firstly, in our attacking the German aircraft industry which had not yet recovered sufficiently by the time the invasion arrived, and secondly, that the destruction of the oil industry and the simultaneous dislocation of Gorman corriuriicätion system were decisive.
"L"

SOURCE; Doctor Schacht and General Thomas

We asked if anyone in Germany had visualized the likelihood of bombardment of factories before the war. Both of them said that many had but that Goering was in complete control of production and would not listen. Schacht said "Goering was, how do you say it?, a complete charlatan. He was a fool. He knew nothing, nothing about production. A plan would be shown to him for producing so many fighters per month end he would take the plan as the accomplished fact and say 'See, mein Fuehrer, we are now producing this many fighters per month.' After the bombardment started we tried to dislocate (he meant disperse) the critical industries deep into Germany but this took an incredible amount of steel and brick and labor and hurt our production capacity that much more." We asked about the attempts to counteract the American heavy bombers and Schacht again returned to his basic promise about Germany's weaker industrial capacity. He said "Goering insisted on concentrating on fighter production in order to attack your bombers. To do this we had to give up bomber production and so could not molest your bomber factories» The result was inevitable." We mentioned that for a time German fighter strength threatened to stop daylight bombardment, as at the Schweinfurt battle in August 1943. "Yes," said Schacht, "but then you just waited a month or two until your strength had again built up far in excess of ours. We were powerless to stop it,"
"H"

SOOURCE: General Kolb

General Kolb considers that at the opening of the bombing of aircraft industry the Germans were caught short by having left their factories vulnerable to air attack, and dispersal to the underground sites should have started far earlier than it did. This prisoner of war could not understand why the Allied bombing of oil refineries and fuel depots started so late as it did.
'L"

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost
The gasoline shortage was first felt in Italy about January 1944. Major Hutmacher was then commanding a Geschwader and he was instructed to keep the information from his crew. Before January 1944 the supply of gasoline was apparently unlimited, By July 1944 bomber groups had to be left standing because of a shortage of fuel, and it was about this time that the reorganization of the Luftwaffe was effected,
"F"

SOOURCE: Reichsminister Albert Speer

Asked about his opinion on Allied target selection, Speer stated that in general the right targets hr.d been selected. The final decision was due in great part to the elimination of German synthetic oil production. Oil and high grade steel were the two focal points of all war production. Steel, however, was at no tine decisively-affected by strategic bombing. The bombing of the ball bearing industry did not bring about a decisive setback although the reserves of the industry shortly after the bombing were sufficient for only five days of production. The crisis V.T.S, however , overcome by redesigning motors and engines speedily and thereby effecting a saving up to 30^ of bearings per unit. Our continuous bombing of aircraft assembly and other dispersed plants was not considered of decisive effect by Spe3r. He compared German war production to a stream. Instead of bombing the source (steel) we chose to concentrate on tho mouth. This could not decisively alter the course of the stream.
"I"

SOURCE: General Thomas

Strategic bombing forced a revision in armamenJ plans in the summer of 1941 when the efficiency of strategic bombing became apparent. Since the summer of 19421 armament plans, especially the planning of aircraft production, were greatly influenced by growing air force attacks. Since 1944 Allied air operations beerme the deciding influence in Gorman war planning.
"K"

SOURCE; German Radar Officers

.......Whenever a question was asked on the time required to design and produce equipment, the German officers always placed the Allied bombing as a major factor. The Allied air offensive was obviously one of our major victory operations. To stop this offensive, the Germans did use two systems: flak and fighters. However, during the last year, the high priority that was placed on the design and production of jet aircraft and several forms of fighter control and early-warning radars, shows that the Germans had decided to depend upon fighters rather than flak to do the job. All the officers that were interrogated believed that this was a fundamental error, (it must be noted that they were all flak officers«) This might be more obvious now since the jet formations never became a reality. However, these officers felt that instead of attempting to construct massive radar equipment, and to obtain a high production rate on fighters of a revolutionary design under the pressure of extensive Allied bombing, it would have been better to place the highest priority on flak equipment. The required improvements were desired in the following orders:

a. Development of rocket flak to cut down transit time, and the application of proximity fusing.

b. Better anti-jamming devices and, if possible the development of a microwave, automatic tracking radar, similar to the SCR 584 that would eliminate the-human function so far as possible.

SOURCE: General Veith

Prisoner of war states that the Eighth Air Force tactics were excellent fron the point of view of defense against fighters, but that the close formation flying provided good targets for flak gunners. He states, however, that the results obtained by the daily bombing methods of the United States Air Force were fron a strategic point of view, in his opinion, more successful than the methods adopted by the R.A.F. by night, and he further states that it is his opinion that for the purpose of these daylight attacks the tactics employed by the United States Eighth Air Force were the most suitable. (From an A.D.I, (K) Report (British) Number 321/1945.)

SOURCE: Doctor Hjalmar Schacht

Dr. Schacht believes that the deciding factor in the European war was Allied air power. "We have been overwhelmed by your air force," he exclaimed. He believes that from the American or Allied point of view, strat gic bombing is the most economical method of attaining a military ond yet conceived: economical from the point of view of the cost in money and resources and from the point of view of lives saved. The priority of targ-ts as worked out by the Allies was "masterly", Dr. Schacht said. The early raids on the Schweinfurt ball bearing plants were one of the greatest blows to the German war machine, particularly in view of the fact that Sweden, who was giving Germany no credit, was the chief remaining source of import for ball bearings.
"K"

SOURCE: General Thomas

Strategic bombing attacks on the German aircraft and fuel industries during the years 1943 and 1944 were decisive. In the aircraft industry, the most seriously affected item was engines and in the aircraft accessories industry. It was bell bearings, gears, injection pumps, etc. The engine deficiency was already felt in 1943.
The shortage of fuel started to affect operations and training of the Luftwaffe and tank troops in 194-3» A German defeat might have been brought about much sooner in the event strategic bombing of the fuel industry had started earlier because the long distances to be overcome on the Eastern front presented a much greater supply problem than was the case in 1944.
"G"

SOURCE: Hauptmann Flaechentraeger

"We were beaten a year ago when Allied air attacks against gasoline and aircraft industries had crippled our air am and our transportation system had begun to crack. I attribute Germany's defeat primarily to the strength of your air force, for without strategic bombing of industry and transportation you could not have successfully invaded the Continent. Lack of gasoline held us up more than lack of aircraft. In my opinion, one bomb dropped against a gasoline plant was aorth two bombs dropped against an aircraft factory,"
"J"

SOURCE: Reihsminister Albert Speer

Question: One of the fundamental problems is: Whose attacks were norc effective on industry, British or American?

Speer: When the English bombs actually hit they caused more destruction. I forbade the press to mention that American bombs caused less effect. Perhaps the explosive is not so good, I don't know. My opinion is that the detonator was not sensitive enough and thus the crater was too deep and t he blast went up instead of out to the side as was the case with "English bombs. In addition you dropped lighter bombs while the Ehglish mixed mines which had a greater effect than the bombs."
Daunbach: "It isn't true that a 500 lb. bomb has one-half the effect of a 1,000 lb. bomb. A 2,000 lb. bomb would be preferable as it would tear up the foundations. In the small i-eights the difference in effect is not double per double weight."
"I"

SOURCE; General Thomas

Besides the irresponsible Hitler military leadership since 1941, the attacks of the Allied air force are the chief reason for Germany's defeat. They include the destruction of aircraft production, crippling of the transportation system and in the last months of the war, the deterioration of morale of troops and civilians.
'G'

SOURCE! General Halder

The Allied air force obtained a decisive superiority in 19/1.3. From news düch General Holder receivad privately, he understands that the attacks on German aircraft and fuel industries nsre the decisive factor.
'G'

SOURCE: General Hartmann

"Allied air power was the most outstanding cause of Germany1s defeat. After Germany had conquered France and the LOT; Countries and thus laid the foundation for a 'Festung Europa' , almost the entire Allied war strategy had to be aimed at coning to grips with the Wehrmacht on the European Continent. That the Allies were not only able to establish a foothold in Europe, but also to drive the war to a successful conclusion, is the victory of the Allied air force."
"J"

SOURCE: General Thomas

A complete crippling of industry and transport occurred only in the last months of the war. However since 1943 strategic bombing of important industrial and transportation centers caused essential troubles in production and transport. Chiefly affected, were aircraft industries, fuel plants and artificial rubber factories while raw material industries (coal and iron) suffered less. Strategic bombing of the fuel industry especially affected oil refining and synthotic fuel plants. Oil ^rells in Rumania and Germany were not badly damaged. Greatest damage to transportation centers was caused in Berlin, Middle Germany, The Ruhr area and Frankfurt.
"G"

SOURCE; Major Budelmann

"Strategic bombing of German industry and transportption is, in my opinion, the one paramount reason for Germany's defeat. As the aircraft industry was largely dispersed in various sections, attacks on a few important departments could hold up production all down the line, attacks on the transportation system, furthermore, held up production by delaying the delivery of vital material."
"J"

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering.

