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ALL WORLD WARS
WARSAW UPRISING. INTERROGATION OF GENERAL LIEUTENANT
REINER STAHEL
April 1945, August 1945, November 1951
Warsaw Uprising. Interrogation of General Lieutenat Reiner Stahel
April 1945, August 1945, November 1951
Stahel Reiner, born in 1892, was a native of Bielefeld (Germany), a German national from an officer's family, in the German Army since 1911, Lieutenant General. Awarded the Knight's Cross with Swords and Oak Leaves by Hitler.
April 28, 1945
1. On July 27, 1944, as the head of "Stahel's Sonderstab," I was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves by the Führer. Under these circumstances, he appointed me as the commandant of Warsaw and assigned me the following tasks: a) maintain order and peace in the city; b) assist in constructing fortifications.
2. On July 27 of the same year, the situation in Warsaw was as follows: The Red Army, advancing with motorized forces from the southeast and east, approached the city by 30-40 kilometers. The 73rd Division and the Hermann Göring Division units were positioned in front of the Red Army's units, creating a reasonable prospect of delaying the Russians for a considerable time. In addition to two security battalions, there were numerous transitional formations and civilian authorities in the city, some moving to the rear. These included reserve unit camps, communication troops, the main field command, and others. I never had precise data because the local command had just changed, and civilian authorities such as mail, railway transport, and monopoly management had not yet been subordinated to the governor until they were placed under my authority with the start of the uprising on August 1 (what martial law was declared). I estimate that the total German forces numbered 6,000 people, including 500 policemen. These were exclusively older and elderly individuals armed with only small arms and a few machine guns. Only the police had one outdated armored car. Civilian authorities were responsible for constructing defensive structures to the city's east, while military units stationed there constructed fortifications on the outskirts. Life in the city appeared to be completely normal. The police reported that although one had to be constantly prepared for an uprising, there was no danger.
3. Events developed as follows before the start of the uprising on August 1:
The Red Army was successfully advancing toward Otwock, Polish Minsk, and Radzyń, forcing me to withdraw 5-6 companies from the eastern defensive positions. Construction of these positions had not yet been completed, and the Russians managed to breach them in various places and capture them. I was completely unfamiliar with the situation in Poland and Warsaw, so in addition to organizing the staff, which required selecting new officers from the Army, I was heavily occupied, familiarizing myself with the military and civilian situation. Due to limited time, I only managed to do this superficially because the priority was accounting for all forces. I was only able to briefly speak with the section commanders who had been allocated for internal unrest and give them basic instructions. Around this time, Mikolaichik visited Moscow, as the police informed me. Polish insurgent activity noticeably intensified based on this and the approaching Red Army. In any case, without precise data, we considered these events interconnected.
4. Throughout this time, the police vigorously pursued insurgent movements and, as a countermeasure, repeatedly eliminated explosive depots, arrested commanders of units, and so on. They categorized them as a) Armia Krajowa, the Polish national movement; b) the communist movement; and c) various smaller movements pursuing separate goals. The police had their agents in these movements, who, shortly before the uprising, especially agents within Armia Krajowa, provided reliable information. Other information was obtained through discoveries while confiscating editorial offices, etc. According to all available information, one of the subgroups' agents was the most reliable. As far as I can remember, he reported on July 27 that the uprising would begin. July 30 - no, nothing will be undertaken. July 31 - Alert level 3 will start within 40 hours. August 1 - around 15:30 - today, it will begin. Since neutralizing and suppressing the uprising was primarily the responsibility of the police, I did not inquire further about details or, especially, the identities of the agents. Due to the uprising, I became estranged from the police chief. As a result, I did not receive any further details, especially since I was only interested in military actions involving all Poles. No one seriously considered the Polish uprising because it seemed unpromising. However, given the temperament of the Poles, it was considered possible. But even this possibility seemed so unlikely that we refrained from putting police units on alert and arming them with heavy weapons. Later, because of interrogations of the arrested individuals, the following preparations became known: Preparation had been underway for four years. According to all available information, there was a trained force of 4,000 people. They were organized into squads and platoons, battalions, and regiments. They were commanded by military officers, such as lieutenants and captains, and so on. In many cases, former career and reserve Polish officers appeared in Polish military uniforms at the start of the uprising. Only part of them was wearing German uniforms. They typically wore red and white armbands and had a Polish eagle on their steel helmets. The commanders were only known by their nicknames and were known to a small circle. Identification documents were prepared (with nicknames indicated). They were printed in a small pocket-sized format, even instructions on new German weapons, such as the MG 42 (with illustrations). The weaponry was limited. It is possible that even the trained force did not have all types of small arms. On the other hand, each individual was armed with homemade grenades and incendiary bottles.
The trained force was very skilled in the art of urban warfare (defense). They were well-versed in all modern tactics. For example, alongside the construction of barricades, they engaged in combat with tanks from the windows of buildings. The tactical objectives set at the beginning of the uprising seemed relatively minor. They included seizing weapon depots, providing minimal security and watchmen, blocking certain streets, surrounding large apartment buildings, and attacking telephone stations.
In addition to the trained force, a significant portion of the "reserve rank and file" was likely organized and enlisted, although they were probably not armed and trained. However, the number of insurgents increased significantly within the first two days of the uprising (20-40,000 people*). Food supplies were prepared, at least for the trained force. Women were assigned as medical personnel, along with doctors.
According to available information, churches were used as dressing stations and gathering points. Apartments were prepared to accommodate groups of 20-30 people by the start of the uprising. Street blockage locations, houses, and so on were meticulously scouted. Shortly before the uprising, they were taken over (with residents locked inside), allowing the uprising to start unexpectedly.
5. The uprising occurred on August 1, 1944, at around 16:30. In some places, insurgents captured security forces by surprise, blocking streets and surrounding buildings.
In Prague, Józefów, the Fort Bema area, Mokotów, Okecie, and Bielany, the uprising was quickly suppressed because these parts of the city had tanks and anti-aircraft artillery.