In order to hamper the German Air Force most, the following order of targets should have been observed:
a. Synthetic oil works
b. Communications
c. Aero-engine factories
d. Airframe factories
e. Ball bearing factories
f. Airfields
'0"

SOURCE; General Bayerlain

Question: How would the General rank the causes for defeat in explaining the defeat of the German ground forces?

Answer: Causes for defeat:

1. Tactical air power (I am unable to decide)
2. Strategic air power (which is the better)
3. Artillery (directed by aircraft, with air superiority) .
4. Numerical superiority (materiel, aircraft and arnmunition).
5. Allied strategy.
6, Tanks. The Sherman tank because of its inferiority in range, caliber and armor could be used only as infantry support. Destruction of enemy tanks was job of dive-bombers and air-directed artillery.
7. Excellent organization of supply lines.
8. Engineers who built and repaired bridges across many rivers with astonishing speed.
9. German strategy.
'R"

SOURCE: General Lamelson

The attacks on the fuel industries v/ere the most important (than those on the aircraft industry). The results of these attacks vTere perceptible in the steady decline of German Air Force effort in Italy, but particularly in an ever-increasing shortage of motor fuel,
"P"

SOURCE: General Jahn

The Allied Air Forces were of great, but not decisive importance. In spite of the complete absence of the German Air Force, and enormous difficulties, it was possible up to t'-e very last to keep the front supplied with the most essential materials of all sorts, and to accomplis troop movements. Even the morale and the will to fight of the German people was not broken, despite the destruction of practically every large German city and the enormous losses among the civilian population.

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering

The attacks on synthetic oil works were the most effective of all strategic bonbing and the most decisive in Germany's defeat. "Without fuel, nobody can conduct a war."
"Q"

SOURCE: General von Vietinghoff

Allied air power was chiefly responsible for Germany's defeat in this war because:

a. Industry and transport facilities were greatly reduced, which resulted in a lessening of supplies to all fronts.
b. On the Italian and the Western Front, all freedom of movement for reserves, tanks, etc. was denied during the daylight hours. Thus, counter attacks were impossible. In isolated instances, when we were successful in assembling troops for a major surprise attack, it could only be done at night and then the Allies were always in a position to bring their Air Force into action at any desired spot in a few hours and thus frustrate every German attack. For this reason alone I was forced, in the autumn of 1943 to give up my original idea, which we to destroy the forces of the 5th and 8th Armies by using all available German forces first against the 5th and tbaa against the 3th Army. Instead I had to go over to a pur'ly defensive policy. After that, every possibility of clearing the Italian mainlan' disappeared, and it became equally impossit to force the Allies into an engagement requiring the commitment of substantial strength, which without Allied air superior would previously have certainly existed as a practical possibility.
"P"

SOURCE: General Boehlke

During the first years of the war the Allied air attacks only had a small retarding effect on German aircraft and fuel production, but toward the end of the war the antinu ing attacks had a decisive effect in determining the course of the war.
"P"

SOURCE: General Wolff

Allied air attacks on the fuel industry had the greater effect (than attacks on aircraft industry) and the results were cumulative unti] finally, in the last months of the rar, the industry was almost totally destroyed.

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering

As between airframe and online factories, prirority should definitely have been given to the latter. Attacks on air frame factories were effective, but concentrated attacks on engine factories would have crippled the German Air Force much sooner. (This, incidentally, is contrary to the opinion of Prof. Messerschmitt, who was questioned on this and other points and claimed that there is no difference in the importance of these two types of targets.)
"Q"

SOURCE; General Lemelson

Considered as a part of the general material superiority/ of the Allies, the strength of the Allied Air Force was of first importance - especially during the last year in Italy - because it:
a. Prevented all movement of tactical reserves on the battle field during the day and therefore made the transfer of a stront point, especially if it included motor transport, possibly only to a very limited degree, and then only at night.
b. Limited the movement of operational Panzer reserves to the hours of darkness and thereby greatly reduced their effectiveness.
c. Greatly increased supply difficulties by reason of the destruction of railway lines although reduced supplies were also to some extent due to air attacks against our war industries. It was always possible to get what supplies there were through by motor convoys.
"P"

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering

Attacks on ball bearing manufacture were, according to Goering, none too effective. He offered three reasons for this: dispersal, underground factories, and above all, substitution of roller bearings for ball bearing.
"Q"

SOURCE: General von Vietinghoff

nsofar as it is possible to judge from Italy, it is generally recognized that Allied air attacks v/ere extremely successful. This is especially true with reference to attacks on the fuel industry which by the end of the war proved to be the decisive factor.
"P"

SOURCE: General von Schellwitz

Allied air power was a major factor in Germany's defeat because on the Fome Front, it involved the destruction of industry, crippling of transport facilities and likewise, to a certain extent, of the food supply;
War Front, it involved crippling of the service of supply, destruction of the fighting units an critical strong points, interfered with and finally prevented the bringing up of reserves, crippled our submarine warfare, and encouraged the resistance movements behind the German lines.

SOURCE: Reichsmarschcll Hermann Goering

The general effect of our strategic bombing on the production schedule for jet aircraft resulted in the decision to give absolute priority to the production of the ME 262 and to speed up its manufacture to the utmost.
"Q"

SOURCE: General Roesener

Air attacks forced decentralization of the aircraft industry and consequently affected production possi bilities, In the fuel industry there occurred almost a tota stoppage in the late stages of the war and the latter program was considered the more effective of the two.
"P"

SOURCE: General Wolff

(Allied air power was chiefly responsible for Germany's defeat in this war) for the following reasons:

a. The ever-increasing disruption of producti plant and transport facilities resulted in a supply situation which became more and n< unsatisfactory. The front died of slow starvation.
b. Allied air superiority was used so success fully against our artillery and anti-tank weapons (PAK and 8.8 Flak) that time and again a path was blasted into and through our defense lines for your ground troops.
c. Deployment of troops and counter attacks became impossible, that is to say, unprofitable, during daylight hours.
d. The almost constant interruption of the railway services had the effect of preventing the arrival of practically all Army mail since February 1945. This placed an additional burden on the soldiers' nerves and morale, since no one knew whether his family was still alive, or if they were, where and under what circumstances they were living.
"P"

SOURCE; General Boehlke

The Allied Air Forces have undoubtedly played a large part in the defeat of Germany for the following reasons:
a. Destruction of the German Air Force, thereby achieving absolute air superiority over German-occupied territory. The consequences
of this wore that it became extremely difficult to move reserve troops and it became practically impossible to develop strong points for defense in sufficient time,
b. Destruction of German armament and transport facilities, which resulted in serious short ages at the Front of all types of war materials
c. Complicated the work of food administration
d. Forced the evacuation of important industrie to points far distant from their normal supply of raw materials.
e. Eliminated German submarine warfare as a serious factor.
"P"

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering

Goering claimed that the Germans realized at an early stage of air attacks that the Allied air force intended to bomb by systematic selection of related targets. Immediately after our first attack on the oil industry, they were sure that synthetic oil works would then become our first priority target. Generally speaking, our attacks selected the right targets and did not overlook any installation, the bombing of which would have ended the war sooner. Explosives factories should have received more attention. The priority which we put on the targets was not always right either. He also felt that I.G. Farben plants has been comparatively spared for some particular reason.
"Q"

I b. EFFECT OF AIR OPERATIONS (TACTICAL)

SOURCE: Field Marshal von Rundstedt

Field Marshal Karl Gerd von Rundstedt, admitting complete German defeat, said today (4 May 1945) he regarded air power as the most decisive factor in the Reich's military failure.
'C"

SOURCE: Field Marshal von Rundstedt

Northern Italy was defended so as to keep the enemy from Germany and especially to make the Allies' air forces' flying time and distance longer, he added. There also were political considerations involved, namely to keep Mussolini in line, he said.
'C"

SOURCE: Field Marshal von Rundstedt

"It is hard to fix the exact moment (when the war was lost) but generally it can be said we were poor in material. Accordingly, three factors defeated us in the West where I was in command. First, the unheard of superiority of your air force which made all movement in daytime impossible. Second, the lack of motor fuel - oil and gas - so that the Panzers and even the remaining Luftwaffe were unable to move. Third, the systematic destruction of all railway communications so that it was impossible to bring one single railway train across the Rhine. This made impossible the reshuffling of troops and robbed us of all mobility.

SOURCE: General Galland

Galland believed that Allied air power was the essential factor in the winning of the war in the same way as Ge*-iaa.ny*s air power won the early campaigns in Poland, France and Russia. Allied military oper^lons in Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy aficj r?*a'ing Runstedt's offensive were also decisive end dependent upon air superiority. In the last weeks of the war Allied air superiority stunned the German defenses and shortened hostilities by months.
"L"

SOURCE: General (Graf) von Schwerin

An Air Force today is far more decisive than armor. If there had only been tanks at the Po they wouldn't have caused us as big a headache as their fighter bombers did.

SOURCE: Lieutenant Colonel Walter Hartmann

I must admit, there's no point in further resistance. There'll only be fighting now in Bavaria, in the Tyrol, in Salzburg. The Allies will concentrate all their air power against that area. There'll be 1000-bomber raids, 2000-bomber raids. This war is really hell; and worst of all is the air warfare. Our positions were attacked by squadrons of twenty-one, twenty-five, or even thirty-two planes, one wave after the other, there was no end to them. It was hell.

SOURCE: General Bodenschatz

The invasion could not have been made without the overwhelming superiority of the Allied Air Force. The Germans could not bring up their reserves as the railways were cut; they could not move their troops by road in daylight, and as the nights were short, only very little time was loft to move their troops at all.
"L"

SOURCE: General Galland

In the West, in 1940 and 1941, it was the Royal Air Force fighter force which prevented the German Army from advancing on England. In the African campaign the Allied tactical air superiority enabled tho Allied forces to move forward, and again in Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, Allied successes were largely due to tactical air superiority.
"L"

SOURCE: General Galland

General Galland rated bombing targets in the following scale of effectiveness:

1. Transport facilities, because of their direct importance to military operations and war production.
2. Oil targets, because of their relation to the function of air forces, armored forces and military transport and industry in general.
3. General industry including aircraft production.
4. Attacks on cities to cripple manpower.
"L"

SOURCE: General von Vietinghoff

By heavy attacks prior to 9 April 1945, the bomber units were able to smash even strongly fortified areas and to cut them off for the first moment. The actual losses however were not too high in the last analysis. In special mass carpet-bombing in open terrain, for example at Anzio, many were buried alive. In cities such as Cassino the remains of houses and barricaded streets offered good opportunities for battle for an opponent schooled in close-range combat (for example, 1 FS Rifle Division) especially against the enemy armor. The fighter-bomber pilots had a genuinely damaging effect. They hindered practically all essential movement at the focal points. Even the radio and telephone communications were delayed threefold. Local reserves, which should have been moved by day, often arrived with great delay at the ordered position. Even the tanks could move only at night because of the employment of fighter-bombers; however the actual losses were few. The effectiveness of the fighter-bombers lay in that their presence alone over the battlefield paralyzed every movement. The artillery-spotting pilots were unpleasant as well. Their mere presence enforced silence upon our artillery. Each soldier felt himself observed and recognized by the artillery-spotting pilot, even when this was not the case. In this manner, in decisive phases of the battle, the center of gravity of our defense, the artillery, fell away. Our light, medium, and heavy artillery in the front lines had few casualties from air attacks, especially from those of light bombers.
"A"

SOURCE: General Spies

General Spies stated categorically that without air superiority the invasion would have been defeated. Superiority was needed both strategically to attack German communications and tactically to aid the advancing armies. He ascribed the speed of Allied advance both in Africa and France to the very effective tactical bombing of all types of targets including transport facilities and he considered the strategic disruption of communications was the vital factor.
"L"

SOURCE: Field Marshal Sperrle

Allied bombing was the dominant factor in the preparation for and execution of the invasion. In his opinion, the initial landing would have been possible without the assistance of the Air Force but the subsequent breakthrough would have been out of the question without the massive scale of the bombing, particularly of the communications and installations in the German rear.
Sperrle thinks that Allied air power was the chief factor in Germany's defeat and he again emphasized the final confusion caused by the bombing of communications.

SOURCE: General von Pohl

"According to my knowledge, the evacuation of Sicily was the first case where the operational plans of German Headquarters had to be changed by the activities of the Allied air force before a decision on the ground was reached. This change was caused by the air force attacks on the railroads in southern Italy and the soa area off Messina, which effectively delayed the arrival of German reserves and supplies."
"G"

SOURCE: Hauptmann Schulz

Q. "Did you know where the Fifteenth Air Force missions were going?"
A. "Yes. Your weather reconnaissance tipped us off faithfully. We heard the weather ship call for take-off instructions, followed it en route to target area, intercepted its reports to Fifteenth Air Force Headquarters. By 0Ö00 we knew the general target area.
"We followed the bombers circling over Foggia area, heard them call their Wing Headquarters—thus got battle order. Early Warning System followed to within gunlaying radar range at which time the small Wurzburgs started tracking."
"M"

SOURCE: German Officers

The Germans evidently banked on defensive fighters as the best weapon against our bombers. When their industry could not produce the necessary fighters the German High Command, being bound in red tape, still continued to neglect new developments in flak weapons and methods.
"M"

SOURCE: General von Pohl

The defeat at El Alamein was a turning point in the war. It was due to the stoppage of supplies from Sicily to Africa (the amount of fuel available at times in Africa was zero) and to the new system of carpet pattern bombing which the already shaken troops could stand no more.
"G"

SOURCE: General Bayerlein

Q. Do ground forces find bombs or strafing more unpleasant?
A. Strafing is more unpleasant for ground troops than bombing because of better and more exact results, even in trenches. There is no way of evading it. Penetration of armor of armored cars and tanks (except Tiger II). Serious injuries, which almost always resulted in complete disability.
"R"

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering

The first objective at the beginning of a war must always be to destroy the enemy's air force, completely disregarding all other targets. The air force is the heart of military power and resistence, and only when this is destroyed, should other targets be attacked; the priority to be given to these other targets would obviously depend on the economics of the country under attack.
"Q"

SOURCE: General von Schellwitz

In our attempts to bring up reserves we undoubtedly sustained heavy losses from your attacks on our rear areas. Nevertheless, because of the generally deterior ating military situation in Germany at the time, the invasio would have been possible even without the bombing of transport facilities in our rear areas, but it would have involve considerably stronger forces, more time and larger losses
on your part.
"P"

SOURCE: General Bayerlein

Q. Does the General have any awareness of the effects of Allied air attacks on army dumps and depots for ammunition, gasoline, food, clothing, engineering, equipment, ordnance, etc.?
A. Air attacks on back area installations - it is known that attacks on fuel and ammunition dumps are effectiv Fuel dumps often burned out completely, as attempts to put the fires out in time were refrained from because of an extended stay of the aircraft over the burning target. Attacks on ammunition dumps wero not so effective. In many cases only individual sections wore set on fire and then burnt out only partly, as the dump sections were placed far apart. In order to destroy an ammunition dump completely, a very heavy bomber attack is necessary.