German strongpoints initially defended themselves but then shifted to an offensive, to the extent possible without heavy weapons, to encircle enemy resistance centers. As a result, the following pockets of Polish resistance were formed: a) the Blumenstrasse district, b) Drajkróytzplatz, and c) north of the castle and the Theater Square.
These counterattacks without heavy weapons, led by inexperienced elderly individuals in urban combat, resulted in losses for the Germans, which indicated the impracticality of further combat without heavy weapons and young troops.
Apart from units of the East Prussian Grenadier Regiment, which were temporarily deployed, the task of clearing the city was entrusted to the police under the command of SS Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski.
From the second day of the uprising, German strongpoints inside the city had to be considered isolated. Communication via armored vehicles remained possible for several days until insurgents built numerous barricades and hindered this with incendiary bottles.
In the first two days, insurgents suffered significant losses (2,000-2,500 people). They initially behaved passively but obstructed German efforts to clear the city with their snipers.
6. Immediately after the start of the uprising, a leaflet emerged, shedding some light on the insurgents' goals. It appeared to come from the Armia Krajowa and was signed by Colonel BUR.
The leaflet announced the imminent liberation of Warsaw, indicating the proximity of the Red Army, which could advance into Prague at any moment. It was evident that the leaflet nurtured hopes and belief in assistance from Russia. They hoped the Russians would arrive soon and believed Russia would recognize Poland's freedom and old rights.
It was not entirely clear how the leadership was directing the insurgents. Arrested individuals revealed that communists and other parties had united with the Armia Krajowa, and all Poles in the city would participate in the uprising. Once, a messenger brought a note signed by Lubishov (or something similar), the supreme commander of the new Polish Army. In any case, the majority of insurgents considered themselves soldiers. The leadership mobilized all men available for military service, but I am unaware of the basis on which they were called up.
Most of the population and all the clergy were undoubtedly shocked by the uprising and were mostly against it, as they were already suffering greatly.
7. While I had to confine myself to controlling the expansion of German strongpoints from my staff quarters (Saxon Garden), the police began an offensive from the outside:
- The SS Police Regiment Dirlewanger advanced west to east toward Saxon Garden.
- The Kaminski Regiment moved from Okecie in the direction of Akademiska.
- Later, approximately two police battalions were thrown into battle, followed by tanks and assault guns (12-20).
The offensive was conducted on a broad front in the specified direction. During intense fighting, which resulted in large fires, partly due to aerial bombings and partly due to arson, some areas caught fire.
Since it took several days for police units to reinforce, the insurgents' resistance intensified, and all available men were mobilized for this purpose. Women were used in barricade construction, and in some cases, they participated in combat.
The insurgents' weaponry was supposed to be reinforced by airdrops. Special balloons were dropped containing machine guns, ammunition, and primarily anti-tank weapons with ammunition (English anti-tank weapons), starting from approximately the fourth day of the uprising. Sometimes, the balloons also contained civilian clothing and cigarettes (from Havana, Cuba). Most balloons fell into German hands, and around 40 were collected in just one night. Supply flights for the insurgents ceased after 9 to 12 aircraft were shot down in a single night. The crews were British but refused to provide any information except for their surnames, so I do not know where they flew from.
8. When I left Warsaw, the city, except for resistance strongholds on Blumenstrasse, Drajkróytzplatz, and minor remnants north of the Theater Square, had been cleared of insurgents.
On the contrary, insurgents regained control in Mokotów. Around August 15, 1944, a broadcast was made on the London radio by BUR, who called on his troops in Poland who had not yet participated in combat to aid the insurgents in a difficult situation in Warsaw. To what extent this order was executed, I do not know.
9. The suffering of the population was enormous. Only a small portion of it was provided with food for an extended period. For 10, 14 days, and more, they stayed in basements, awaiting the end of bombings and fires.
I ordered the evacuation of the population from destroyed buildings. 200-300,000 people with meager belongings passed through German positions to the west. Subsequently, the insurgents prevented the population from evacuating to the west. Civil institutions organized reception camps for refugees. The sick and feeble were partially left in the city in temporary hospitals or transported by railway.
10. The overall losses of the insurgents are very difficult to determine since insurgents could often not be distinguished from the civilian population. It can be assumed that the total losses by August 25 were 8,000-10,000. I determined this figure, although I did not have information from the police. It could be significantly higher, even double the figure I mentioned. I can only judge German losses based on information from my people, not the police. I estimate that they reached 600-800 people, including the wounded.
11. The course of the battles east of the Vistula had little influence on the uprising. The Eastern Front remained strong. Everything needed for provisioning was found on the eastern bank. Only in the early days did we occasionally have to detour through Modlin. Communication with the west through the city was interrupted only briefly. General Gille was the commander on the Eastern front, and he had 2-3 divisions under his command. I had no contact with him.
12. My daily reports to the 9th Army, to which I was subordinate, contained only brief events over a day, intentions, and everything I learned about the insurgents.
Until approximately August 12, I had no communication beyond Warsaw. However, this did not matter because telephone communication was functioning. What was less pleasant was that I could not visit my strongpoints, which was receiving orders by phone. Later, the insurgents managed to capture the telephone exchange by blowing up a poorly guarded building. Communication was often disrupted due to bombings as well. Because of this, water supply ceased in various parts of the city. However, this did not impact efforts to clear the city of insurgents.
In the Blumenstrasse area, insurgents often held street meetings while singing national songs. They displayed red and white flags on large buildings held by the insurgents.
13. The failure of the uprising can be attributed to the poorly equipped insurgents, who had to surrender quickly when facing heavy weaponry. Moreover, not all preparations were carried out properly. Most importantly, the uprising was hopeless because it began without coordinated action with the Red Army.
August 25, 1945
Question: Under whose orders and with what mission did you arrive in Finland in 1918?
Answer: Under the orders of the German High Command, I, along with a group of officers, went to serve as instructors in the Finnish Army in 1918. Finland had a civil war between the revolutionaries and the White Finns at that time. Our task was to assist the Finnish bourgeois government in defeating the revolutionary movement in Finland and then proceed to build the Finnish armed forces.
Question: How did you practically carry out the task assigned to you?