SOURCE: General von Vietinghoff

The (invasion) landing itself was always possible (without air superiority), but without the supporting bombing of our transport facilities we could have at least isolated the beachhead and possibly wiped it out.
"P"

SOURCE; Reichsrnar schall Hermann Goering

"The Allies owe the success of the invasion to their air forces. They prepared the invasion; they made it possible; and they carried it through." Without the Allied air force, Goering claimed, it would have been possible to bring up German ground reinforcements and make full use of armored units.
He particularly stressed the part which the United States Air Force has played. "Without the American Air Force, the war would still be going on elsewhere but certainly not on German soil."
"Q"

SOURCE: General Bayerlein

Q. What were effects of attacks on Corps, Army and higher headquarters? Were they useless from Allied point of view? Did they produce effects on Commander morale? Would more have been useful to Allies?

A. Attacks on headquarters were excellent in several cases. Headquarters was almost completely destroyed in the attack by Marauders, Thunderbolts, and Rocket Typhoons on Headquarters, 5th Panzer Army in NORMANDY, nortl of CONDE, on 10 June. The Commanding General was the only one left of all the high-ranking officers.
'R"

I c. EFFECT OF AIR OPERATIONS (INTERDICTION)

SOURCE" General von Viotinghoff

From the 9th to the 20th of April 1945, was the period of the most effective employment of the Allied. Air Force. In the attack on Scnio fortifications the number of casualties was increased by the dropping of numerous small-caliber fragmentation bombs. Especially in the region of Ferrara and Lake Comacchio the r joistanco of the troops was greatly reduced and communications and command were disrupted as never before. Through the destruction of almost all crossings of the numerous canals trans-shipment was made much more difficult and we had to leave much heavy equipment behind. The smashing of all communications connections was especially disastrous. Thereafter the orders failed to come through at all or failed to come through at the right time. In any case, the command was not able to keep itself informed of the situation on the front, so that its own decisions and commands came, for the most part, too late. The air attack on the Headquarters of Army Group C on the 20th of April 1945 at Recoaro inflicted only slight damage, for the most necessary command positions had already boon made bomb-proof. "ho crossings of the Reno and the Po were decisively influenced by the employment of the Allied Air Forces. ihe smashing of almost all ferries and bridges made an ordered retreat across the Po no longer possible. The troops amassed at the crossing points and often had to swim to the other bank without heavy weapons. After the 20th of April less use was made of the Air Force. In considering the most important effects of Allied air power, the morale effect upon the German troops must not be underestimated. However, it was here decisive in that, as a result of their complete lack of an air force of their own, without the promise cf the help of a like force, the troops felt still more the enemy's superiority of materiel.
"A"

SOURCE: General von Viotinghoff

Rail traffic was struck in the most protracted fashion by the destruction of bridges. Restoration of bridges required much time; the larger bridges could not be repaired. As improvisation, many bridge sites were detoured or the supplies were reloaded. With the increasing intensity of the air attacks, especially on the stretch of the Brenner, the damaged sections were so groat and so numerous that this stretch, despite the best of repair organization and the employment of the most powerful rebuilding effort, became ever worse and was only ever locally and temporarily usable. A few bad weather days, in which the Allied Air Force could not have flown, would often have sufficed to bring the traffic again to its peak. Only in February and March was it again possible to travel by rail through the Brenner to Bologna

SOURCE: General von Vietinghoff

The ceaseless use of fighter-bombers succeeded in paralyzing all day-time movement and through this alono the tactical counter-measures became of secondary importance. In general, air attacks against bridges interrupted traffic only temporarily. In about 50$ of the cases the bridges were so damaged in the first attack, and the remainder in subsequent attacks, that they could no longer be used. Destroyed bridges in every case brought a hampering of communications, but were never able to cripple them, for in the Po plain, above all, there were sufficient auxiliary routes provided in the secondary roads. Good air raid warning and air raid shelter on all the main roads limited losses and accidents considerably.
"A"

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

Sources did not regard the interdiction program against German rail lines as decisive. In almost all cases rail cuts wore repaired in 48 hours. Had gasoline been plentiful the transportation system would not have been disturbed, even if tho rail attacks had been much heavier. The crux of the German war ill Italy was gasoline. Both sources were enthusiastic in their claims that the destruction of the German fuel structure through our strategic bombing of oil won the war in Italy as well as in the rest of Europe.
To support their contentions that rail bombings were not disruptive to communications, they insisted that as recently as a week ago it was easily possible to travel from Berlin to Villafranca in 5 -6 days and two weeks ago from Munich to Lake Garda in 6-7 hours.

SOURCE: General Georg Thomas

"Not until the end was the bombing of troops effective. Victory is production, and you destroyed Gorman production. Victory is movement -you paralyzed us.
"When we could not produce or move, then your pianos came over our troops and they saw no German planes but only the enemy, and so their morale was destroyed."
"H"

SOURCE; General Peterson

The invasion could not have taken place without the strategic bombing of transport and communications.
"L"

SOURCE: General Ibel
Without air superiority, the invasion of Europe would have been impossible. This General could not speak from personal experience but was of the opinion that a major factor in the success of the invasion was that reserves could not be brought up owing to the bombing of communications.
"L"

SOURCE; General Siedel
The decisive factor was the disruption of German transport communications.
"L"

SOURCE; Colonel Friedrich Vollbracht

Colonel Vollbracht felt that Allied air attacks on transport had been one of the decisive factors in victory in the Theater. The Germans had always had adequate radio and telephonic equipment. The important thing was the impossibility of transport and supply. The closing of the Brenner route was of primary importance. Asked when he had first known that the Germans had lost the war in the Italian Theater, he replied that everyone had known it when the Allied armies were able to cross the Po,
"D"

SOURCE: General Galland

Galland considers that the bombing of communication facilities such as railroads, canals, bridges, etc. was the most important single factor in the defeat of Germany. In fact, he termed this bombing "decisive". He was careful to point out, however, that the bombing could only be called decisive in the light of the general Allied tactics which wore actually used.
"L"

SOURCE: General Hartmann

"... the Allied landings in Europe could never have been successful without Allied air superiority. Possibly without air superiority a landing might have been made, although the beachhead could have been isolated and later wiped out if we had been able to rush reserves immediately to the front and for that our transportation system would have to have been functioning effectively. Allied air attacks against our communications network prior to and following the actual invasion were responsibL for the success of the invasion."
"J"

SOURCE: General von Pohl

Within the Reich, the Ruhr area, because of destruction of communications, seems to have been handicapped aLnost completely, while in Italy a complete handicap to production never occurred. He believes that there wore too large time intervals between attacks in Italy which always permitted repairs of the Brenner Line and the east-west railroads. In principle, he thinks attacks on communication systems and fuel factories to be the most effective.
"G"'

SOURCE: General Hartmann

"The question still remains, however, how far the Russians could have advanced without the Allied strategic bombings. Throughout the last months of the Eastern campaign, our troops were seriously handicapped by the need for an unimpaired transportation network behind them."
"J"

SOURCE: General von Pohl

Until the end of 1944 difficulties in the supply of aircraft and fuel wore mostly due to disruption of communications. It was only after the loss of the Rumanian oil fields, the destruction of a part of the Gorman aircraft factories and principally the destruction of Gorman synthetic fuel plants that the remaining Luftwaffe forces in Italy could not be provided with sufficient fuel. This condition was severely felt beginning early 1945. In May 1945 there was only sufficient fuel on hand for a few operations. The only jet planes in Italy were three Arado 234's.
"G"

SOURCE: Major Gallonkamp

"The greatest single cause of the Gorman collapse was Allied strategic bombing of the German transportation system. Cutting our rail lines indirectly restricted the production of our industries. For example, riy father-in-law's factory in Osnabrück - the Schooller Photo-paper Factory - began to feel the coal shortage acutely during the late fall of 1944. In January 1945, so little coal could bo transported from the Ruhr due to the air attacks against the transportation network that 50% of the factory activities wore shut down.
"By the beginning of 1945, air attacks had reduced railroad traffic in North Italy to an insignificant trickle of supplies. The effectiveness of these attacks depended largely on whether the target was a railroad bridge or simply a section of the line. When anti-personnel 'butterfly bombs' were dropped on a bombed-out bridge, the difficulty of repair was increased tremendously. As a certain number of these bombs were fused to explode within a half hour after striking the ground, our repair crows were compelled to wait a half hour before attempting reconstruction. The remaining 'butterfly bombs», fused to explode on contact, then had to be set off. A gunner, protected by a shield, fired at the individual bombs from a distance of 50 to 60 meters. By this method 6 hours were required to explode 110 bombs. Though our personnel losses were quite small, the time lost was tremendous,
"The air war against railroad communications was a greater factor in the German defeat than the raids against industrial targets. Very often the factories were missed entirely or else slightly damaged. Though the destruction of the surrounding residential sections might break the morale of a people like the Italians, it could not knock the Germans out of the war. Without a doubt a successful Allied invasion of the continent would have been impossible without the destruction of our communications system by Allied air attacks. If we had had an effective railroad system behind us at St. Lo, so that supplies and reinforcements could have been rushed in at the right moment, the case might have been entirely different."
"J"

SOURCE: Genoral Hartmann

"Damage by Allied air action against rail road and M/T transportation was very great. Primarily the greatest damage was to material - railroad cars, trucks, cargoes, etc., but personnel losses were very slight. During the crucial fighting at Cassino, the railroad line
from Florence south could not be kept in regular operation and material had to be brought a distance of 600 kms by truck."
"J"

SOURCE: Roichsmarschall Hermann Goering

"The disruption of our communication linos has done more harm to us than the destruction of our factories." Our attacks on the German transportation system became particularly severe and most noticeable at a time -when it was finally decided to build underground factories. The destruction of tho transportation system prevented a contraction of industry which had previously been dispersed all over the country in underground factories.
"Q"

SOURCE: General Roesenor

The landing in Normandy became possible through heavy bombing attacks against our communications and supply system. However, if paratroops had not been used immediately aftor the bombing attacks the invasion would have been a much more difficult matter, or might oven have been repelled.
"P"

SOURCE; General Jahn

In the absence of air attacks on transport facilities in rear aroas, the invasion would have required the commitment of considerably larger forces, moro time, and involved heavier losses, In the course of time, however, the invasion would have succeeded anyway.
"P"

SOURCE: General Fretter-Pico

Bombing attacks had a greater paralyzing effect on the transportation system than against industry.
"P"

SOURCE: General Lemelson

A landing in France was possible at any time and along any part of tho Coast, if sufficient superiority of air and sea power were brought into action. However, had not the transport facilities in our rear areas been bombed, it would have been possible for the German Army to bring up adequate resorves and institute counter-attacks which would have contained, if not obliuterated the beachhead.

SOURCE: Gonoral Boehlke

Bombing at first had only a nuisance value in its effect on industry and transportation facilities. Damage was overcome fairly quickly, either by repair work, or evacuation to a new location. It was not until the last year of the war that the results reached such proportions that it could be said that the bombing had actually accomplished a paralyzing effect.
"P"

SOURCE: General Bayerlein

Q. How did existence of fighters affect tactical decisions to move or not to move?

A. Troop movements could not be carried out in day time when the weather was favorable for flying. Movements were therefore always dependent on the weather. It was no longer possible to fix a definite time for a movement. Nevertheless, if marches had to be carried out, they were very expensive in casualties and material. Necessary night marches required more time than day marches. No long distances could be covered during the short summer nights. All troop movements were, therefore, delayed and rendered very difficult by Allied fighters so that Headquarters were unable to make any definite time calculations and troops often arrived at the decisive place too late.
"R"

SOURCE: General Jahn

The attacks on the German transport system, coordinated with the serious losses in the fuel industry, had a paralyzing effect not only on the industries attacked, but on all other Gorman war industries as well.
"P"

SOURCE; General Boehlke

Without the crippling attacks on our transport facilities by Allied air forces, the invasion could never have succeeded. Through the destruction of supply lines and railway installations deep behind the front linos it became impossible for the German High Command to build up any suitable strong points as the situation required.

PART II. JET AIRCRAFT IN ITALY

SOURCE; Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

There were three Arado 234 's in the Italian theater, based at Udine. They were known as the "Kommando Sommer" and were to have been formed into Staffeln (squadrons). They were used for reconnaissance only with great effective- ' ness (see below). Of the three, one was captured at the front when it force-landed behind Allied lines, one burned on landing at Udine five weeks ago, and the third was believed destroyed at Udine.
Until the Luftwaffe introduced the iirado 234 into this theater the Army was never satisfied with the recce reports. Despite the fact that there were only three Arado 234's in the theater, after they began to do regular recce over a strip from Livorno to Ancona, there v;ere no more complaints. Until the use of the Arado 234t Luftwaffe recce planes simply could not get into the target area - they were kept from doing recce by tactical considerations, not by fuel lack.
The Arado 234 proved itself excellent for recce work. It customarily operated et 9-12,000 meters. It had no armament whatever, but did have a Fu Ge 25. There WLS no Fu Ge 16 built in but they were soon to have been provided. Although the Arado 234 was still experimental, it was highly successful in all phases and seems to have had no mechanical difficulties. It had interchangeable fittings for all three standard types of camera equipment. Since there were only three in the theater, there was no serious fuel shortage for them; they used a low grade fuel (1-2), completely unrefined (?), shipped in tank trucks from Miessburg near Celle, sources thought.
"F"

SOURCE: Colonel Friedrich Vollbracht

Colonel Vollbracht 's opinion, based on hearsay alone, since he had never seen the aircraft, was that the Arado 234 wes a highly successful airplane. There were never more than three of them in Italy, based, to the best of his knowledge, at Udine♦ He had no information concerning mechanical difficulties from which they may have suffered, nor any details of cameras and/or armament with which they were provided. As far as he knew there was no fuel shortage for these aircraft; since there were only three of them in the theater and since they use a low quality fuel, he believed there was sufficient.
'D'

SOURCE: German Officers

It had been hoped to develop a larger jet aircraft program in Italy in order to meet the tremendous Allied air superiority. General Galland was supposed to be organizing and training several jet aircraft groups near Munich. These v.ere tc be piloted entirely by officers. But it all came to nothing because of a lack of fuel due to Allied strategic bombing and the Russian advance. There were never more than four jet aircraft in Italy, and these v.ere used for reconnaissance purposes.
"N"

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher

"Reichsmarschall Goering and Luftwaffe General Galltnd argued about the proper use of the ME-262. Goering wished it used as a fighter-bomber (as it was used in the West with great losses to ground fire); Galland wished it used strictly as a weapon against our four-engined heavies. Since Kitler wanted some Luftwaffe activity over the V/estern front every day Goering won the argument.
"Galland was called to Fuehrer Headquarters after ME-262 losses in the West had become very high. A plan was evolved to try his suggestions against the Fifteenth Air Force in January 19/4.6. The industry was to produce some 4»000 aircraft for the mission. The plenes were to stage in Austria or northern Italy and attack the bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force before rendezvous with their escort. An alternate plan was for one-third to engage escort, two-thirds to engage bombers.
"Needless to say the aircraft industry did not supply the planes - end anyway the war ended too soon."
"M"

SOURCE; Major Hoofer

"In the East the ME-262 was used ts a fighter with great success; in the West it wes used as a ground attack weapon with great losses to small Erms fire. No attempt was made to armor plate the jet engines."
"M"

III. V-WEAPONS IN ITALY

SCURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

The Germans became aware through various sources and as a result of our constant recce over the Villafranca area that the employment of V-Y,eapons in the Italian theater was anticipated by the Allies. Inasmuch as there was no V-l construction underway and furthermore as there had never been any talk or plans of actually using this weapon in the theater, the Germans were at loss as to why the Allies expected the weapon to the extent of obviously having decided from where V-l would be launched.
Further information told the Germans that we had reports of actual V-l's deployed along railroad sidings and ready for launching.
Sources claimed that they had even been informed as to the approximate dates the Allies were expecting the first V attacks.
As much of their information seemed to center about the Villafranca area their own recce was sent up in an effort to learn the basis for Allied suspicions.
Results of this disclosed that £ section of the concrete surfacing of a landing strip, because of the shading of colors , appeared very similar to photographs of actual V-1' launching sites.
The presence of V-l bombs T/as explained by large concentrations of 1,800 kg bombs and 8 x 10 meter gasoline tanks which Italian civilian rumors had already identified as V-Veapons.
Sources claim that v.hen the grounds for Allied fears of possible V use were fully understood unofficial enhancing of the evidence "might" have been performed.
The simple explanation of why the use of V's was never contemplated in Italy is the insufficient quantity of these weapons that German industry was able to produce.
Sources claimed to have heard that the demands of the England-directed launching sites were never fully satisfied.
"F"

SOURCE: Colonel Friedrich Vollbracht

Colonel Vollbracht did not believe tha^p» Germans had considered using V-l or V-2 in the italian theater, but give no reason why not.