Answer: I formed a brigade of Finnish volunteers, which, under my leadership, fought against units of the Finnish Red Guard on the Karelian Isthmus. Through the skillful actions of the brigade under my command, I managed to cut off the Vyborg-Petrograd road and thus significantly contribute to the suppression of the revolution in Finland. Following that, until the end of 1918, I was engaged in organizing Finnish military units until, at the request of the representatives of the Entente, all German instructors, including myself, were removed from Finland.
Question: Under what circumstances?
Answer: I received an invitation from acquaintances of mine, due to my previous activities in Finland, the owner of the OKA factory, and the deputy director of the prison in the city of Abo-Haineman, to come to Abo and begin organizing the so-called Schutzkorps.
Question: Wasn't this trip to organize the Schutzkorps coordinated with German government circles?
Answer: Of course, the German command and government were aware of my mission in Finland. However, to avoid protests from the Entente countries, the German government did not establish any contact with me. Simultaneously, for better concealment, I deemed it necessary to acquire Finnish citizenship.
Question: What were the goals of organizing the Schutzkorps?
Answer: The organization of the Schutzkorps pursued the following objectives: firstly, to combat the internal enemy, namely the Finnish working class; secondly, to strengthen, through the Schutzkorps, the disparate Finnish military units, which at the time served as a base for various kinds of actions against the Soviet Union. I was engaged in this work until 1925.
Question: What was your involvement in the organization of the Finnish Schutzkorps?
Answer: I was responsible for the military training of the Schutzkorps and, primarily, its officer corps in the Abo region. For my merits in organizing the Schutzkorps, I was awarded the Finnish government's Commander's Cross of the Order of the White Rose.
Question: What did you do after 1925?
Answer: In late 1925, I traveled to Germany, where I participated in the management of a textile enterprise owned by my father until 1933.
Question: What military-political activities were you involved in during this period?
Answer: From 1926 to 1932, I was a member of the monarchist union "Stahlhelm." Starting from 1927, I served as the head of the local union organization in Bielefeld. In this capacity, I played a leading role in political struggles, primarily against communists and social democrats, who were my main political opponents in the Bielefeld area. In November 1933, after Hitler came to power, I re-entered the German Army.
Question: How were you received when Hitler came to power?
Answer: Like most leading members of the "Stahlhelm," I had high hopes for the revival of German military power with Hitler's rise to power. I was confident that Hitler would succeed in defeating the revolutionary organizations of the German working class, which had grown to threatening proportions by that time.
Question: What role did you play in the fascist coup in Germany?
Answer: I did not participate in any way in the fascist coup.
Question: Please describe your military service after 1933.
Answer: From 1933 to 1938, I served in the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Aviation, with my main task being the organization and development of German anti-aircraft artillery. From 1938 to 1940, I held various positions in anti-aircraft units of the German Army, ranging from battery commander to division commander. In the summer of 1940, I was appointed to the German Control Commission for Disarmament of the French Army.
Question: Who recommended you for work in the German Control Commission?
Answer: I was sent to work in the commission on the recommendation of a senior official from the German Ministry of War, Colonel Mertich, with whom I had previously been associated through my service.
Question: What were your responsibilities in the German Control Commission?
Answer: I was brought in to work as a military specialist in the commission. I was responsible for overseeing the disarmament of French anti-aircraft artillery units. The weapons obtained through this activity were transferred for use by the German Army.
At the end of March 1941, after I had completed the tasks assigned to me, I was recalled to Berlin by order of the Personnel Management of the German Air Force, where I received an assignment to the active Army on the Eastern Front.
Question: When and where did you receive your assignment?
Answer: On April 1, 1941, I was appointed to the Eastern Front as the commander of the 34th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, which was part of the 2nd German Air Corps. Units of my regiment were responsible for protecting airfields in Minsk, Baranovichi, Orsha, Smolensk, Shatalovka, Seshchina, Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga, Anisovo-Gorodishche, where units of the 2nd aviation corps were stationed.
I held this position until March 31, 1942. Then, until October 5, 1942, I, as the commander of the 99th anti-aircraft regiment, participated as part of the VIII Air Corps in the offensive from the Kursk area in the direction of Voronezh, Millerovo, Tatsinskaya, Kalach, and Orlovka. In the Orlovka area, I was involved in ground battles against units of the Red Army. On October 6, 1942, I was appointed as the commander of the 4th Field Air Division, with the task of holding the defense east of Vitebsk.
In November-December 1942, the Russian offensive began. I was appointed commander of the "Oblivskaya" battle group, tasked with holding the defense on the Chir River. Every day, my units had to repel fierce attacks by two Russian divisions and a Guards Cavalry Corps. On December 31, 1942, the Russians surrounded and partially defeated the forces subordinate to me. However, I still managed to withdraw them from the encirclement and break through to German lines in the Morozovskaya area. On January 5, 1943, due to illness, I was recalled to Germany, to the disposal of the supreme command of the armed forces.
Question: How did the German command further utilize you?
Answer: Until the end of May 1943, I was recovering in Leipzig, and on June 6, 1943, I was sent to Italy with a special mission from the German high command.
Question: What was the nature of this mission?
Answer: My task involved overseeing the condition of German defenses, primarily anti-aircraft defenses, in Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily
Question: Who directed you to Italy?
Answer: I was sent to Italy by the Chief of Staff of the German Air Force, Colonel General Jeschonnek.
Question: Why did the command decide to use you for this assignment in Italy?
Answer: During my time on the Eastern Front, I gained significant practical experience in defending fortified areas and withdrawing German troops from encirclement. The German command believed that my combat experience would help strengthen Italy's defense before the invasion of Anglo-American forces.
Question: How did you carry out the assigned task?
Answer: I had to actively participate in military operations against Anglo-American forces in Italy. The German command noted my role in organizing anti-aircraft defense on the coast of Sicily and evacuating German troops through the Strait of Messina. In September 1943, I was appointed as the commandant of Rome.
Question: You were sent to Italy to inspect the condition of German defenses. What led to your appointment as the commandant of Rome?
Answer: Following the Badoglio coup, German troops under Field Marshal Kesselring occupied Rome, and a military commandant was required. Since I had completed the tasks assigned to me by that time, with the consent of the supreme command of the German armed forces, Kesselring appointed me as the commandant of Rome.