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering

The development of V-l started during the war. It wcs originally in the hands of the Luftwaffe, but later was handed over to the flak organization.
The V-l was very primitive end did not require much material which might otherwise be used in aircraft production. The production of V-2 was more complicated and absorbed more material, although not enough to handicap aircraft production. In this connection, Goering mentioned that the production of aircraft was held back by the "ridiculous" Wavy program, particularly by the building of heavy battleships.
The research work on V-2 began already before the war. It wes based on the original idea of developing an express mail service to the U.S. The German Army then sponsored the further research and developed it.
Because of the impossibility of exact aiming, only .larger cities could be attacked with V-weapons. Too much success, however, was not expected as only an insufficient number of missiles was available.
"V-2 was impressive (V-2 war imponierend)," Goering said with enthusiasm and pride when he related how he had seen a V-2 being fired, when he imitated - as the actor that he is - the process of the V-2 firing, from the sofa which he filled, the effect was almost as unattractive as the actual firing.

IV. ADOLF HITLER

SOURCE: Field Marshal von Rundstedt

Regarding Hitler's death he said he had not heard the radio for days since the electric current had been cut off at his hospital, butt "I feel satisfied, however, that the Fuehrer is dead. Either he was wounded and died as a result of these wounds and possibly even fell fighting, or he died under the impact of the pressure of events upon his soul. Never, never will I believe he put an end to his own life. That was not in accordance with his nature."
Regarding the theory that Hitler might still be alive and in hiding, von Rundstedt said: "Impossible. That would not be according to his character as I knoY/ it« Anyway, where would he go?"
when asked why HitJbr did not make a last stand in the Berchtesgaden area, the Marshel said: "The most menacing threat to the Reich always has been Bolshevism, The Fuehrer therefore went to the point of greatest danger, namely Berlin. The- effect of that fact on Berliners must not be underestimated. He might have conducted Berlin's defense and the war generally by radio and telephone from Berchtesgaden but he was c brave man who never thought of his ov;n security,"
Hitler, he claimed, was a "Great strategist, his intuitions were good." One had a feeling throughout the interview that in this build-up for the Fuehrer, von Rundstedt was deeply conscious that he was facing enemy reporters before vhom the Hitler legend must be preserved.
"C"

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher end Major Frost

Both Major Hutmacher and Major Frost concurred in the opinion that: "The Fuehrer died as a hero. He always said he v/ould live or die with his troops. That he did. Death was his only way out. After his cause was lost it was only through death that he could prove his own belief in that ccuse."

SOURCE: General Georg Thomas

"I doubt that Hitler or Himmler ever realized that Germany would not win. They kept telling themselves that something would happen, some miracle. I know that Hitler felt England and America would in the end fight against Russia."
"H"

SOURCE: Doctor Hialmar Schacht

Schacht was not above an occasional joke. We asked him if he thought Hitler wes dead. He replied, "I would not believe it if he told me so himself."
"E"

SOURCE: Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering

Goering was asked: "What was the reason for the delay in the use of the ME-262 es e fighter?" Promptly end excitedly came the answer: "Adolf Hitler's madness (Der Wahnsinn Adolf Hitler's)." He elaborated this statement with the following explanation: When the first ME-262 left the assembly line in May 1944 Goering, confidently and full of hope for a revival cf the GAF's fighter strength, presented it to UdoIf Hitler as the fighter which was to sweep Allied air power from the skies.
To Goering's and everybody else's surprise end consternetion, Hitler said: "I am not at all interested in this plane cs a fighter." He insisted that it be converted into a bomber. He ordered that the armament be removed and that 1 x 5°° kg or 2 x 250 kg bombs be carried instead. V.hen Gcering called his attention to the fact that a removal of the guns would cause an unbalance, Hitler suggested that extra fuel should be carried in the front, thereby also increasing the range of the aircraft. Hitler in his ignorance, stated Goering, did not realize that since this extra fuel would be consumed in flight, the original unbalance would return.
Hitler even went so far cs to have Goering issue c. written order strictly forbidding that the aircraft be referred to ES a fighter. He wanted it to bo called a "Blitzbomber",
"Q"

V. PERSONALITIES

Bayerlein , General .....Commanding General, 53rd Corps.

Bodenschatz, General .....Chief Administration Officer of the Luftraffe High Command until the Hitler bomb plot (20 July 44)

Boehlke, Generalleutnant .....Commanding General, 334th Division

Budelmann, Major .....AirfieId Commander

Flaechenstraeger, Hauptnann .....Squadron Commander

Fretter-Pico, Generalleutnant .....Commanding General, 305th Division

Frost, Major Rupert Commanding Officer .....Nacht Schlacht Geschwader 9

Galland, Generalleutnant ..... Commanding General, Fighters

Gallenkamp, Major .....Intelligence Officer

Goering, Reichsmarschall Hermann ...,. Reichsninister for Air, Supreme Commander of the Luftv/affe, Prime Minister of Prussia, President of the State Council President of the Reichstag, Reichsminister of Forestry and Game, President of the Scientifi Research Council, etc.

Haider, Generaloberst Franz Chief of Staff of the German General Staff until relieved in September 1942

Hartmann, General ..... General der Artillerie (American equivalent: Lieutenant General in Artillery)

Hartnann, Lt. Col. Walter ....Commanding Officer, 276th Grenadier Regiment, 94th Infanti Division

Hilderbrandt, Generalleutnant ....Commander of the Liaison Staff to the Monte Rosa Division

Hefer, Major ..... Chief of Staff tc Gen. von Pohl

Hutmacher, Major Walter .....Luftwaffe Operations Officer, Italy

Ibel, Generalmajor .....Commanding General, Jagd Division 2

Jahn, General .....Commanding General, Lombardy Command

Kolb GeneraI Major .....Area Airport Commander (East)

Lemelson, General Commanding General, 14th Army

Pemsel, Generalleutnant .... Liaison Officer to General Graziani

Peterson, Generalmajor ....Area Airport Commandert Boblinge: and subsequently Croatia

Roesener, General ...SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Polizei, Wehrkreis 18 (Western half of Austria)

Schacht, Dr. Hjalnar .....President of the Reichsbank, March 1933 - January 1939

Schiel, Generalmajor .....Commanding General, 94th Division

Schulz, Hauptmann Signals Officer on the General Staff in Italy

Seidel, Generalmajor ....Commanding General, Luftflotte 10

Speer, Reichsminister Albert ....Minister in charge of War Production

Sperrle, Generalfcldnarschall ..... Commanding General, Luftflotte 3 until the fall of Paris

Spies, Generalingenieur ..... Chief Engineer, Luftflotte 10

Thomas, General der Infanterie Georg .....Chief of Hie Wehrwirtschaft und Ruesturgsamt (roughly equivalent to the Commanding General, Army Service Forces)

Thyssen, Fritz ....German industrialist (steel)

Untrieser, Generalleutnant .....Officer in the German Air Ministry

Veith, Generalleutnant .....Commanding General, Flak Training

Vollbracht, Colonel ..... Divisional Commander, Luftwaffe Troops in Italy

von Massow, Generalmajor .....Commanding General, Training

von Pohl, General Max .....Commanding General of the German Air Force in Italy

von Rohden, GGneralmajor ..... Chief of Abteilung 8 (Historical of the German Air Force General Staff)

von Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarshall Gerd ..... Supreme Commander, West

von Schellwitz, Generalmajor .....Commanding General, 305th Division

von Schwerin, Generalleutnant Gref .....Commanding General, LXXVI Armored Corps

VTon Vietinghoff, Generaloberst ..... Supreme Commander, Southwest (Italian Theater)

Wolff, General. SS Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS

VI. LUFTWAFFE ORDER OF BATTLE

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

Fernaufklärungs Gruppe 122 (Long-renge Reconnaissence Group 122) had two squadrons (Staffel) in Bergamo. This group regularly flew recce missions for the Mediterranean area and over Malte. Aircraft from this unit did most of the recce over Neples, Bari end Algiers end did some escort flying as well. When the allied Armies crossed the Po, three or four planes v.cnt to Bolzano, v;here they were destroyed and six or eight got safely off to Innsbruck.
Nehaufklarungs Gruppe 11 (Short-range Reconnaissance Group 11) consisting of only one squadron made mostly of ME-109's was always based at Udine. This squadron flew little, doing recce over Ancona for the most part. It had 15 aircrcft end 10 - 12 pilots. "»»hen the Allies crossed the Po the squadron was ordered to Bolzano, but bad weather prevented take-off and the aircraft were destroyed on the ground. It is possible that one or two did escape, however.
Nechtschlacht Geschwader 9, of which Major Frost was the Commencing Officer, was formerly stationed at Ghedi and Villafranca but was recently moved to Thiene near Vicenza. It had 25 JU-87's end 15 FW-190's forming, on the basis of 12 operation aircraft per squadron, totaling two squadrons of JU-87's end one of Fw-190's. Six FW-190's and 13 JU-87's, roughly 50% escaped to Innsbruck when the Allies crossed the Po. They were subsequently ordered to return to ..Bolzano but were unable to do so because of bad weather.

SOURCE: Generalleutnent Galland

The heavy attacks by United States strategic bombers on the main centers of German aircraft production early in 1944 practically destroyed the German fighter production for a short period, but at that time their dispersal program was already under way and after a short period it was possible age in to maintain production. The figure for fighters, night fighters and fighter bombers in 1944 reached a total of 3,050 aircraft per month while the average for 1943 was about 2,500.

N.B. The figure of 3,050 aircraft given by Galland represents the peak monthly figure which was attained in August or September 1944 end it includes a total of 600 aircraft coming from repair factories. It also includes all single and twin-engine day and night fighter types, jet-propelled aircraft and new types such es the DO 335. From September 1944 until December, output declined continuously when the total amounted to 2,000, of which 500 represented repaired rircraft.
"L"

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

The first Italian Fighter Group, last stationed at Galerata. The Group had 28 ME-109's, of which 18 - 25 were always operational. It is believed that the remaining aircraft were destroyed on the ground at Gaierata.
The Second Itelian Fighter Group was stationed at Ghedi and Villafranca until about seven months ago, when they moved to the airfields at I/vieno and Osoppo. This Group was also equipped with ME-109's, of which the remaining 18 were transferred to Bergamo 23 -April and were there destroyed on the ground.
The Third Italian Fighter Group was loccted £t Holzkirchen, Germany. It has been there for the last two or three months, but it was never operational. Its function was one purely of training and it had only some old training types of aircraft.
The total strength of the three Italian Fighter Groups during the last days was perhaps 40 - 50 pilots with a total of 50 planes.
There was also an Italian Torpedo Squadron equipped with Savoia-Marchetti 70's with its operational base at Ghedi and its rear base at Bergamo. It had some 20 planes and 16 pilots. In the last six months this squadron was known to have made only one attack against some Allied ships at Ancona about 28 January 1945» The personnel of these units were all Italian.
"F"

SOURCE: Colonel Friedrich Vollbracht

When the last offensive begen in North Italy, the Headquarters of the Luftwaffe Staff Troops in Itcly was at Somnz. Compagna, between Villafranca and Verona» Later, when the Allied Armies had succeeded in breaking across the Po, this Headquarters was moved to the neighborhood of Villech.
"D"

Strength end Readiness: Order of Battle, 22 April 1944

An Operational Readiness report for 22nd April gives the current situation of the German Air Force in Italy:

Type of Aircraft	Strength	Available Aircraft
Long-Range Recconnaissance	12	11 (92%)
TAC/Recconnaissance	9	6 (67%)
Night Ground Attack	33	29 (88%)
Fighters	80	59 (74%)
Torpedo Bombers	12	7 (58%)
Type of Crew
Long-Range Recconnaissance	18	9 (50%)
TAC/Recconnaissance	20	16 (80%)
Night Ground Attack	39	27 (69%)
Fighters	98	71 (80%)

AVIANO	part, 4/JG II (Ital)	2 ME 109 G-10	1 ready
	part, 5/JG II (Ital)	1 ME 109 G-14	None ready
	part, 6/JG II (Ital)	2 ME 109 G-14	None ready
		1 ME 109 K-4	None ready
BERGAMO	4/FAG 122	1 JU 88 T-3/ Night Photo	1 ready
		5 JU 88 D-2/ Night Photo	4 ready
	6/FAG 122	6 JU 88 D-2/ Hohentwiel	6 ready
	III/JG (Ital)	1 ME 109 G-10	1 ready
GALLERATA	1/JG I (Ital)	7 ME 109 G-10	5 ready
		4 ME 109 G-14	2 ready
GHEDI I	part, 4/JG II (Ital)	9 ME 109 G-10	6 ready
GHEDI II	2/NSG 9	3 JU 87 D-3	3 ready
	part, 1/LT-Gr (Ital)	7 JU 87 D-5	7 ready
		8 SM 79	6 ready
HOIZKIRCHEN	No report
LONATE	Stab I/JG (Ital)	2 ME 109 K-4	2 ready
	2/JG I (Ital)	7 ME 109 G-10	6 ready
		6 ME 109 G-14	4 ready
	3/JG I (Ital)	7 ME 109 G-10	5 ready
		4 ME 109 G-14	2 ready
	part, 1/LT Gr (Ital)	4 SM 79	1 ready
OSOPPO	Sonderko Goetz	1 AR 234 B-2	1 ready
UDINE II	2/NAG 11	8 ME 109 G-10/R-2 camera/M-50methane-
		water equipment	5 ready
VILLAFRANCA	Stab/NSG 9	1 JU 87 D-5/school	none ready
	1/NSG 9	3 FW 190 A-8	2 ready
		4 FW 190 F-8	4 ready
	3/NSG 9	6 JU 87 D-3	6 ready
		10 JU 87 D-5	7 ready
	Stab II/JG (Ital)	1 ME 109 G-10	1 ready
	part, 4/JG (Ital)	3 ME 109 G-10	2 ready
	part, 5/JG (Ital)	2 ME 109 G-14	1 ready
		4 ME 109 G-14	3 ready
	part, 6/JG (Ital)	5 ME 109 G-14	4 ready
	part, II/JG (Ital)	2 ME 109 G-126/	1 ready
		7 ME 109 G-6/School	7 ready

VII. POLITICAL COMMENT

SOURCE: Fieldmarshall von Rundstedt

Japan's entry into the war had no effect upon the German military fate, the field marshall said., since Russia and Japan did not cone to blows.
"We know you had enough to fight a war in the Pacific and the Atlantic, but if pressure on our eastern front could have been relieved by Japan's becoming involved in a war with Russia, that would have h-Ipod," he explained.
"C"

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

Neither source had personally any firsthand knowledge of Gorman-Japanese relations, but both were conversant ~7ith propaganda on Axis partner solidarity. It was almost a yoar ago that the last blockade runner, a J p'nesc ship, had got through to Bordeaux,
There were no Japanese units with the Luftwaffe, although the Japanese had technical experts serving in the aircraft and other factories.
In general, the Germans did little rejoicing over Japanese victories because they felt it a pity that the yellow race should debase the white» They were happy, however, that the Japanese were strong enough to hold off large numbers of Allied troops and large quantities of material.
"F"

SOURCE: Doctor Hjalmar Schacht

"Hitler was always careful to make people believe that I supported him. In the beginning it was important to him that people should believe I was for him.
"But when I began to tighten up on the financing of his wild rearmament plans, then he began to resort to other means of financing, dangerous means which I knew must eventually effect the currency of Germany. And that was when I broke with him."
"H"

SOURCE: Fieldmarshall von Rundstedt

The Wehrmacht, von Rundstedt said, made no serious effort to invade ühgland after the fall of France because "for an assault on England it was necessary to select the closest point from the mainland^ Nov/, to the north of that point v/as the North Sea,t to the south the Atlantic. We did not have a fleet capable of standing by to protect us from those two sides. Moreover, our landing equipment (von Rundstedt used a contemptuous German term 'aepfelkaehne' meaning mere barges for hauling apples) was totally inadequate as experiments with them showed."