Question: Therefore, the German command relied not only on your military abilities but also your political skills when appointing you as the commandant of Rome at such a critical moment.
Answer: I performed purely military tasks to maintain peace and order in Rome.
Question: How did you do that?
Answer: All major institutions, roads, and squares in Rome were controlled by the military units subordinate to me. Acts of sabotage and partisan actions in the vicinity of the city were quickly suppressed with the help of the Vatican.
Question: Please elaborate on your relationship with the Vatican.
Answer: On September 10, 1943, I received an order from the operational headquarters of the supreme command of the armed forces to ensure the security of the Vatican. Given the significant authority of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy, I decided to use this order to fulfill my task – suppressing resistance movements in Rome.
After consulting with the German ambassador to the Vatican, von Weizsäcker, I established unofficial contact with Father Pancratius, the leader of the Salvatorian Catholic order, who was of German nationality. I asked him to inform me about possible tensions between the Catholic clergy and the German soldiers under my command so that appropriate measures could be taken.
Cardinal Canali, the head of the Vatican's economic administration, often attended during our meetings. I easily convinced both priests that the suppression of "disorders," meaning the fight against Italian partisans, was mutually beneficial for the German authorities and the Vatican.
As a result, we reached an unofficial verbal agreement, approved by Pope Pius XII, according to which, in my person, the German command undertook to ensure the complete security of the Vatican, provide security for the delivery of food, and compensate for all losses caused by German soldiers to the private property of Vatican representatives.
The Vatican leadership committed to instruct the clergy to influence parishioners to cease resistance against the German military authorities.
Question: Thus, did the Vatican place itself in the service of the German military command in the fight against the Italian liberation movement?
Answer: Yes, as I understood from conversations with Canali and Father Pancratius, the Vatican was just as interested as we Germans in suppressing the patriotic movement in Italy, as it feared it might threaten the well-being of the Roman Catholic Church.
Question: In practical terms, how did the Vatican cooperate with the Germans?
Answer: At the direction of the papal nuncio, his subordinate priests began to preach more actively in churches, advocating greater assistance to the German authorities and urging people to refrain from acts of sabotage, which were considered displeasing to God. Confession was widely used for the individual processing of parishioners. As a result of all these measures, acts of sabotage in Rome were almost completely halted, and the activities of the partisans significantly decreased.
Question: Whom did you arrest among the Italian anti-fascists, if anyone?
Answer: Apart from a few saboteurs whose names I do not recall, I did not arrest anyone in Rome, as arrests were carried out only by order of Hitler and Himmler's special plenipotentiary, SS-Obergruppenführer Wolff. On the orders of Wolff, in October 1943, a trainload of Jews, including men, women, and children, numbering around 1500, was sent from Rome to Poland for labor purposes, as was announced.
Question: In reality, was the purpose of sending the trainload of Jews to Poland to eradicate them?
Answer: I do not have information about that. Shortly after, on October 31, 1943, I was recalled from Rome to Germany, and I cannot say who was later arrested there.
Question: To whom did you report upon your arrival in Germany regarding your work in Rome?
Answer: Upon my arrival in Germany, I was summoned to report to Hitler's headquarters, which was located in East Prussia near the town of Rustenburg. On November 3, 1943, I arrived at the headquarters and was received by Hitler. Field Marshal Keitel, Major General Schmundt, the head of personnel for the German ground forces, and Major General Sherf, a historian, were present at the meeting.
Hitler asked me to provide an overview of the situation in Italy. I reported to Hitler that Rome was calm. I had achieved this with the help of the Catholic clergy, which helped stop sabotage, neutralize partisans' actions in the vicinity of the Italian capital, and ensure communications safety. At the same time, I pointed out that the Italian people were in complete disarray. The fascists and the king did not influence the country, and the clergy was the only influential factor in Italy.
Hitler then asked me what more could be obtained from Italy to conduct the war successfully. I replied that, in my opinion, Italian military units under the command of Marshal Graziani could only be used to protect communication routes and prisoner-of-war camps. Regarding the state of the Italian industry, I couldn't provide Hitler with any specific information as I had no data on the matter. However, I stated that the Italian population could be mobilized for industry needs. Furthermore, I reported that there were enough officials in Italy who would obey German directives, and there was no need to organize a special German occupational apparatus.
Hitler listened to me, and addressing everyone present, he said, "Duce (referring to Mussolini) is already old; he is 63 and is unlikely to be able to regain his former position. When I started organizing the National Socialist movement, I was only 35 years old. Perhaps Stahel (likely referring to Wilhelm Stahelcker) is right when he says we should protect our interests in Italy with minimal forces."
With that, the audience with Hitler ended.
Question: What instructions did you receive regarding your further work?
Answer: I did not personally receive any instructions from Hitler this time. Colonel Belov, the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) representative at Hitler's headquarters, told me I would receive instructions later.
Question: Whom else among the leaders of fascist Germany did you meet?
Answer: In January 1943, I had an audience with Göring, and in March of the same year, I met with Himmler.
Question: Please tell us about your meeting with Göring and Himmler.
Answer: On January 17, 1943, after I had returned from the Eastern Front, Göring summoned me to meet with him. He congratulated me on my award (I received the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross) and asked me to share my impressions from the front. I honestly told Göring about the difficulties the German Army faced on the Eastern Front and the considerable strength of our opponents.
Göring listened to me very friendly, made some playful remarks, and, encouraged by his attitude, I asked a question for which I later reproached myself. I told Göring that based on my impressions from Russia, communism had undoubtedly played a progressive role. I explained that the Bolsheviks had managed to raise the country's prosperity quickly and establish public education, and, in my opinion, the propaganda conducted by Goebbels regarding Russia was thoroughly dishonest and only served to embitter front-line soldiers. Göring was greatly outraged by my statement, stating that I could not understand the actual state of affairs, and soon ended the conversation.
Question: After that, you did not risk engaging in political discussions with Göring?
Answer: I did not meet with Göring again.
Question: Why were the fascist leaders at that time showing such a heightened interest in you?
Answer: I can only explain this because I had managed to distinguish myself on the front. I received high awards, was promoted to the rank of general, and my name was repeatedly mentioned in German command reports. In particular, in early July 1944, the German command sent me back to the Eastern Front with the task of extricating German units that were surrounded in Vilnius. I completed this task, which solidified my reputation as the "Kessel Breaker," as the German press called me.
Question: Your meetings with the leaders of fascist Germany did not end with the receptions you mentioned.
Answer: No, they did not. On July 27, 1944, after completing the work of extricating our units from Vilnius, I was again summoned by the high command to report to Hitler at his residence in the Rastenburg area. This time, I met with Hitler not in a summer barrack, as on the first occasion (the barrack had been destroyed during the attempt on Hitler's life), but in a small concrete structure resembling a railway car. Field Marshal Keitel, Major General Schmundt, and Colonel Belov mentioned above, were at the meeting besides me.
Hitler congratulated me on the successful liberation of German units surrounded in Vilnius and announced that he was awarding me the "swords" to the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. Then, Hitler informed me that he intended to send me to Warsaw as a military commandant. My task would be to restore order among the numerous units of the Warsaw garrison and mobilize all forces for the urgent construction of fortifications in the Warsaw area, given the rapid advance of Red Army units.
Hitler said that Gauleiter Koch, entrusted to the construction of fortifications, complained that he could not meet the deadlines due to a lack of labor force. It was my task to find the necessary labor force. Hitler emphasized that he intended, contrary to the opinion of military experts, to hold Warsaw in the hands of the German Army and hoped for my assistance. Immediately, he instructed Guderian to provide me with more detailed information about the situation in the Warsaw area.
Question: Did Hitler inform you about the political situation in Poland?
Answer: No, not a word.
Question: What did Guderian inform you about?
Answer: Guderian provided me with more detailed information about the military situation, particularly that the advance of the Red Army had been halted and that I would have some time to construct military installations and mobilize all capable units. At the same time, he told me that the Poles were feeling uneasy, and he suggested that upon my arrival in Poland, I should contact the Governor of Warsaw, Fischer, to obtain information on this matter.
Question: What information did you receive upon your arrival in Warsaw?
Answer: I arrived in Warsaw on July 28, 1944. On the next day, I met with General Ror, who was temporarily acting as the city's commandant. He informed me that there were many small paramilitary formations in the city, and it was necessary to instill discipline among them. He also informed me that industrial facilities were being evacuated from Warsaw to the rear, and I would have to deal with that as well. Finally, he told me there was information about preparing a Polish uprising and that I should coordinate with the Governor of Warsaw, who had police forces at his disposal.
On July 29, I contacted the head of the SD (Security Service) and police in Warsaw, Standartenführer Gaibel. He informed me that the Poles had several strong underground organizations, primarily the "Armia Krajowa" (Home Army), planning an uprising shortly. Gaibel stated that the intelligence materials he possessed confirmed the intention of the Armia Krajowa to rise shortly. The police operations conducted by his units had allowed them to seize several depots with explosives, as well as an underground printing press and weapons. Gaibel also declared that he was prepared for any uprising and continuously provided new information on this matter to Governor Fischer and the head of the SD for the Polish General Government, SS-Obergruppenführer Koppe. I told Gaibel that, according to the authority vested in me by the High Command, all information should be sent to me. In the event of a declaration of a state of siege, Gaibel and his police would come under my command.
On the same evening, I had a conversation with the commander of the 9th German Army, General der Infanterie Forman, who described the current military situation and asked if I considered it necessary to declare a state of siege in the city. I replied that I believed such a measure was premature since there was no exact information about the uprising yet. The declaration of a state of siege would only encourage the Poles, as they would interpret it as a sign that the situation on the front was unfavorable.
Question: Did you inform Hitler's headquarters about the situation in Warsaw?
Answer: No, I did not inform them.
Question: Why not?
Answer: As I have shown, the German authorities did not consider it likely that a real armed uprising by the Poles would occur soon. Additionally, it was not within my task to provide direct information to Hitler's headquarters, as I was subordinate to General Forman, and all messages were to go through him.
Question: What information did you have about the timing of the uprising?
Answer: On July 31, through agents, we received information that the uprising in Warsaw would begin in 40 hours. On August 1, at approximately 3:30 p.m., we received information that the uprising would begin on the same day.
Question: What measures did you take when you received precise information about the start of the uprising?
Answer: On the previous day, July 31, I summoned all district commandants of Warsaw who already had similar action plans in case of an uprising. I warned them to be highly vigilant because we had to consider that the uprising would begin at any moment. On August 1, I informed the governor, the commander of the 9th Army, and district commandants that we were expecting the Poles to rise today. On the same evening, I declared a state of siege in the city.
Question: How did you suppress the uprising in Warsaw?
Answer: Fierce street battles erupted in Warsaw. Until August 10, I was cut off from the units under my command, and it was only when outside help arrived that I could actively coordinate the suppression of the uprising. In the early days, the insurgents suffered significant losses, no less than 2,500 people. Later, these losses significantly increased. According to incomplete data, by August 25, Polish losses had risen to 10,000 people.
Question: You showed that in declaring a state of siege in Warsaw, all police came under your command. Consequently, do you bear full responsibility for the atrocities committed by German police units in Warsaw?
Answer: Yes, I bear responsibility for the actions of the German police in Warsaw during the uprising, but I couldn't oversee the activities of the police units as I was cut off from them by the insurgents for a long time.
Question: Are you deliberately trying to evade responsibility for the atrocities committed by you? It is known that tens of thousands of innocent residents of Warsaw were brutally killed by the Germans. Do you acknowledge this?
Answer: I was unable to control the actions of German soldiers towards the Polish population. When it became known that German soldiers were looting the homes of civilians, I issued an order that allowed soldiers to take anything they wanted from those houses where fires had started.
Question: So, you sanctioned the looting of the civilian population of Warsaw by German soldiers?
Answer: I must admit that I allowed the looting of the civilian population of Warsaw because I believed that German soldiers could not be restrained.