SOURCE: Major Hoofer

Major Hoefer claimed that Russian weapons and pianos "ere on the whole inferior to those of the Germans or the Anglo-Aricricans t that Russian accuracy and precision as flyors and gunners uere also inferior, hut that sh or weight of nunb'.rs, coupled v;ith an unbeatable physical vitality and endurance, had been too much for Germany.
"N"

SOURCE: Doctor Hjalmar Schacht

Dr. Schacht estimates total German armanent expenditures for the years 1933 through 1939 at 40 to 45 billion marks. The amount for the year 1933 was very little and for 1934A/6/7/ about 30 billion marks.

SOURCE: Major Budelmann

"In January 1941 Flieger Korps 10, under General Goissler, arrived at Catania at Fliegerhorst Komandantur A 230, and carried out bombing raids on Malta. After this unit left, around May 1941, for Greece, the task of bombing Malta ras left temporarily to the Italians - who did a miserable job. On one occasion the Italians v;ere supposed to fly a fighter cover for a German bombing mission against Malta - a half hour later they were saying they couldn't locate the island!"
"J"

Major Hoefer

Major Hoefer claimed that so far as he ras able to judr;e, Russia was being politically smarter than either the United States or Britain, in that she was permitting Gorman officials to carry on the provisional government, although under Russian control« She was also taking steps to feed the population and speed up a return to normal life in her occupied territory in order to win Germans to Communism. The German people uere being shov/n that propaganda of their former leaders about the brutality and ruthlcssness of the Russians and Bolshevism was not true. This was, however, all a cruel hoax which would lead to a future Germany within the Russian rather than the Western orbit. Unless Hfogland and the United States did something similar, they would face not only Russia in the next war, but Russia strengthened by a large proportion of Germans, and poor Germany as the inevitable battle ground,
"N"

SOURCE: German Colonel

The parting statement to me of the German Colonel in charge of all Flak along the Brenner line was: "if you Americans need a good Flak officer against the Japanese, lot me know. I should be very happy to help out!"
"N"

SOURCE: Major Hoefer and Hauptnann Bergenthum

Both Major Hoefor and Hauptraann Bergenthum stated that Russia (or the Slavic race) uas destined to control th:j future. Through their bitter experience, the Germans had learned that the Russians had not only unlimited resources and population, but "a primitive vitality" which was alnost certain to dominate over the already degenerating Western races and nations. With a fatalism (not unlike that of the philospher Spengler), they saw little hope in a League of Nations or a Security Council, but were convinced that the question of a showdown between Western culture and Eastern (Slavic) culture was only a matter of time.
»N«

VIII MISCELLANY

SOURCE: Field Marshal von Rundstodt

Coming to the December offensive in the so-called bulge, the Marshal let a flicker of a smile creep over his otherwise impassive poker face when I said it was known in America as the Von Rundstedt offensive.
"Somebody must always take the rap and stand the consequences," he commented. Then resuming in a serious tone, he explained "the purpose of the winter offensive was to relieve by counterattack the strong pressure of the American and British Forces in the Aachen area and heading for the Ruhr. Our objective was to throw the Allied troops back again over the Mouse and seize Liege. Actually the forces under (Field Marshal Walther) von Model got within 5 kilometers (3 miles) of the Mouse."
"We succeeded in surprising you, but our reinforcements had to be brought up without the aid of railways, many even on foot. Patton could conduct his I skillful counteroffensive with complete mobility."
The bulge offensive was Germany's last chance and von Rundstodt declared he "said so in an order of the day. That I was right may be seen from the fact that when the Russian offensive began we had to shift all our mobile equipment to the east."
Although the order for the winter offensive came from the Fuehrer himself, he said, the generals on the spot in the west shared the opinion that only a surpris. offensive might succeed. "When one fights defensively with weak forces against a strong enemy who can pick a weak point, there is only one chance left - break through by surprise."
"C"

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

Sources could not cite any specific tactical use of information obtained from Allied prisoners of war except that in one instance they understood the Germans had succeeded in getting detailed information of American night-fighter tactics down to ranges of radar from a prisoner of war.
In this case the information elicited was highly important and would have played an important part in operations, but "unfortunately" little opportunity was had to put it to use.
In spite of the fact that both sources understood that much valuable information had been obtained from interrogating Allied air men both were quick to admit the superiority of British interrogation techniques, after which their own were but "poorly patterned."

SOURCE; Field Marshal von Rundstodt

Discussing D-Day, Germany's supreme commander for the west explained that he was not in. command after July 5, 1944 and hence declined to answer why the troops were so quickly pulled back from the Atlantic.
About events before then, von Rundstedt said: "We naturally expected a landing attempt but could not tell where it would come, whether in Holland, central Franco or southern France. So I could not pull all my reserves one place. Yet our reserves were so dispersed and placed that I could have met the D-Day landing even though it surprised us except for the fact we had no mobility, and could not bring up our reserves. Between Paris and Roueri there was not a single bridge across the Seine."
"Furthermore, your naval artillery was terrific. Also we could move only by night. We knew you v/antod to got to the Rhine, hence we had reserves ready for an attempt somewhere between the Seine and the Somme even though we did not know in advance when nor exactly where you would land."
"C"

SOURCE: Field Marshal von Rundstedt

Asked what he thought of American generals, von Rundstedt unhesitatingly replied: "During the last war I had the feeling your generals were new and untried and therefore paid for their mistakes with big losses. This time I am simply amazed at what you have learned meanwhile. It is terrific. Your mobility, your ability to detect and exploit the enemy's weaknesses is as modern as were our operations in France in 1940."

SOURCE: Major Hutmacher and Major Frost

Sources wore of the opinion that Italians needed no more training than Germans and made good fighter pilots, even better in many cases, than did Germans. They had a "feel" for flying pursuit ships and were masters of the "art" of flying rather than the "technique". However, they were undisciplined and could not be depended upon to fly formation. German fighter pilots, on the other hand, flow formation well. The Italians made poor bomber pilots because they had difficulty with the complicated nature of the mechanisms involved. The failure of the Italian Air Force should be ascribed to their lack of modern type aircraft rather than to their inability in handling the types they had. Supplies, gasoline, etc., for these Italian Units came from the Germans entirely.

SOURCE: Colonel Friedrich Vollbrach

Colonel Vollbracht had never seen an Allied propaganda leaflet (he said) and had not listened to foreign broadcasts. He had an order not to listen to foreign broadcasts and, as a soldier, he obeyed that order.
"D"

SOURCE: Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

Goering's appreciation of the German industr: al situation in relation to the German war effort was nil. In the early days of the war, when told that United States steel producing capacity was four times that of Germany, he said, "You must have added an extra zero to the Arnericar figure" and refused to discuss the matter further.
'K"

SOURCE: General Bayerlein

Q. Docs the General consider that more or less emphasis on air power by the Allies at the expense of, or in favor of, ground power would have been profitable?

A. Increased tactical air operations after 1 August 1944 would have added to German losses and could have hastened the Allied operations. Heaviest air operations of this war were in NORMANDY.
«R»

SOURCE: Dr. Hjalmar Schacht

The budget for the year March 1937 - 1938 was already approved and included the sum of three billion marks for rearmament, of which approximately two-fifths was allotted to the Luftwaffe. (General Georg Thomas of Wirue Military Economic Office , comparable to our War Productio Board - estimates that this percentage of budget allotment to the Luftwaffe was roughly maintained until the end of th> war.)
"K"

SOURCE: General Bayerlein

Q. Does the General consider that Allied bombing would have been more effectively employed if it had been concentrated more against the ground troops and less in strategic attacks against the German economy, or vice versa.

A. The attacks on industry and communication systems were absolutely necessary and decisive for the end of the war. Attacks on troop concentrations were rare. An increase in this type of attack would have been advantageous Thoy are particularly effective because attacks on columns and troops in the MLR ordinarily result in a small number of casualties, whereas attacks troop concentrations bring greater losses in personnel.

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