Question: due to the atrocities committed by the German troops under your leadership, the number of casualties in Warsaw was not in the tens of thousands as you claimed, but in the hundreds of thousands.
Answer: I left Warsaw on August 25, 1944, and I am unable to provide exact data on the casualties among the residents of Warsaw. However, I want to state that the responsibility for the suffering inflicted on the population of Warsaw lies not only with us Germans but also with the leaders of the AK (Armia Krajowa), who, for their selfish purposes, threw the population of Warsaw into a doomed struggle.
After I departed from Warsaw, the leadership for the final suppression of the uprising was placed entirely in the hands of SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach. General Schindler was appointed as the military commandant of Warsaw in my place. However, I did not have the opportunity to meet him as I needed to leave urgently.
Question: In connection with what did you have to leave Warsaw?
Answer: On August 25, 1944, according to the orders of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Germany, I urgently left for Romania to assist German forces that were surrounded around Otopeni. My task was to lead the troops out of the encirclement and then act according to the instructions of the command of the southern army group of the Germans.
Question: In your personal information, you stated that you were not a National Socialist, yet your entire activity within the German Army was aimed at supporting the criminal German fascism. Do you acknowledge this?
Answer: Yes, I acknowledge that for several years, I faithfully served Hitler and was awarded the highest German orders.
The interrogation protocol was recorded accurately from my words translated into German.
Stahel
November 21, 1951
The interrogation began at 11:35 a.m.
Question: It has been established during the investigation that you often had dealings with Hitler and carried out several special assignments for him. Please show when and under what circumstances you came into contact with Hitler.
Answer: Earlier, during the investigation, I stated that in November-December 1942, as the commander of the combat group "Oblivska," consisting of 5-6 thousand active troops, I held the defense on the Chir River (a tributary of the Don) and successfully repelled attacks by superior Russian forces for about a month. It is worth noting that the German command attached special importance to this section of the front. Field Marshal Richthofen, the commander of the 4th Air Fleet, told me, in particular, that holding the Oblivska airfield was of utmost importance because it was used for the supply of food and equipment to the encircled German forces near Stalingrad. On December 31, 1942, Soviet forces finally defeated my group, and with the remnants, I managed to break out of the "cauldron" and reach the German forces in Manstein's group. Nevertheless, the command highly recognized my achievements, and I was recommended for the "Oak Leaves" award. According to the existing procedure, the "Oak Leaves" were personally awarded by Hitler to the Knight's Cross recipients. On January 14, 1943, I arrived near Hitler's headquarters in Rastenburg in East Prussia. On January 16 of the same year, I was received by Hitler, who presented me with the award. Thus, I was introduced to Hitler for the first time.
Question: Please provide more details about your meeting with Hitler.
Answer: I arrived at the headquarters at 11 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) von Belov, who was the liaison officer from the Air Force command to Hitler, told me that it was unlikely that the Führer would see me because the headquarters resembled a destroyed beehive, where everyone buzzed about only one thing – Stalingrad. Von Belov, whom I knew previously, confidentially informed me that the Führer had lost sleep and appetite, hardly went out in the fresh air, and, therefore, to distract him a bit, his close associates had given him a dog. "This is now the closest creature to the Führer," von Belov added. "He takes a short walk with the dog near the bunker." Around 3 p.m., von Belov invited me to the hall for military briefings in the so-called "wooden barracks" – a fairly spacious room near Hitler's bunker. In the hall, Hitler was alone at the writing desk.
I was struck by his swollen face, apparently from insomnia. Hitler got up from behind the desk, quickly swallowed some powder, then approached me and, shaking hands, said to me in a barely audible voice, "Congratulations, Colonel. I know your name from the operational map. You defended your position well." With these words, he handed me a box with the award. A photographer immediately appeared, and the flash of magnesium illuminated me in a handshake with the Führer.
I wanted to brief Hitler on my thoughts regarding some senior officers' ineffective leadership of operations, thinking that the Führer would be interested in the report from a front-line officer who had just come from the hell of Stalingrad. But that wasn't the case. First, Hitler mumbled in a quiet, sad voice about the betrayal of the Italians and Romanians, who abandoned him to the mercy of fate, which, according to him, led to the defeat at Stalingrad. I seized the pause and commented that even among us Germans, many incompetencies couldn't compete with the Russians. I wanted to continue my thought, but Hitler interrupted me and, raising his voice to a scream and grabbing me by the sleeve, shouted, "You're right, absolutely right! I'm dissatisfied with the generals, terribly dissatisfied! Changes are necessary; we must infuse young blood into the general staff..." At that moment, an SS officer entered and informed Hitler that General So-and-So (I don't remember the name) was waiting in the reception room. Hitler immediately fell silent. "Goodbye, gentlemen," he said to me and von Belov. We left the room.
Von Belov reassured me over a cup of coffee, stating that not only I but no one else was allowed to say a word to Hitler. With a touch of "staff" irony, he further remarked that my concerns were unfounded because, according to the Führer himself, the Battle of Stalingrad was merely the death throes of the Soviet regime, which had thrown all its reserves into the Volga. "We know," von Belov continued with a self-satisfied smile, "that soon the Russians will roll back on the entire front." Such was the mood artificially maintained by Hitler and his military advisors for military propaganda. On the same day, I left for Berlin for rest and medical treatment, an unexpected interruption due to a new summons to Hitler's headquarters.
Question: How did that happen?
Answer: I was at home in Leipzig. At night, on February 20, 1943, the secretary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, Jeschonnek, called me and informed me that by Jeschonnek's order, I should immediately fly to Vinnytsia, to Hitler's headquarters, with a small amount of luggage. On February 21, I arrived in Vinnytsia.
Question: Where was Hitler's headquarters located?
Answer: Hitler's headquarters were in the forest, about 10 km from the city. Unlike the East Prussian headquarters of "Wolf's Lair" with its bunkers and fortifications, the Vinnytsia headquarters had a temporary character; all the buildings were made of wood, although well camouflaged to blend into the surrounding terrain. Here, my second meeting with Hitler took place.
Question: What did you discuss with Hitler during this meeting?
Answer: I was met by the von Below and immediately escorted to the second floor of a two-story house where Hitler and his closest associates were located. On the way, von Below informed me that I might have to leave for Zaporizhia tonight.
I must admit, I was in complete bewilderment. We entered a small room where about ten generals and officers of the General Staff were crowded around a map. Among them was the then Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Zeitzler. Hitler was sitting at a separate writing desk, leaning over the map. When he saw me, he slightly rose and greeted me with a characteristic gesture of the Fuhrer. According to established protocol, I thanked Hitler for appointing me to the rank of general on February 1, 1943. Standing behind the table, where I noticed a map of the Zaporizhia region, Hitler, in a state of great excitement, the reason for which I was explained later, addressed me with a stream of disconnected orders:
"I appoint you as the Chief of the Defense of the Zaporizhia region. It's good that you have arrived; my generals understand nothing about economics or politics. One of them almost lost the Baltic States. So, Zaporizhia is very important. It's the Dnieper Dam, manganese mines. I need manganese for the guns. Without guns, I cannot win the war against the Bolsheviks. They (nodding towards the silent generals) don't want to understand this. Organize an impregnable defense. Don't forget about the importance of the airfield, as it's the only decent airfield remaining under our control in this area."
I somewhat boldly interrupted Hitler's monologue, stating that I could not accomplish the task alone with the available resources. Zeitzler hurried to announce that he could move the 48th Division from Kuban to Zaporizhia. "Agreed," said Hitler, "you are under my direct command from now on. Report directly to me about any difficulties you encounter." The meeting was concluded. A quarter of an hour later, I had an interesting conversation with Zeitzler in the officer's mess. During this conversation, Zeitzler explained the reason for Hitler's extraordinary agitation.
Question: What was the reason for Hitler's extraordinary agitation?
Answer: The reason for Hitler's extreme agitation, as it turned out, was not the fear of losing the manganese mines. Hitler was terrified because the day before, as Zeitzler told me, he had almost fallen into the hands of Soviet tank crews as a trophy.
On February 20, 1943, the Russians broke through the front in the area of Izium, and a tank column managed to break through to the Zaporizhia region, where Hitler had arrived the day before to meet with Manstein. Hitler's plane was at that very airfield, the importance of which he had explained to me. The Russian tank crews were just 5 kilometers away from the airfield when they were blocked by a German armored train with anti-aircraft guns. At the same time, fighter planes were scrambled from the airfield for protection. The Russians managed to delay the tanks, and late in the evening, Hitler flew to Vinnytsia on his plane with a fighter escort. Hitler was gripped by panic. It is enough to say that during the subsequent campaign, he never left Germany, except for a 2-hour flight to Zaporizhia a month later. But by that time, the front had somewhat stabilized, and I had fortified the Zaporizhia region according to German fortification principles.
Question: Did you meet Hitler during his visit to Zaporizhia?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Can you specify when that happened?
Answer: It was around March 20, 1943. I met with Hitler at a luncheon to which his adjutant, General Schmundt, invited me. During the luncheon, also attended by Manstein and Richthofen, Hitler informed me that he considered the task assigned to me as completed and that he would soon find another, no less important, assignment for me.
Question: Did Hitler fulfill his promise?
Answer: Yes, he did. On June 6, 1943, I was sent by Hitler to Italy to control the condition of German defenses, primarily anti-aircraft defenses. In September 1943, I was appointed the Commandant of Rome by order of Field Marshal Kesselring, who commanded the German forces in Italy. I have provided detailed information about my military and punitive activities in previous interrogations.
Question: Did Hitler personally give you the order to go to Italy?
Answer: Yes, I was summoned to Berchtesgaden, where, in the presence of the Jeschonnek mentioned above, Hitler briefly explained the essence of my Italian assignment. Nothing particularly noteworthy happened during this meeting except for the complaints that had become customary for Hitler about his generals. "I am informed," Hitler said, "that everything is in order, but upon verification, it turns out that nothing has been done. Therefore, I am forced to send you to Italy."
Question: To whom did you report on the work you carried out in Italy?
Answer: I reported directly to Hitler. On November 3, 1943, I arrived at the Wolf's Lair. Field Marshal Keitel, General Schmundt, and the historiographer Major General Sherf were at the reception with Hitler. Sherf was tasked with writing the "history" of Germany's conquest of the world by Hitler. Hitler gave Sherf instructions, and he tried his best to depict the "heroic" deeds of the Fuhrer.
Hitler, in this exceptional case, was in a good mood. He allowed me to speak to the end for the first time, allowing me to report on the situation in Italy, particularly Rome.
I informed Hitler that, with the active support of the Vatican, I had temporarily paralyzed the actions of the partisans and, to some extent, ensured the safety of German communications. I candidly told Hitler that Mussolini was extremely unpopular and his Blackshirts had no influence in the country. In my opinion, the only real force to reckon with in Italy was the Catholic clergy – the numerous "Black Army" of Pope Pius XII.
Hitler did not object to my conclusions and asked what else could be realistically extracted from Italy for the further conduct of the war. I replied that the Italian industry could still contribute much, provided the Germans mobilized the local population to work in Italy rather than export Italians to Germany. As for the troops of Marshal Graziani, due to their weak combat capability, they could only be used for guarding communications and prisoner-of-war camps. That concluded my report.
Hitler leaned back in a carved chair, shook his head sadly, and then, with a rather contemplative look, addressed those present: "Duce is already old; he's 62 years old, and at such an advanced age, you can't rectify the situation that has arisen. When I took over the National Socialist movement in Germany, I was only 35 years old. Perhaps Stahel is right in his conclusions about the situation in Italy." Then Hitler allowed me to go without giving any further instructions.
Question: But you met with Hitler later, didn't you?
Answer: I was summoned by Hitler three more times to his Eastern Prussian headquarters, "Wolf's Lair," twice in March and once in July 1944.
Question: For what reason?
Answer: In March 1944, von Belov called me and urgently asked me to take a train to the headquarters because I had a special mission from Hitler. Upon arriving at the headquarters, I learned that Hitler had summoned me due to the threatening situation on the Eastern Front. Soviet forces were advancing inexorably towards the borders of Poland. At the same time, significant partisan forces had infiltrated behind the front lines, operating in the area around Przemysl. Hitler preferred to keep silent about this. During our conversation, Hitler mentioned that there was chaos in Lvov, and the military authorities wanted to declare a state of siege, although Frank considered this measure premature. Hitler suggested that I spend a couple of days at the headquarters, thoroughly familiarize myself with the situation on the fronts, and then proceed to Lvov to assess the situation before returning to the headquarters to report.
Question: Who provided you with more detailed information about the situation on the fronts?
Answer: Hitler allowed me to attend two military council meetings as an observer. During these meetings, I gathered the necessary information from the reports of the respective council members.
Question: Could you name the individuals who participated in the military councils at Hitler's headquarters?
Answer: Hitler strictly determined the circle of individuals participating in the military councils. From the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl, and Jodl's assistant, General Warlimont (nicknamed "handsome Warlimont" behind his back due to his good looks), were present. Ground forces were represented by Chief of the General Staff Zeitzler and several of his staff members. The Air Force was represented by Chief of Staff General Korten, who had replaced Jeschonnek, who had committed suicide. Representatives from the Navy included Admirals Puttkamer and Foss, and from the Waffen-SS, General Fegelein, the same Fegelein who, as I later learned, married Eva Braun's sister while in captivity.
Usually, a representative of Göring or "Göring's ear," as he was called, General Bodenschatz, and Ribbentrop's permanent representative, Ambassador Hevel, who reported Hitler's latest dispatches, were also present. The most inconspicuous, silent member of this gathering was the "historian" Sherf, whom I mentioned in my previous testimony.
Once, Himmler attended one of the meetings. He also did not utter a word during the meeting, but unlike Sherf, Himmler remained silent because he apparently had a private conversation with Hitler after the meeting. This was the circle of individuals I had to see at the meetings at the "Wolf's Lair."
Question: Did you meet with Hitler just before leaving for Lvov?
Answer: Yes, I went to report about my departure. Hitler did not say a word to me, only shook my hand firmly, gazing intently into my eyes with his heavy, unblinking stare, and then left the room. By then, I was no longer a newcomer to the headquarters, and I knew that such a farewell was Hitler's way of expressing his trust in those executing his will.
On the same day, I flew to Lvov, where I stayed for three days, returning to the headquarters around March 15, 1944, to report to Hitler.
Question: Please briefly describe the essence of your report.
Answer: I reported to Hitler that the immediate danger of Lvov being captured by Soviet forces had been averted. At the same time, I conveyed to Hitler a request from Field Marshal Manstein, commander of the Southern Army Group, to appoint a single leader for the SS and security forces in Poland instead of having multiple independent heads of Einsatzkommandos, special-purpose groups, etc. Hitler replied that a decision on this matter would be made later. I was graciously allowed to return home to Leipzig.
Question: When did you receive a new assignment from Hitler?
Answer: On July 8, 1944, I received orders from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in Germany to urgently fly to Vilnius, where I was to take command of the surrounding German units and lead them out of the encirclement. I have already told the investigators that, at great cost, I managed to evacuate the remnants of the garrison from the encirclement. For this operation, I was awarded by Hitler with a high-order decoration - "swords to the oak leaves of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross."
On July 27 of the same year, I arrived at the "Wolf's Lair," where I received this award from Hitler. This was my last meeting with Hitler.
Question: You didn't just come for the award; you had a special assignment from Hitler. Why are you not mentioning the specific task assigned to you by Hitler?
Answer: I forgot to mention that during my last meeting with Hitler, he appointed me as the military commandant of Warsaw. I have sincerely confessed to my crimes committed in the position of the commandant of Warsaw, especially during the suppression of the uprising, in my previous testimonies.
Question: Let's return to the details of your last meeting with Hitler.
Answer: I arrived at the headquarters around 7 p.m. on July 27, 1944. Keitel kindly provided me with a compartment in his train, parked on a special track on the headquarters' premises. Keitel's adjutant, von Schimanski, provided me with detailed information about the assassination attempt on Hitler that had taken place exactly a week earlier, on July 20, 1944. Von Schimanski emphasized the fact that the briefcase with the infernal machine had been in his hands for a few minutes, but Stauffenberg had told him that he would deliver the briefcase to the conference room himself, and he very politely thanked von Schimanski for his efforts.
At one in the morning, in pitch darkness due to an air raid warning, von Belov (as I had previously referred to him) escorted me to Hitler's bunker. The narrow corridor leading to Hitler's office was filled with SS officers, and my pass was checked twice. Then, I entered a small, modestly furnished room where Hitler was, along with his new chief of staff, Guderian.
Hitler had changed dramatically compared to March 1944: he was severely hunched, his face was a swollen, expressionless mask, and the hand he cautiously extended to me was trembling greatly. In a hoarse, unintelligible voice, he mumbled something along the lines of not expecting to meet me whole and unharmed after Vilnius. With these words, he handed me the "swords." Then, looking off to the side, Hitler unexpectedly to me, ordered me to fly to Warsaw immediately. "Chaos reigns in that city," said Hitler. "Our retreating units have disorganized all military control. Strict order needs to be restored, and you should watch the Poles closely. Further instructions will come from Guderian."
I left the room, deciding to wait for Guderian in the corridor. As I stood there, Jodl walked past me with his head bandaged. Then General Venck approached me – a rising star at the headquarters with two staff officers. We talked about the situation on the Eastern Front in Russia. Engrossed in conversation, I almost missed Hitler, who emerged from a side door with Guderian. Hitler seemed to continue the conversation about the assassination attempt on his life as he complained about the unbearable pain in his side because of the concussion.
"But no matter, it's not easy to eradicate a weed like me," Hitler said, slightly smirking. "Thank God I'm alive and see the finger of destiny in my rescue." The last words were spoken somewhat louder to make those around him hear them. Then Hitler walked deeper into the bunker, where, presumably, his quarters were. That's all I can show about my last meeting with Hitler.
Stahel
Interrogated by: Senior Operational Investigator of the 2nd Main Directorate of the MGB of the USSR, Major Kopelyansky.